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Summary  
The municipalities are part of an overall emergency and risk 
management system in Norway. The municipalities have a sole 
responsibility for daily social welfare and safety at the local level. The 
Supervisory Authorities‟ (SA) tasks are to guide and inspect how 
municipalities conduct emergency and risk management. The intention 
of the thesis is to contribute knowledge for improving the quality of 
municipal risk management. The main research question addressed in 
this thesis is: How does the use of different risk tools influence risk 
management in municipalities? The risk tools that are analysed and 
compared are Risk and Vulnerability Analysis (RAV) and Mini Risk 
Analysis (MRA).  
 
Part 1 
 
Part one covers the main research question and background, addressing 
the research as a whole and considering both theoretical and 
methodological issues common to the articles presented in part 2. 
Theories of planning, organisation and risk have given a wide variety 
of perspectives with which to examine the tools. Rational and 
communicative planning perspectives have provided a useful way of 
analysing the different approaches to municipal risk management 
revealed in the empirical material. In 1994, the Directorate for Civil 
Protection and Emergency Planning (DCPEP) made the Risk and 
Vulnerability analysis guideline (RAV), which is still a risk tool 
recommended for use in municipalities. RAV can be considered as a 
rational planning approach due to an underlying assumption of having 
an overview of all possible risks and their consequences. RAV is used 
within a top-down strategy, where the top management and experts 
conduct the analysis. The Mini Risk Analysis guideline (MRA), 
developed in Klepp municipality in 2002, is a risk tool made to fit a 
municipal context and is thus of interest to this research. MRA shares 
elements with a communicative approach. It is mostly used in a 
bottom-up strategy where the middle and street level bureaucrats in the 
municipal organisation conduct MRA as a tool for assessing daily risks.  
 
This is a qualitative study based on a case study design. The context is 
the municipalities Klepp and Time, who use MRA and RAV 
respectively. Klepp has developed MRA. Time uses the ordinary RAV 
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as recommended in the DCPEP guidelines. The risk tool is the case and 
phenomenon of interest. The main challenge in this research has been 
limited experience in the use of MRA since it is a new tool; on the 
other hand it has been valuable to follow the start of an implementation 
process. The use of two different risk tools is contrasted to be able to 
explain both similarities and differences.  
 
Comparing these different tools has shown different implications. RAV 
and MRA are suitable in different situations. RAV is most appropriate 
in long term planning and when making overviews of severe risks, 
whereas MRA invites involvement of low and middle level employees 
in collaborative assessment and handling of daily risks. The 
introduction of MRA seems to have filled a gap that has been lacking in 
traditional risk assessments.  
 
 
Part 2 
 
The articles are presented in part two. Each of the articles addresses 
part of the main research question.  
 
Article I compares RAV with MRA. RAV has a long term planning 
focus, concentrating on serious accidents. MRA has a short term 
procedural focus, concentrating on daily incidents. The findings show 
that the tools are complementary. They can provide a broader view of 
risk management if used in combination (A I). 
 
Article II is a critical analysis of whether different strategies in risk 
management have an effect in the municipalities of Time and Klepp. 
The focus is on the implementation process and how the different risk 
tools have, or have not, been assimilated thoroughly at all municipal 
levels. The main findings in both municipalities are mostly similar 
despite Time using RAV in a top-down risk management strategy and 
Klepp using MRA as part of a bottom-up strategy. Similar methods of 
risk assessment were found, even where the concepts of RAV or MRA 
were not known. These similarities can be explained by common safety 
regulations, professionalism and institutionalism. However, where 
MRA was used regularly, an increased systematisation and 
consciousness in risk assessment was reported. This article also 
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discusses the importance of implementing new tools based on already 
existing practice and knowledge (A II). 
 
Article III examines the Supervisory Authority‟s (SA) role. The SA‟s 
tasks are to guide and inspect municipalities in risk and emergency 
management. The municipalities have been trained in emergency and 
risk management by participating in exercises organised by the SA. The 
supervision has been analysed using rational and communicative 
planning perspectives. Time has been a passive recipient of SA 
guidance whereas Klepp has resisted readymade templates and 
inspections. Klepp has acted as a political body, contributing to its own 
solutions. SA and the other municipalities have gained knowledge of a 
new risk tool through dialogue, despite a difference of opinions (A III).  
 
Article IV examines MRA as an empowerment tool. MRA has been 
developed as part of proactive Safe Community work in Klepp. There 
have been many attempts to involve participants in local injury 
prevention in Safe Communities (SC), but SC research has focused on 
statistical injury registration. What is lacking is research in how to 
improve involvement of street-level workers in local health promotion 
and risk management. Empowerment in working processes is found in 
Safe Communities although it is sparsely mentioned in SC research 
literature. Empowerment theory and experiences from SC have been 
used to analyse MRA. The findings show how MRA can contribute an 
empowerment tool for injury prevention work and local risk 
management. 
 
In conclusion, RAV and MRA share the common aim of revealing 
risks, but use different methods. The use of RAV and MRA has 
different focuses. RAV focuses on catastrophes and crises, MRA on 
daily risks. RAV has a long-term planning focus, whereas MRA is a 
procedural planning tool, which considers risks in daily working tasks. 
In this way the different risk tools complement each other. The main 
research question in this research is: How does the use of different risk 
tools influence risk management in municipalities?  The different tools 
address different areas within risk management invoking different 
actions and addressing different issues. Combining both risk tools can 
be a way to increase the quality of risk management in municipalities 
because together they cover a wider range of risk situations than if one 
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tool is used alone. However, this relies on an adaptation of new tools to 
already existing knowledge and practice. If not, the new tools could 
easily be neglected in daily risk promotion. There is a need for research 
on how to optimise the combination of the different risk tools in order 
to solve the dilemmas found in risk management.  
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1. Background and problem 
Stories about risks and accidents appear daily in the papers. We live in 
a risk society where many risks are global and can affect everybody 
(Beck, 1992). Knowledge of risks and hazards is increasingly focussing 
on awareness of systemic risk production in addition to human failures. 
Systemic risks can be found in the interdependencies between 
economy, society and technological development (OECD, 2003). 
Handling such risks demands different perspectives and solutions. A 
societal safety perspective can contribute a broader context than that of 
single private enterprises. 
 
The focus on risks and accidents leads to a demand for public risk 
management, where mitigation, preparedness and efficient responses to 
crises are central. A continuous learning system is needed in order to 
manage new and emerging risks. There are many laws and regulations 
in risk management. There is a knife-edge balance between rules and 
regulations and peoples‟ belief in their own ability to handle risks. 
Focussing too much on regulations can have the pitfall of using too 
many resources in making rules and not fostering the ability of 
robustness in organisations and personal life (Adams, 2006, Clarke, 
1999, Power, 2004). It is the balance between the different stances that 
can be a dilemma. These are considerations to take into account when 
conducting public risk management.  
 
1.1. Risk management in public planning 
The hurricane in the northwest of Norway in 1992 and the severe 
flooding in the east of the country in 1995 highlighted a need for 
further development in risk and crisis management. There was an 
increased awareness of society‟s vulnerability. A Vulnerability 
Committee was established by the government to investigate the most 
critical areas in Norway (NOU, 2000). The main challenge was that 
emergency management was too fragmentary. The committee saw a 
need for further research into general „societal safety‟. This concept is 
defined as: „a process of applying scientific principles and practices in 
dealing with threats, dangers, risk, losses and other dynamic side 
effects of modern society. It aims to be a systematic approach to 
understand and respond to social problems such as accidents, 
emergencies, crises and disasters, both intentional and accidental‟ 
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(Olsen et al., 2007). Critical analysis of the administrative bodies from 
governmental to local level, revealed a need for better coordination. 
Although there has been a positive development in the municipalities‟ 
ability in crisis and risk management, there is a further need for 
integrating Risk and Vulnerability analyses (RAVs) in municipal 
planning (NOU, 2000). This will enable systematic prevention work. 
There is still a debate about making a statutory provision on emergency 
duty in municipalities. 
 
Another element in municipal risk management is less focus on 
everyday risks in municipal planning than on large accidents 
(Johansson et al., 2006:5, Nilsen and Olsen, 2004, Hood and Jones, 
1996:5). Traditional (Norwegian) risk analyses in municipalities focus 
on large events, rather than risks in daily services. The focus is on a 
long-term planning perspective rather than a procedural focus on daily 
work operations. Using a reactive rather than a proactive approach in 
risk management tends to focus on known rather than developing risks 
(Rosenberg, 2004).  
 
The municipalities are a central part of a national risk and emergency 
management system (Norwegian Parliamentary Bill, 2002). Risk 
management in municipalities is important, because this is often where 
risks occur and accidents happen. During extraordinary challenges and 
accidents, municipalities receive help from other institutions as 
described in Table 1, but the municipalities have a sole responsibility 
for daily social welfare and safety at the local level. The municipality 
organisation is multi-purpose, providing many different services from 
running kindergartens to building roads. This makes the organisation 
very heterogeneous, leading to challenges when it comes to risk 
management in the whole organisation.  
 
There are three main principles that are central in Norwegian 
emergency management: 
  
 The principle of Responsibility. Every agency has a 
responsibility for taking preventive measures, emergency 
preparedness and crisis handling. 
 
Background and problem 
  5 
 The principle of Equality. The organisation should be as 
similar as possible in peace, crisis and war.  
 
 The principle of Proximity. The crisis shall be handled at the 
lowest level possible. In practice this means that the 
municipalities have the primary responsibility for handling 
crises occurring in peacetime (DCPEP). 
 
These principles form a framework for safety work in society, both in 
preparedness and crisis handling. The municipalities have a central 
role, with responsibility for management and handling of local risks. 
When there is increased severity, other institutions will become 
involved. 
 
In Norway the Ministry of Justice and the Police are the head of the 
Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning (DCPEP). 
The directorate‟s aim is „to help prevent loss of life and to protect our 
health, the environment and material assets in connection with 
accidents, catastrophes and other undesired incidents in times of peace, 
crisis and war‟ (DCPEP homepage 2006).   
 
DCPEP is the national public authority for the Supervisory Authorities
1
 
preventive, emergency and response work. The task of the SA is to 
supervise and inspect the municipalities‟ ability to conduct public risk 
and crisis management. This way of organising shows how 
municipalities can be a part of systemic risk prevention (A III). Table 1 
shows the institutions of relevance to this study. The Supervisory 
Authority (SA) in Rogaland County has the responsibility to inspect 
and supervise the 27 municipalities in Rogaland. This study compares 
and contrasts the risk tools RAV and MRA used in the two Rogaland 
municipalities of Klepp and Time.  
 
                                                 
1
 In this study the term Supervisory Authorities (SA) is used instead of County 
Governor.  
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Institution  Purpose  
Ministry of Justice 
and the Police
2 
 
Political decisions about top-level aims and 
frameworks for crisis management. 
The Directorate for 
Civil Protection 
and Emergency 
Planning (DCPEP) 
To maintain a full overview of risks and 
vulnerability for society in general. The aim is 
to promote measures which prevent accidents, 
crises and other undesired incidents and to 
ensure sufficient emergency planning and 
management of crises and accidents. DCPEP 
provides information and advice, and carries 
out supervision of supervisory authorities and 
municipalities.
3
 
Supervisory 
Authorities  
Responsibility for coordination of regional 
crises, supervision, inspections of 
municipalities. 
Municipalities Primary responsibility for handling crises 
which occur in peacetime. Make RAV and 
emergency plans.  
 
Table 1 Norwegian emergency and risk management system 
 
1.1.1. Public risk assessment tools in Norway 
In 1994 DCDEP
4
 made a guideline for Risk and Vulnerability analysis 
(RAV) to be followed by the municipalities.  However there is no 
statutory provision. RAV is supposed to be used in „municipal 
emergency planning to give municipalities a tool for preparing a 
coordinated emergency response plan in the event of accidents and 
disasters‟ (DCDEP, 1994:4). A guideline from 2001 about systematic 
societal safety and emergency work in municipalities states the 
expectation that municipalities use RAV thoroughly in municipal 
                                                 
2
 Other departments are also included, but the department of concern in this study is 
the Ministry of Justice and the Police 
3
 The information is from DCPEP Internet 2006. www.dsb.no 
4
 DCDEP is the former abbreviation for the Directorate for Civil Defence and 
Emergency Planning. On 1
st
 September 2003 the name of the Directorate changed to 
The Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning.  
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planning (DCDEP, 2001). The risk tool RAV is also a part of a political 
aim to reduce vulnerability in society. In 2005, 67% of all 
municipalities in Norway had produced an RAV within the previous 4 
years (DCPEP, 2005).  
 
The analysis stage of the RAV guideline is presented here in order to 
explain the tool. The analysis stage consists of the following steps 
(DCDEP, 1994):  
1. Identify undesirable events 
2. Causes and probability 
3. Consequences 
4. Systematization 
5. Proposed countermeasures.  
 
A risk matrix is used to classify risks with regard to probability of 
occurrence and severity of the consequences. The example events in the 
guideline are mostly major accidents.  
 
 
Probability  
of events 
Very 
probable 
     
Probable 
     
Less 
probable 
     
Improbable 
     
 Unimportant Limited Serious Very serious Catastrophic 
 Consequences of events 
 
Table 2 Risk matrix 
 
The risk matrix is a foundation for deciding which risks to prioritise, 
and has a long term planning focus. In the RAV guideline  “Risk” is 
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defined as „the threat posed by undesirable events to people, the 
environment, property and essential functions and activities of society‟ 
(DCDEP, 1994:3).  
 
In 1998, Klepp municipality started work with a new risk and 
vulnerability analysis, the Mini Risk Analysis (MRA) as part of 
preparation for an application to be designated a Safe Community. In 
2002 the analysis had undergone testing and was published on the 
DCDEP public Internet site. Mini Risk Analysis (MRA) is a tool for 
mapping everyday risk and vulnerability (Klepp-Municipality, 2002).  
It gives an overview of dangers that can occur and identifies how to 
reduce or handle these if they do occur. It also allocates responsibility 
for preventing and handling accidents and is a way to make activities 
safer. 
 
The specific MRA method (Klepp-Municipality, 2002) 
1. Which activity/situation are we going to take into 
consideration? 
2. This is what we fear might happen. 
3. What must and should we do something about? 
4. What can we do to reduce the chances of these incidents 
occurring? 
5. What can we do to reduce the consequences if these incidents 
do occur? 
6. Evaluation. 
 
The MRA method has a here and now focus considering risk in daily 
work situations or leisure activities. 
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1.2. The research problem and purpose  
This thesis focuses on municipal risk management. The municipalities 
have official responsibility for the inhabitants in their area. To be able 
to lay the foundation for a safe municipality, different strategies and 
risk analysis tools can be used to make preventive efforts and a 
foundation for emergency handling. The study is limited to the 
employees in the municipalities. This means when using the term 
bottom-up strategy it does not include lay-persons and non 
governmental organisations. This is done to have a more limited design 
and to be able to compare the municipalities in a similar way.  
 
The newly developed risk tool MRA has not been studied before. By 
contrasting MRA with the traditional RAV, the differences and 
similarities between the two tools can be described and explained more 
clearly. Rational and communicative frameworks
5
 have been used as 
theoretical contributions for explaining the risk tools RAV and MRA. 
Other theories such as safety, organisation and learning theory have 
also been used to explain the tools. Although theory from planning has 
been used to describe the rational and communicative frameworks, the 
purpose is to illuminate the field of risk management with a focus on 
different risk tools. The field of risk research is here used in an 
interdisciplinary way; using theories from a wide range of fields can 
contribute to a generic insight rather than specific theoretical insights. 
The planning perspective has not been the major focus, but has been 
useful for explaining the differences in risk tools and the implications 
of these. The research problem is: How does the use of different risk 
tools influence risk management in municipalities?  
 
The purpose of this study is to contribute to knowledge about municipal 
risk management: 
                                                 
5
 Rational and communicative planning perspectives are used as labels. This may be 
misleading as both perspectives are rational, but use different rationalities. Another 
dichotomy, not used in this thesis, is instrumental versus communicative rationality. 
The rational planning label has its origin from Banfield and is therefore used here. 
The communicative rationality is described by Habermas. A further explanation is 
given in the theory chapter.   
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 To improve the knowledge of different kinds of risk tools and 
their advantages and disadvantages in the municipal context.  
 To improve the insight into which factors can be necessary to 
contribute to learning and local involvement in the municipal 
context.  
 To contribute knowledge for improving the quality of municipal 
risk management.  
Background and problem 
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1.3. The structure of the thesis 
This thesis is in two parts. Part 1 covers the research as a whole and 
considers common issues in the articles, both theoretical and 
methodological. Rational and communicative frameworks are used to 
analyse the risk tools RAV and MRA and explain the differences in the 
empirical material and the implications of the different risk tools. When 
the risk tools are compared, the Supervisory Authorities are included to 
further describe and explain how the municipalities participate in a 
national learning system for improving risk management. Involvement 
of the risk tools‟ users has been investigated through use of experiences 
from Safe Communities and using empowerment theory. Different 
challenges in municipal risk management are discussed and a 
conclusion is given summing up the research. 
 
Part 2 comprises four articles: 
 
I. RAV is compared with MRA. Differences and combinations of 
the different tools are explained (A I).  
II. The use of top-down and bottom-up strategies is analysed and 
compared. Despite using different strategies, a pattern of 
similarities in use was prevalent (A II).  
III. Supervisory Authorities (SA) use rational and communicative 
strategies. Resistance against readymade templates in Klepp 
municipality has resulted in development of MRA. Through a 
communicative supervision approach, despite different opinions, 
SA and the other municipalities have learned about MRA (A III).  
IV. The challenge of how risk managers can supply a tool for local 
involvement in risk assessment is investigated using 
empowerment theory. (A IV).  
 
The articles contain a wider range of theoretical perspectives, a more 
in-depth analysis and discussion of the specific research questions 
raised in each of the articles, than in the more general part 1.  
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2. Theory 
This chapter presents the general theoretical contributions relevant to 
the theme. The research problem is: How does the use of different risk 
tools influence risk management in municipalities? This research 
problem gives some of the structure in this theory chapter. Some 
central concepts in the research problem will be in focus. Rational and 
communicative explanation frameworks are used in analysing both the 
municipal organisation and the different risk tools. Theory leading to 
the research questions will be discussed briefly. Each of the articles 
will give a more in-depth description and discussion of a wider variety 
of theories.  
  
2.1. Risk definition  
„The essence of risk is not that it is happening, but that it might be 
happening‟ (Adam et al., 2000:2). Therefore it is difficult or 
uninteresting to look at risks as an ontological entity, it is both 
„im/material‟ according to Adam et al. Examining risks from a factual 
or a socio-cultural dimension gives different implications according to 
epistemology (how we understand the world). Risk can be seen as 
material in the sense that risks have occurred and can be seen as 
positivistic facts. A traditional natural science definition of risk is 
expressed in numbers: „Risk is a result of the probability (frequency) 
and consequences of undesirable events‟ (DCDEP, 1994). These facts 
can give, for instance, a foundation for probability analysis of risks. 
Terje Aven of the University of Stavanger challenges this traditional 
definition. He defines risk together with insecurity. „Risk is a 
combination of possible consequences and associated 
insecurities‟(Aven, 2007:41). Instead of treating statistical probabilities 
as „the truth of risks‟, they should be regarded as numbers with 
incorporated insecurity which should be taken into consideration in the 
decision-making process.  Numbers do not include risk perception and 
political decision processes. Taking the immaterial stance into 
consideration, culture relativists see risks as constructs (Douglas Mary, 
1983), but constructs in themselves cannot harm people (a further 
debate can be found in the book Risk and Rationality (Shrader-
Frechette, 1991). The immaterial stance is connected to risk perception; 
how do people interpret and understand risks? A bridge between factual 
and socio-cultural positions takes both stances into consideration, 
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focussing on both statistical material and value evaluations as important 
when considering risks (Aven et al., 2004). Taking both experts‟ 
statistical knowledge and political and laypersons‟ risk perception into 
consideration when making decisions about risks, incorporates different 
positions in planning. 
 
In the philosophy of science there are similar considerations of risks. A 
need for a middle position between objectivists and relativists is 
outlined (Shrader-Frechette, 1991). This position is called scientific 
proceduralism: „There is an unmet need for placing ethical and 
evaluative weights on the risk evaluations, so that members of the 
affected public can choose how to evaluate risks they face….risk 
evaluations often exhibit only one type of ethical norms, those of 
utilitarianism‟ (Shrader-Frechette, 1991:194). Taking a pragmatic view, 
both objectivism and relativism in philosophy of science can be used as 
a framework to understand complex risks. The philosopher Bernstein 
sees a need for going beyond objectivism and relativism (Bernstein, 
1989). Bernstein uses Habermas‟s ideas about communicative 
discourse as a way to consider problems and confront them with 
different arguments. Communicative planning states that those affected 
by a decision shall have the opportunity to contribute their opinions in a 
dialogue. In this way utilitarian rationality can be confronted by ethical 
considerations where a consensus is an ideal. 
 
This research can be linked to a debate about risk in a rational actor 
paradigm and a need for a more dialogical rationality in safety research 
(Jaeger et al., 2001). The background for the need for dialogue was a 
one-sided focus on rational actor perspectives and utilitarianism, where 
social evaluation was lacking. A part of the debate resulted in a 
framework of risk governance developed by Renn, including risk 
management/risk analysis and how risk-related decision-making is 
carried out between actors (Renn, 2005). This is further described in the 
discussion.  
 
Hazards and risks are related but not similar concepts. „The term 
“hazard” generally denotes a phenomenon or circumstance perceived to 
be capable of causing harm or costs to human society‟(Hood and Jones, 
1996:2). Risk has a broader meaning. „[Risks] should not be restricted 
to the mere likelihood (probability) of an adverse impact but rather to “ 
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a combination of the probability, or frequency, of occurrences of a 
defined hazard and the magnitude of the consequences of occurrence” 
(Hood and Jones, 1996:3) This definition is used in this thesis.  „Risks‟ 
has a wide research area, covering technological, natural and societal 
risks. Some researchers are concerned about severe hazards and 
accidents. Others focus on „incidents of lower magnitude and higher 
probability (such as road accidents and accidents in the home) which 
may, nevertheless, have a larger absolute fatality rate‟(Boyesen, 1997, 
Hood and Jones, 1996). This study is about risk management in 
municipalities, focussing on risks that can happen at a local level and 
which municipalities have a responsibility to handle.  
 
2.2. Risk management 
Risk management is defined as „a range of related activities for coping 
with risk, including how risks are identified and assessed and how 
social interventions to deal with risk are monitored and evaluated‟ 
(Hood and Jones, 1996:7). Risks are different and this can have an 
effect on how risk management is conducted. Risk can be classified 
according to complexity. Simple risks, complex-, uncertain-, and 
ambiguous risk problems (Renn, 2005). Simple risks are easy to solve, 
ambiguous risks need to be handled in another way. The classifications 
of different risks can be managed using different strategies. An 
instrumental rationality can be appropriate when handling simple risks 
and where routines can be used to solve the risk problem. When risks 
are more complex, uncertain and ambiguous, a communicative strategy 
can be more appropriate (Renn, 2005). Ambiguous risks contain 
normative elements and including more participants can increase the 
ability to see risks from different views and take these into 
consideration when making decisions. Risk management can be a 
prescriptive strategy where experts provide risk solutions. Risk 
management can also be laying the foundation for creating deliberative 
forums for solving complex risk problems.  
 
2.3. Rational and communicative planning 
perspectives 
Two main normative perspectives have been used to analyse the 
findings in this study. These are the rational and communicative 
planning perspectives. Both perspectives are rational, but they have 
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different rationalities; „rational‟ rationality and communicative 
rationality. The terms instrumental or purposive rationality can also be 
used instead of rational rationality. I have chosen to concentrate on 
rational planning because analysis of Banfield‟s ideal planning 
prerequisites and the RAV guideline revealed many similarities. The 
label rational planning is found in Banfield‟s theory of an ideal decision 
and planning situation. I have chosen to use rational planning as a label 
and use communicative planning as a contrasting perspective. „In 
contexts of communicative action, we call someone rational not only if 
he is able to put forward assertion and, when criticized, to provide 
grounds for it by pointing to appropriate evidence, but also if he is 
following an established norm and is able, when criticized, to justify his 
action by explicating the given situation in light of legitimate 
expectations‟ (Habermas, 2004:15). In communicative rationality, the 
rationality is to find the best solution based on dialogue and common 
consensus reached by the stakeholders. The rational and 
communicative planning methods have been used as frameworks to 
explain the municipality as an organisation and to analyse the different 
risk tools. The risk tools RAV and MRA will be analysed later in this 
chapter. Examining municipalities from these different perspectives 
gives diametrically opposite results. These implications will be taken 
up in the discussion. 
 
The context of this study is municipalities. This research is limited to 
the municipal organisation; in this respect the employees working in 
the organisation.  
 
2.3.1. The rational planning perspective 
The foundation of the rational perspective can be found in Weber‟s 
development of action theory. The agent tries to realise intentions and 
purpose through actions. Weber‟s concern was to reveal the Western 
rationality. The transaction from a traditional to an industrialised 
society made upheavals in organising work. Work tasks were more 
specialised in industry, for instance in assembly lines. Accuracy, 
efficiency and the ability to follow rules became central. The 
development of efficient institutions was central to be able to develop a 
functional society with high material standards. Weber found that 
purpose rationality was central; „..the perspective is a utilitarian one, 
where the purpose of the action is to maximise those values that are 
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ranked highest by the actor, whether they are expressed by terms such 
as „utility‟, „self interest‟ or by way of some other concept‟ (Eriksen 
and Weigård, 2003:22). In the instrumental rational action typology; 
means, ends, values and consequences are prevalent. Only the 
description of the purposive rationality is covered in this study, 
although Weber has more action typologies (Weber, 1978). This is in 
order to present a purified rational perspective on an abstract level, 
which can be seen further in rational planning.  
 
Banfield is central in rational planning theory. A rational perspective 
presupposes a stable environment. Banfield has a natural science 
approach to planning.  The world (ontology) is predictable. Actors can 
be seen as rational actors with rational choices. „Planning is the process 
by which he selects a course of action (a set of means) for the 
attainment of his ends‟(Banfield, 1959:139). The normative ideal of a 
rational planning decision is: 
 
1. „The decision maker lists all the opportunities for actions open 
to him‟ 
2. „He identifies all consequences which would follow from the 
adoption of each of the possible actions‟ 
3. „He selects the action which would be followed by the 
preferred set of consequences‟ (Banfield, 1959:140). 
 
This is a normative model for decision-making. In the rational planning 
tradition, clear means and ends are prerequisites (Banfield, 1959). It is 
possible to get an overview of action alternatives and their 
consequences. There is a belief that the best solution will be chosen in 
the end. In the hierarchic organisation, the top level makes decisions 
and the lower level executes the tasks according to the top-down 
strategy. The rational planning ideal presupposes a harmonic model, 
where conflicts are minimised. This is the pure form of the rational 
planning perspective and it is hard to find all these elements in practice. 
 
It has to be stated that this perspective is a normative one. Banfield 
underlines that in practical life „these ideal criteria are hard to find in a 
purified form.‟ Rationality, as defined above, is less likely to be found 
in public than in private organizations. One reason for this is that „the 
public agency‟s ends often reflect compromise among essentially 
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incompatible interests‟ (Banfield, 1959:148).  Other theories have been 
developed in the wake of Banfield‟s purified rational planning 
perspective. Herbert Simon introduced the „bounded rationality‟, where 
it is not possible to get an overview of all possible consequences. He 
introduced the term „satisfice‟ which means satisfactory action rather 
than to be able to fulfil an ideal action (Simon, 1977).  
 
2.3.2. The municipality in a rational planning perspective 
Both Weber and Banfield‟s foundations in the rational perspectives are 
normative perspectives. Analysing municipalities using a rational 
planning perspective has elements from such a foundation. The 
municipalities and planning will be examined in this chapter. In a 
rational framework, the municipality can be seen as a bureaucracy. 
 
The ideal typology of a bureaucracy was developed by Weber (Weber, 
1976, Weber, 1978). The bureaucracy is seen as a rational institution to 
fulfil assigned tasks. A metaphor to describe this is a „machine 
organisation‟. „A machine is certainly precise; it is also reliable and 
easy to control; and it is efficient- at least when restricted to the job it 
has been designed to do‟ (Mintzberg & Quinn1996: 640). The classic 
bureaucracy is a hierarchical organisation, where the top level in the 
bureaucracy assigns tasks to the lower levels. In a classic bureaucracy 
the top level in the organisation uses a top-down strategy, where the 
lower levels execute the top level‟s decisions with no interference 
(further description is given in A II). 
 
The „ideal bureaucratic‟ institution has hallmarks of: 
 Legal authority 
 Accuracy, rapidity, clarity 
 Hierarchy (Weber, 1982).  
 
The management values are to be accurate, rapid and to be able to work 
as an effective bureaucracy. Rational planning in municipalities should, 
according to the theory above, lay the foundation for rational planning 
situations. This presupposes minimal conflicts and unified means. The 
top level manages the municipality with use of a top-down strategy, 
and the lower levels execute the tasks without any interference. 
Combining this perspective with risk management in municipalities 
gives a straightforward planning situation. Experts and the top level in 
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the organisation make an overview of the risks in the municipality. This 
oversight is exhaustive and all the consequences are known. The top 
level decides which risks should be prioritised according to severity 
and the lower levels execute the decision.  
 
2.3.3. The communicative planning perspective 
The foundation of the communicative perspective is Habermas‟ theory 
of communicative action (Habermas, 1995, Habermas, 2004). Speech is 
considered as action (Austin 1962,). „By this he meant that the use of 
linguistic utterances is a fundamental element in human interaction, and 
that social conditions are to a great extent formed and transformed 
through the use of language‟ (Eriksen and Weigård, 2003:38). The 
opinions that the actors contribute within a dialogue are central. In this 
theory there is a subject-subject relationship in planning in contrast to 
the subject-object relationship found in the rational planning 
perspective. Communicative rationality is procedural. „What is rational, 
then, is the opposition or claim which is supported by the weightiest 
arguments. A procedural approach to rationality does not guarantee that 
we will arrive at the right answer in all cases, but it guarantees that we 
can continuously test the answers again if there is reason to doubt their 
correctness‟(Eriksen and Weigård, 2003:4).  
In an ideal speech situation:  
 Every interest has to be present  
 Everybody must be able to present his or her view  
 The best argument will be the basis for the consensus which the 
dialogic group will reach at the end of a debate.  
 
These elements are abstract and normative ones.  
 
There are critical remarks about the communicative theory due to its 
very normative foundation. Time pressure, power, and lack of influence 
are critical factors, which are not incorporated in the normative theory 
(Flyvjerg and Richardson, 2002). Thus using a normative framework in 
an analysis gives a tool to investigate similarities or differences from 
the normative ideal.  
 
In communicative planning tradition, Habermas‟ theory has been 
refined for more practical planning arenas. The communicative 
planning perspective describes decision processes as a dialogical 
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activity between involved participants (Healy, 1997, Forester, 2000). 
From Innes general experiences „..in communicative planning, 
information becomes gradually embedded in the understandings of the 
actors in the community, through processes in which participants, 
including planners, collectively create meaning‟ (Innes, 1998:53).  The 
procedural learning process is central. Both the inhabitants and the 
planners are in a dialectical process in order to reach a decision on the 
basis of mutual understanding. Not only the expert knowledge but also 
local considerations and political assessment are central in this process.  
 
2.3.4. The municipality in a communicative planning perspective1 
The municipality can have the role of partner and contributor in a 
dialogue with the Supervisory Authorities (SA). The SA has the 
responsibility for supervising municipalities in risk management in 
Norway. Risk management ability is trained and evaluated through 
both exercises and inspections. It is often perceived that governmental 
guidelines have little connection with the local reality (Clarke, 1999),  
which may lead to a wish for more contextual solutions. Instead of 
having an inspector role as is prevalent in a rational perspective, the SA 
can consider the municipality as a communicative partner where local 
considerations are seen as valuable in the field of risk management (A 
III).  
 
Examining the communicative perspective within the municipality 
reveals a need for a strategy where employees are included in assessing 
risks. A bottom-up strategy can be prevalent in this respect. The ideal is 
that there should be mutual interaction between the participants and 
everyone‟s opinion should be heard. The decisions should be reached 
through a dialogue where consensus has been achieved as a result of 
discussion between the different parts. The information should be based 
on many sources. Contextual factors and different assessments are 
important contributions in addition to those of risk experts. Different 
views shall be displayed and the aim is to achieve a mutual 
understanding through a procedural learning process. The 
                                                 
1
 The municipality is presented in a communicative planning perspective for reasons 
of analysis. In practice, a communicative perspective cannot be used as a label for the 
municipality as a whole but can be found in some situations.  The communicative 
perspective can be seen as an ideal. 
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management‟s responsibility is to lay the foundation to include the 
whole organisation in risk assessment and to be able to increase risk-
handling capacity.  
 
This description is normative and difficult to achieve in practice, 
because of inequality in power and resources. The possibility of 
achieving elements from the communicative ideal is defined by each 
situation. The findings in article IV show how some of the elements can 
be fulfilled in practice. 
 
2.4. Analysing risk tools using rational and 
communicative perspectives 
Risk and Vulnerability Analysis (RAV) and Mini Risk Analysis (MRA) 
are the risk tools analysed in this research. In 1994 DCDEP produced a 
municipal Risk and Vulnerability guideline (RAV). This was a 
template mapping risks according to their degree of seriousness. The 
risks in consideration were of interest at a management level, with a 
focus on catastrophes. In contrast, MRA is a locally developed tool 
made to fit a municipal context. MRA focuses on daily risks in work 
operations at an operational level. The aim is for street level workers to 
be independent in risk assessment and handling. The middle and top 
level also use the bottom-up strategy, but more sparsely. 
 
A common element in both RAV and MRA is the aim of mapping risks 
in order to take preventive measures and increase the safety of the 
municipality‟s inhabitants. However the risk tools have been used with 
different focus. RAV has had a focus on major accidents whereas MRA 
has a daily risk perspective where dialogue becomes important for 
learning and implementation. (Nilsen and Olsen, 2004).  
 
The analytical purpose of using rational and communicative planning 
perspectives is to describe and explain the different implications of the 
tools more clearly so that municipalities can select the most suitable 
tool according to the situation. The different tools are suitable for 
different situations. This is explained in further detail in the discussion 
and the articles. 
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2.4.1. RAV and the rational planning perspective 
The main intention with RAV was to make a tool to reveal risks in 
municipalities. It seems clear in the guidelines from 1994 that DCDEP 
considered the municipal institution as a rational bureaucracy. Jaeger et 
al describe formal risk analyses as an operational tool for the rational 
actor paradigm (Jaeger et al., 2001:168). A thorough review of the 
guidelines by the author, showed many similarities with Banfield‟s 
planning theory (Banfield, 1959). In a rational planning situation every 
choice and consequence is analysed, thereafter the best possible 
alternative is chosen. To a great extent the DCDEP supposed that the 
top level in the municipality would map risks. This would give a 
foundation for prioritising of measures to be implemented further down 
in the organisation. On this basis RAV has been connected to a top-
down strategy in municipal risk management.  
 
This strategy is usually based at the institution‟s top level. It is the top 
level administration together with experts, who make overview plans 
for the risk situation in the municipality. The focus is mostly on 
catastrophes and large accidents (Nilsen and Olsen, 2004, Johansson et 
al., 2006). Possibilities, causes and consequences are assessed and used 
as a foundation for prioritising which measures to execute (Banfield, 
1959). The assumption is that all factors can be described in an accurate 
and objective way. This complete overview will give an idea of what 
risks to meet. The analysis recommended by DCDEP is described in 5 
steps: „identify undesirable events, causes and probability, 
consequences, systemization and proposed countermeasures‟ (DCDEP, 
1994:7). Sources of information are mostly statistics, „expert‟ opinions 
and inspection reports, although local knowledge is also mentioned. 
The main impression of the guidelines is that they share many similar 
elements with the rational planning ideal.  
 
It is known within critical bureaucracy theory that strategies from the 
top level are difficult to implement at the street level. Factors like 
working pressures, too many and ambiguous goals and lack of 
resources are explanations of why new goals or strategies are not 
accepted by the street level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 1980). 
 
The objection to such rational handling of risks is that accidents often 
have an unpredictable course of events. Accidents can start to develop a 
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long time before they happen (Reason, 1995, Reason, 1997, Turner and 
Pidgeon, 1997). A crisis is often hallmarked by different phases; 
measures for reducing risks, emergency, crisis and recovery (Turner 
and Pidgeon, 1997). A too narrow focus on major accidents can hinder 
the prevention of small and emergent accidents (A I). These phases 
have different planning needs, including both long term and short time 
horizons. Both scenario planning and immediate crisis handling are 
important in order to cover the complexities of crises. 
 
The advantage of the rational planning embedded in RAV is an 
increased ability to prioritise the most severe risks. RAV is also used as 
a preparedness resource. The top level is also informed about risks and 
therefore can be more likely to give the financial and organisational 
support needed. A further description is given in article 1.  
 
A 5 year research programme on RAV (called ROS in Norwegian) was 
conducted from 1993 to 1997 (Norges-Forskningsråd, 1993-1997). 
Various governmental and research institutions in Norway contributed. 
The relevance for this thesis is research into risk and vulnerability in 
local communities (Norges-Forskningsråd et al., 1997). There are 
examples of RAV used in a nursing home and in municipal planning. 
Experiences from the nursing home show that RAV can be used to 
supply internal control and the quality management system. RAV is not 
entirely restricted to use at a management level; there are also examples 
of its use in medical operations in hospitals. In this study, however, the 
use of RAV has been found only in the top-level of the municipal 
organisation.  
 
2.4.2. MRA and the communicative planning perspective 
MRA is a risk analysis which focuses on prevention and handling of 
risks mostly at a low level. It is an adjustment of the ordinary RAV. 
The thought behind MRA is that employees, voluntary organisations 
etc shall be enabled to assess, prevent and handle their own risks in a 
systematic and conscious way. MRA is in this research mostly used in a 
bottom-up strategy, where employees at a low level are supposed to 
handle dangers. „The method is intended first and foremost for people 
in charge of other people‟s safety and welfare, either at work or in their 
spare time, but can also be useful when considering your own safety‟ 
(Klepp-Municipality, 2002:2). This study is limited to the use of MRA 
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within municipal organisations and does not cover leisure activities or 
voluntary organisations in order to achieve a design that allows 
comparison between Klepp and Time. 
 
When MRA is analysed in the framework of a communicative planning 
perspective, we find that the collaboration processes have many similar 
elements. One of the phases in use of the MRA method is to discuss 
every possible risk between peers. Every consideration is allowed in a 
brainstorming. The process of contributions should not be criticised. 
The following phase is to discuss prioritising the risks to handle. 
Everybody can contribute with his or her views. The ideal is to reach a 
common understanding, which makes it possible to reach a decision 
based on consensus. A further description of the MRA method is given 
in article IV.  
 
MRA can be linked to empowerment theory, where the focus is on 
locally developed solutions (Crawford, 1999, Day et al., 2000, Freire, 
1970, Lee and Koh, 2001). The hallmarks of empowerment are that 
people collaborate and have self-confidence in their own solutions. 
There are many critics of empowerment theory. Argyris writes that it 
can have a function as a leading star, as an ideal to stretch after, but is 
not easy to find in practice (Argyris, 1998). In article IV MRA is 
analysed using empowerment theory.  
 
MRA is a tool for preventing daily risk incidents. The aim for Safe 
Communities (SC) is injury prevention and health promotion. In this 
respect MRA can be used by SC participants as a practical tool for 
preventing risks. SC research is often presented as statistical charts of 
changes in injury frequences (Andersson and Menckel, 1995, Klepp-
Municipality, 2002, Lund, 2004, Timpka and Lindquist, 2001). What is 
lacking in SC research literature is how and why different strategies or 
tools do or don‟t work. The reasons for why participants are involved in 
the activities and why they are motivated have also little focus. There 
are many practical experiences, but these have not been sufficiently 
incorporated in the research literature. A further treatment of this theme 
is given in article IV. 
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2.5. Municipalities and risk management 
The municipal organisation has external influences from government 
which assigns many, sometimes ambiguous, tasks (Andersen et al., 
2002). The street level bureaucracy‟s ability to handle these tasks may 
not always follow a rational pattern. Street level workers are employees 
who; „interact directly with citizens in the course of their jobs‟ (Lipsky, 
1980:3), for instance teachers, social workers and community nurses. 
The street level bureaucracy is not always predictable because of 
ambiguous goals and impossible tasks. A municipal organisation has 
many different services to fulfil and is separated into different 
departments with different means and ends. This produces an 
institution with very little homogeneity. Brunsson introduces the 
concepts „talk‟ and „action‟ in studies of organisations (Brunsson, 
1989). He claims reforms often give great changes in „talk‟ (what is 
said to be done), but it is more difficult to trace changes in „action‟ 
(what is actually done)‟. Within critical bureaucracy theory it is known 
that strategies from the top level are hard to implement at the street 
level (Lipsky, 1980). Working pressure, lack of resources and many 
ambiguities in purposes/aims are explanations of why new strategies or 
aims are not admitted at the street level (Nilsen and Olsen, 2005).  
 
The municipal organisation often has many ambiguous goals and 
political tasks, decisions and duties to execute. A clear strategy can be a 
way to sort out what is relevant in the constant flow of information and 
demands. Strategic management can be seen in different frames of 
reference. There is a distinction between a linear environment, where 
cause and effects are clearly interlinked, and an environment that does 
not presuppose such causal relationships, regarding ambiguities and 
differences in views as a more appropriate description of the 
contemporary world (Stacy, 1993). These different environments affect 
how municipal strategic management can be conducted. A top–down 
strategy fosters a more stable environment, whereas a bottom-up 
strategy gives room for self-organising activities. „A strategy is the 
pattern or plan that integrates an organisation's major goals, policies, 
and action sequences into a cohesive whole‟ (Mintzberg and Quinn, 
1996:3). There is a major difference between strategic planning 
strategies and seeing strategy formation as a process. „The formal 
planning process repeats itself so often and so mechanically that it 
desensitizes the organisation to real change, programs it more and more 
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deeply into set patterns, and thereby encourages it to make only minor 
adaptations‟ (Mintzberg and Quinn, 1996:108). This is a strategy for 
managing stability. To craft a strategy „requires a natural synthesis of 
the future, present and past‟ and has a more procedural focus 
(Mintzberg and Quinn, 1996:110). 
 
Municipalities are multipurpose organisations with limited resources. 
Municipalities are similar to a loosely coupled system (Perrow, 1999), 
which interacts with external influences. Research on High Reliability 
Organisations (HRO) comes from technically advanced industries like 
the aircraft, space and nuclear industries. HROs are known for their 
ability to handle risks. HROs have many resources and are closed 
systems. HROs and the municipalities can never be similar but some 
organisational principles and experiences in risk prevention and 
management can be transferred from HROs to the municipalities. The 
concept of collective mindfulness is an organising principle that can be 
transferred to organisations with less serious hazards than HROs 
(Weick et al., 1999). Collective mindfulness is being preoccupied with 
failures, reporting deviances and reflecting about safety as an ongoing 
learning process. To use these principles in municipal risk management 
can increase the ability of handle and have an awareness of risks. A 
further explanation is given in article I. 
 
 
2.6. Implementation  
„Planning is a remedy to fulfil changes in organisational behaviour. 
When it comes to planning, the general experience is inertia in 
municipalities following governmental laws, regulations and 
recommendations (Olsen, 1994). Implementation takes longer than 
planned and there is little accordance with the content of the plan, the 
formulation of the plan and the recommendations given in the 
guidelines (Kleven, 1990). These are experiences also found from 
implementation in other countries (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973)‟2.  
 
                                                 
2 These excerpts are translated from Kjell Harald Olsen in the description of the initial 
PhD project.  
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However, research from Safe Communities shows that if participants 
are included early in the process of injury prevention, it is more likely 
that they continue the work after a project period is over. Therefore 
early involvement can be a remedy to fulfil implementation (Bjärås, 
1992). Other factors to succeed in implementation found in municipal 
accident prevention is that the top level supports lower levels, all levels 
in the municipality should be included, financial resources should be 
provided and safety matters should be included in both municipal and 
departmental plans (Boyesen, 1995). Knowing about the challenges in 
implementation can help the municipality seek for good examples in 
order to avoid pitfalls. Different levels can be used according to the 
implementation phase. When introducing new tools, the top and  
middle levels are often in focus at the beginning and the street level 
bureaucrats when the tools are used in daily work tasks (Mikkelsen, 
1999, Mikkelsen, 2000). 
  
In this study, rational and communicative perspectives are used to 
analyse the municipal risk management context. Although this research 
is on a local level, the research implications can be of relevance both 
theoretically and as an empirical example. The use of risk tools is 
analysed using both rational and communicative perspectives, the 
implications of which are described in the findings and discussion 
chapter. Using both perspectives in analysis includes both factual and 
socio-cultural perspectives and can give a wider background for 
decision making in risk management than within only a rational 
perspective. 
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2.7. Formulation of research questions 
According to the theory above there are different analyses of municipal 
risk management that are interesting. Throughout the study, the main 
dimension of the rational planning perspective and elements from the 
communicative planning perspective were used to analyse the findings.  
 
In the first article, the differences between MRA and RAV are 
investigated with regard to the rational and communicative planning 
perspectives. These perspectives are not so prevalent in the first article, 
since the pattern of both rational and communicative planning 
perspectives emerged in the research process, but the underlying 
thoughts will be found. In RAV the focus is on major accidents, 
whereas MRA has a focus on everyday risks. Different planning needs 
are uncovered using safety theory about the different phases in crisis 
development; combination of the two tools is discussed in the article. 
The research question is: How can a strategy for coping with daily 
small risk issues be a way to enhance the capacity to mitigate 
disasters?  
 
The second article is a critical analysis of whether different strategies in 
risk management have an effect in practice. Top-down and bottom-up 
strategies are analysed using strategic management theory. This article 
also focuses on the implementation process and sees how the different 
risk tools have or have not been assimilated thoroughly in all the 
municipal levels (top, middle and street level). The two municipalities‟ 
use of different risk tools is analysed. The research question is: How 
can practices be so similar, when strategies are so different?  
 
In the third article, supervision by the Supervisory Authorities (SA) is 
examined within the frameworks of the rational and communicative 
planning perspectives. The municipality can be either an executive 
body or a political body according to these perspectives. These 
different roles have learning implications. Criticisms of ready-made 
templates and a lack of contextually suited tools are examined. The 
main focus here is to see how DCPEP guidelines are understood and 
conducted in municipalities. This leads to the question: How does 
resistance against pre-designed national risk management standards 
influence learning between the regulator and the regulated?  
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The last article focuses on one municipality only. This examines the 
newly developed MRA using safety, empowerment and communicative 
planning theory. In order to achieve a collective mindfulness, all the 
involved workers need to be included in risk assessments on an 
ongoing basis. Practical experiences from Safe Communities are also 
related to the experiences in use of MRA. The question of concern is: 
How can empowerment be related to risk management and how can 
MRA strengthen an empowerment strategy in local health promotion 
and risk management?  
 
These questions will be discussed in the findings chapter.  
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3. Methodology 
Methodological questions will be discussed using a general theoretical 
description of a methodological theme followed by a description of my 
own research. The specific method of data gathering on an empirical 
level will then be presented. Finally, a consideration of this case study 
will be given. 
 
The main challenge when conducting this study has been the lack of 
experience in using MRA and to some extent also RAV. There is 
information about the extent of use of RAV, but no research on its use 
as a continuous risk tool in municipal plans. Since MRA is newly 
developed there was only limited experience with its use. It was 
therefore not possible to research MRA as an ongoing process over 
several years. MRA was a new phenomenon at the start of an 
implementation process. The empirical findings have been gathered 
using a case study strategy. RAV and MRA are contrasted in order to 
reveal differences or similarities.  
 
3.1. Case study as a research strategy  
According to Yin „a case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates 
a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially 
when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly 
evident‟ (Yin, 1994:13). The case study is suitable for research 
questions whose aim is to understand processes and behaviours because 
of the richness of data collected in context. The aim is to see how 
behaviour or processes are influenced by, or influence context. „The 
overall approach is similar- generally inductive analysis focussing on 
processes in their social context‟ (Hartley, 2004:323). Having a rich 
description of a context with a wide variety of variables can allow 
theory development to emerge through a process of linking theory and 
evidence and producing theory for a wider public. A case study can be 
of relevance when new and emerging processes are of concern. In this 
process, hypothesis generation and development of theory are of 
interest. New processes often need adjustments of theory, combinations 
of theory or a totally new theory as a framework of understanding for a 
wider public. This is because the aim is to learn more about the 
phenomenon in an ideographic way. Rich contextual descriptions 
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characterize case studies. The researcher has little or no control over 
the behaviour of the subjects in the study in contrast to experiments. 
 
A case study is not a method, it is a research design. According to 
Vaus, even if you choose other research strategies the method of data 
collection can be the same (Vaus, 2001:10). For instance, using 
experiment or longitudinal or case design, data collection methods like 
questionnaires, interviews, observation, analysis of documents and 
unobtrusive documents can be the same. What purpose the research 
shall serve is relevant to consider when choosing a design.   
 
A case study is not defined in the wake of its research methods, rather 
through its theoretical orientations. „Although a case study begins with 
only rudimentary theory or a primitive framework, the researcher needs 
to develop theoretical frameworks during the course of the research 
which inform and make sense of the data and which can be 
systematically examined during the case study for plausibility‟ 
(Hartley, 2004:324). The case study design is flexible and is able to 
handle changes in processes and to adopt planned but also developing 
theory.  
 
3.2. The choice of case as an inquiry design1 
When I decided to use a case study, there were some factors of special 
interest. The field to be examined, using MRA and RAV, was at the 
start of a process. Although the RAV guideline was introduced in 1994, 
there is little knowledge about how municipalities use RAV in their 
own planning processes. There have been surveys on extension, but 
there is a lack of research on how they are committed. The street level 
workers in the municipalities had a limited familiarity with the risk 
concepts used. This put constraints on the inquiry tradition that were of 
relevance to this project. Because of these facts it was not relevant to 
use a survey. Here was a new and ongoing process at the start of the 
study and asking street level workers about unfamiliar concepts is not 
suitable in a survey. Questions of interests were why they did or did not 
use the concepts and if they had some similar safety assessments in 
                                                 
1
 Inquiry design and research design are used synonymously as in CRESWELL, J. S. 
(1998) Qualitative inquiry and research design. Choosing among five traditions., 
Thousand Oaks, California, Sage Publication Inc. 
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their practice, which required a different inquiry strategy. In experiment 
design, the researcher has to interfere with the informants. Research on 
specific parameters and the subjects has to be performed on the 
designed research occasions. To research naturally occurring practice 
and not interfere, as in experimental design situations, implied use of 
another research strategy. The employees did not use the different risk 
tools on a regular basis. The risk tools were used or not used when the 
users found them relevant to their daily work. There was a need for a 
research design that allowed practice without interfering or without 
accelerating a naturally occurring process. However, being a researcher 
interviewing people may nevertheless have interfered in a limited way 
because the focus on risk handling might not have been so high if I had 
not been there. This is a dilemma known as the Hawthorne effect
2
 
where the researcher‟s presence at the work plant interfered with the 
research. Not having such regular contact with my informants may 
have lessened the interference, but would not have removed it totally.   
 
3.3. Building theory from case study research 
What is the purpose of the case study? Is it to test theory, develop new 
theory or to introduce propositions or possible middle range theory? To 
test theory it is necessary to have a fixed design. There have to be some 
known connections or relations in the theory that will be part of the 
design. Anthropologists have sometimes found new theoretical 
explanations of how natives organise or understand their lives. A new 
insight into a phenomenon can result in an entirely new theory or 
modification of an existing theory. Theory can also be used to analyse 
new fields of reference and to develop new propositions.  
 
In Eisenhardt‟s article about theory building from case studies, there is 
a roadmap of how a theory-building process can be carried out and how 
theory from case studies can be relevant in the larger context of social 
science (Eisenhardt, 1991). Some phases in the theory building process 
are as follows: 
 
                                                 
2
 The Hawthorne effect: an increase in worker productivity produced by the 
psychological stimulus of being singled out and being important. Elton Mayo 
experiment in 1927. Encyclopædia Britannica Online. 
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An ideal is not to be preoccupied with a strict theoretical framework 
when the research is starting. Although an a priori starting point, no 
theory, is desirable (Glaser and Strauss, 1999) this rarely happens 
because the insights we, as skilled researchers, already have, shape the 
research focus in some way or another. On the other hand, using the 
case study as a theory test may limit the awareness of emerging themes. 
„Although early identification of the research question and possible 
constructs is helpful, it is equally important to recognize that both are 
tentative in this type of research‟ (Eisenhardt, 1991:536). As the 
research process emerges, the initial research question sometimes 
changes or the research focus sometimes become clearer after gathering 
the data.  
 
Choosing cases in case study research is done on the basis of 
theoretical sampling to replicate or extend theory. Since the number of 
cases is relatively limited, the process of choosing is not done within 
the framework of a sampling logic. The results are not going to be used 
as extensive proof, but to present a limited context from which general 
theoretical implications can be drawn. This is presented further in the 
description about generalisation.  
 
When building theory, there is a continuous overlapping of data 
analysis and data collection. Flexible data collection gives the 
researcher freedom to adjust the data collection as the research 
emerges. „The flexibility is not a license to be unsystematic. Rather, 
this flexibility is controlled opportunism in which researchers take 
advantage of the uniqueness of a specific case and the emergence of 
new themes to improve resultant theory‟ (Eisenhardt, 1991:539). 
 
The amount of data found in the research is often overwhelming. To be 
able to make sense of all present data Eisenhardt presents two analysis 
models. Analysing within–case data and searching for cross-case 
patterns. A within-case analysis is a detailed writing up of each site. 
The aim is to know the uniqueness in each case. After this analysis has 
been done a search for cross-case patterns can be done. The aim here is 
to look for patterns. Are there differences or similarities or are 
categories/dimensions useful for analysing the cases? The cross-case 
comparison may find that there are similarities or differences in the 
cases.  
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Shaping hypotheses can be done in a two part process „(1) refining the 
definition of the construct and (2) building evidence which measures 
the construct in each case‟ (Eisenhardt, 1991:541). There is a constant 
iterative process between data and theory, to make the theory closely fit 
with the data. As a framework of understanding emerges, more 
evidence can be examined in a systematic way to strengthen or reject 
the findings.  
 
Theory building is often linked to existing theory, sometimes findings 
are confirmed in existing theory, other times analysis of data shows a 
need for adjustment or even totally new frames of explanation.  
 
Within-case and cross-case pattern analysis has been used in this 
research.  
 
3.3.1. Within-case analysis 
The within-case analysis helped to get a better understanding of the 
implementation processes in each of the municipalities. When 
analysing the findings there was a need to properly identify each 
municipality‟s risk management and use of risk tools. Did every level 
in Klepp or Time work with MRA or RAV respectively? The within–
case data analysis showed that MRA was found at all levels in Klepp; 
at the street level it was not used in community nursing, was used 
occasionally in schools and regularly in kindergartens. The findings in 
Time showed use of RAV at the top and partly at the middle level, but 
not at the street level (A II).  
 
3.3.2. Cross-case pattern 
Once the knowledge about each municipality‟s risk management was 
established, a cross-case pattern was searched for using thematic 
analysis of documents and interviews. Analysis of RAV guidelines 
showed a top-down strategy pattern founded in a rational planning ideal 
and explained by bureaucracy theory. The interview findings showed 
that RAV was done at the top-level and was supposed to be 
implemented further down in the organisation, something that had not 
occurred at that point in time. Later follow-up questions confirmed that 
RAV was not thoroughly implemented in Time. Analysis of MRA 
guidelines revealed a bottom-up strategy pattern. Interview analysis 
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supported this as it was supposed that people at the lower level should 
use MRA and try to solve problems at the lowest possible level. The 
patterns of top-down and bottom-up constructs were then used as tools 
for searching for differences (or similarities), and also for consistency 
in the patterns. Supplementary information gathering revealed that the 
cross-case patterns were not as black and white as originally thought. 
There was a mix of both similarities and differences (A II). 
 
3.3.3. What is it a case of? 
When reading about previous case studies it is clear what the cases are, 
but the process of finding them is often not straightforward. The 
empirical findings are often unlimited. Theoretical ideas can contribute 
to limit the evidence of interest. Theory (often vague) is a tool to sort 
out the empirical evidence that is needed in a case study. As a research 
tactic Ragin uses the term casing „to resolve difficult issues in linking 
ideas and evidence‟ (Ragin Charles and Becker, 1992:217). The casing 
can be done in several phases, from a conceptual narrowing of the 
research field to specifying a more specific focus when the evidence is 
gathered. Evidence is often too complex to understand, and theoretical 
lenses may help to see what is important. Even when the cases are 
found, the casing process continues linking ideas and evidence to find a 
proper match. As Stake defines a case study it „is both a process of 
inquiry about the case and the product of the inquiry‟ (Stake, 
2000:436). 
 
Presumptions often change when meeting the field and have to be 
adjusted (Flyvbjerg, 2003, Eisenhardt, 1991). „The initial identification 
of research questions and theoretical framework will work best where it 
is tentative - with a recognition that the issues and theory may shift as 
the framework and concepts are repeatedly examined against the data 
which are systematically collected‟ (Hartley, 2004:325). It is processes 
of inquiry where new insights might help to make different choices 
than originally thought which makes case study a flexible design to 
handle changes. 
 
In this research the case is risk tools. The risk tools RAV and MRA are 
contrasted to see whether there are similarities or differences, how they 
are implemented and what their implications are.  
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The choice of cases was based on the following information. The 
research theme was to see how the implementation process concerning 
risk management tools was interpreted and conducted in municipalities. 
This is a broad question and to be able to do empirical research there 
was a need to refine it. Through the pre-study (presented in the method 
chapter) I learnt more about risk management in municipalities. There 
were surveys on the extent of risk and vulnerability analysis (RAV) 
used by all municipalities in Norway, but there was a lack of research 
on what implications these risk analyses had in municipal risk 
management. At the local SA, a key informant told about Klepp 
municipality who had developed their own mini risk analysis (MRA). 
This was a unique practice in Norway. I wanted to find out if there 
were any contrasts in using either MRA or RAV. The municipality 
Time was selected on the background of „most different 
systems‟(Tranøy, 1993). The „most different system‟ is a strategy in 
choosing cases, where the phenomenon of interest is expected to be 
different. In this study the municipalities used different tools and I 
wanted to see if this had an effect in implications. Other factors were 
similar, like geography, number of inhabitants, industry, and risks. 
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 Klepp  Time  
Geography  Western part of Norway, 
coastline, 115 km
2
.  
Flat landscape 
Western part of Norway, 
182 km
2
. Flat and partly 
hilly landscape. 
Neighbour to Klepp 
Inhabitants  14 832 (year 2006) 14 800 (year 2006) 
Industry  Agriculture (80 km
2
.) 
industry, public and 
private services 
Agriculture (68 km
2
.) 
industry, public and 
private services 
Risk profile  Low risk profile.  
General risks arising 
from: 
 transport 
 health  
 social activities 
 agriculture 
 critical 
infrastructure  
Low risk profile.  
General risks arising 
from: 
 transport 
 health  
 social activities 
 agriculture 
 critical 
infrastructure 
Risk tools MRA RAV 
 
Table 3 Comparison of Klepp and Time municipalities 
 
Both municipalities have joined the same risk management training and 
exercises organised by the local SA. The difference is connected to the 
phenomenon risk tools. Within the strategy of „most different systems‟ 
similar factors in both municipalities are used to focus on the 
differences in phenomenon. In this study the phenomenon is different 
risk assessment tools, RAV and MRA.  It may be easier to find 
differences in the phenomenon when other factors in the municipal 
context of Klepp and Time are similar.  
 
3.3.4. Casing  
According to Ragins‟ use of the concept casing, the aim is to connect 
theory and evidence and use theory to explain the evidence. „Casing is 
an essential part of the process of producing theoretically structured 
descriptions of social life and of using empirical evidence to articulate 
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theories‟ (Ragin Charles and Becker, 1992:225 Ragins article). Casing 
is seen as a research operation. Some casing operations in this PhD 
research will now be described. 
 
Where there any differences in Klepp and Time regarding 
implementation of the different risk tools? This was the focus in A I 
and A II. The casing here was to see how municipalities conduct either 
RAV or MRA and find any contrasts. After the core interviews were 
conducted, a cross pattern was found through analysing interviews and 
documents. Planning and management theory gave insight into 
different strategies in implementation processes. These theories were 
used when analysing documents. The findings showed a top-down 
strategy using RAV and a bottom-up strategy using MRA. The casing 
was to look for differences. 
 
To be devil‟s advocate there was a need to have follow-up interviews to 
confirm whether different strategies lead to different practices or not (A 
II). The findings showed that there were a few differences but a lot of 
similar practices that were conducted despite the different strategies. I 
found explanations for these in bureaucracy and professionalism 
theories. Changes in bureaucratic institutions (here municipalities) are 
often difficult (Kleven, 1990). The different strategies may not have as 
strong an effect as supposed in the first research question; how can 
practices be so similar, when strategies are so different? (A II). Having 
a profession gives common education and similar skills, which may 
also explain why it can be difficult to implement new tools. Some of 
the professionals found they already had taken care of risks well 
enough and did not consider a need for new tools. The casing, 
combination of theory and evidence showed a pattern of mostly 
similarities (Nilsen and Olsen, 2005). This was a test to see what effect 
different strategies had. The assumption that different strategies would 
have an effect was not supported by the findings. Therefore there was a 
need for alternative explanations.  
 
The casing process concerns linking evidence and theory and also using 
theory to explain evidence. Looking for cross patterns (Eisenhardt, 
1991) is a tactic to try to find patterns in the data collected. Patterns of 
similarities or differences are often revealed when using this tactic in 
Methodology 
  39 
comparative cases. Sometimes both similar and different patterns are 
found when comparing cases.  
 
A brief introduction on reliability, validity and generalisation will now 
follow. This will be related to considerations in this case study after the 
method chapter. 
 
3.3.5. Reliability and validity 
Quantitative research 
There is a need for clarification of the concepts reliability and validity. 
These concepts were developed in the tradition of quantitative research. 
This is a brief description only, covering some main elements in order 
to present my own choices. In the quantitative tradition: „Reliability is 
fundamentally concerned with issues of consistency of measures‟ 
(Bryman, 2001). It means being able to replicate, for instance, an 
experiment or a survey. The exact procedure or method is used in order 
to give the same results, independent of the researcher. If the same 
results are found it is research that has reached high reliability. 
„Validity refers to the issue of whether an indicator (or set of 
indicators) that is devised to gauge a concept really measures that 
concept‟ (Bryman, 2004:72). In the quantitative tradition the research is 
often based on a huge number of samples. The results are often used to 
describe extensiveness.  
 
Qualitative research 
The use of the concepts reliability and validity varies in a qualitative 
tradition. Some researchers use reliability and validity more or less as 
in the quantitative tradition, some adjust the content of the concepts to 
fit the qualitative research tradition, and some researchers find these 
concepts not useful (Bryman, 2004:272). I will use the definitions of an 
adjusted version of reliability and validity as described by LeCompte 
and Goetz. They show problems with the concepts of reliability as 
adapted to qualitative research. The problem of using reliability in the 
quantitative meaning is „..,because human behaviour is never static, no 
study can be replicated exactly, regardless of the methods and design 
employed‟ (LeCompte and Getz, 1982:35). They show different 
solutions to this problem, for instance taking similar roles (as 
researcher) in ethnographic studies. Although their reliability definition 
„to the extent to which studies can be replicated‟ (op cit) is close to the 
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quantitative one, they reflect on in what way it is possible to try to 
achieve this ideal in a qualitative research tradition.  To be able to reach 
reliability in qualitative research is: 
 
 To be clear about the limitations of the work,  
 To relate it to the research design and use of methods,  
 To outline theoretical premises and defining concepts,  
 To use different information sources and to thoroughly describe 
how the data was provided  
 
These are some ways of trying to achieve reliability adjusted to 
qualitative research.  
 
Internal validity concerns: „do scientific researchers actually observe or 
measure what they think they are observing or measuring? „(LeCompte 
and Getz, 1982:43). Are the research findings authentic representations 
of reality? The threats to internal validity are when studying process 
and change. As time passes the respondents can develop new 
understandings of concepts, which can lessen the consistency in use of 
concepts. LeCopte and Getz give some advice on how to reach internal 
validity. To ensure internal validity in social research is to: 
 
 Test the informants‟ understanding of concepts in direct 
communication 
 Use rival explanations to test if there are alternative 
understandings 
 Collect data in a long time period to be able to understand 
changes 
 Do cross-informant interviews  
 Be conscious about observer effects 
 
Direct communication with the informants gives the possibility to test 
out their understanding of concepts to examine if there is mutual 
understanding. Using a rival explanation control can be a way of testing 
official understandings. To test the interview questions in another often 
similar setting, can reveal if the questions are relevant or not. The 
definition of external validity is used equivalently with the concept of 
generalisation and in what way the research has relevance for others. In 
a qualitative research tradition, the research has more of an ideographic 
Methodology 
  41 
concern; to learn more about the research problem in depth. There are 
often few informants and the results cannot be used as proof of 
extensiveness, although they can be used as limited generalisation 
(Williams, 2000). 
 
3.3.6. Generalisations  
The purpose of the research can be linked to generalisations. 
Researchers often want to share their research with others. How is it 
possible to make generalisations from case studies? Generalisations are 
usually connected to representations on behalf of high numbers of 
informants. The generalisations from case studies cannot be drawn 
from large samples simply because the numbers of cases are too 
limited. The field of interest is –„interpretivism to indicate those 
strategies in sociology which interpret the meaning and actions of 
actors according to their own subjective frame of reference‟ (Williams, 
2000:210). It is to make sense of the natural settings where the actor‟s 
actions and language occur. The aim is to get an increased 
understanding of a phenomenon that can be generalised. 
 
Generalisations can be considered from different frames of reference. 
The concept generalisation is often connected to natural science. As 
Williams explains, there can be three sets of explanations concerning 
generalisations in science.  
 
1. Total generalisations. ‘Where a situation S is identical to another S 
in every detail, for instance the law of gravity‟. Apples fall to the 
ground from apple trees everywhere. In social science such axiomatic 
laws like gravity do not exist because of the interpretative nature of 
humans. Hence, this is not appropriate in this study. 
 
2. Statistical generalisations. This is within a framework of sampling 
logic. „Where the probability of situation S occurring more widely can 
be estimated from instances of S‟. Probability sampling is often done in 
social science to be able to find statistical evidence. This is to prevent 
bias and all the sites have an equal chance to be drawn from the 
research population. Generalisations are done on the basis of 
extensiveness. This kind of generalisation is less relevant in this study. 
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3.  Limited generalisations. „Where aspects of S can be seen to be 
instances of a broader recognisable set of features‟. It is a kind of 
inductive reasoning, is a way of generalising everyday life and is 
interpretive research. (Williams, 2000:215 all quotations are from 
Williams). In this study this kind of limited generalisation is most 
relevant.  
 
Generalisations other than statistical generalisation can be made from 
case studies. It is not necessary to think about a case study in terms of 
statistical sampling. A case is a sample of one or a few and therefore 
cannot be representative in the meaning of extensiveness. Using a 
limited generalisation argument broadens the way in which 
generalisations can be made in social science.  
 
Within the framework of limited generalisation, social findings can be a 
basis for generalisation. Case study researchers often relate their 
findings to comparable cases and contexts (Bryman, 2004). This is a 
way to extend the understanding of similar contexts, phenomena, 
processes etc. found in other cases.  
 
The method described in the next chapter will be described on an 
empirical level, and then the whole research will be considered in a 
concluding chapter. 
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3.4. Method 
This is a description of how the data was gathered. Table 3 shows the 
details of data. A description of the methods used will then be 
presented.  
 
Year  Activity  Organisation Details  
2001 Meeting DCDEP Key information about BiS 
and general risk management 
and emergency work 
Seminar  DCDEP To learn about societal safety. 
Interview  Klepp Information from the project 
leader about MRA. 
Exercise  SA The municipalities trained at 
the topic of a hurricane. 
Observation 
Document 
collection 
Klepp  MRA documents to get 
background info 
SA Exercise, inspection reports, 
as background information 
about differences in risk 
management 
DCDEP Generic information in annual 
reports 
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Year  Activity  Organisation Details  
2002 Interview  Stavanger  
Municipality 
An interview with the 
emergency leader to get an 
overview of topics in risk 
management 
Interview Klepp To get further information 
about MRA process 
Test of 
interview 
guide 
 To test the validity of 
questions. An anonymous 
municipality.  
Talk  
Observation  
Time  Conversation with emergency 
leader and to be informed in 
meeting with executive 
committee information about 
RAV.  
Course  
 
DCDEP 
 
National course in municipal 
emergency management. 
 
Public 
Health 
Conference 
Klepp Participation when Klepp was 
designated as Safe 
Community. 
Document 
collection 
Klepp To get information about SC 
work. Letter with research 
confirmation.  
Time To get information of their 
RAV. Letter with research 
confirmation.  
SA Inspections reports about risk 
management in 
municipalities.  
DCDEP Annual reports 
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Year  Activity  Organisation Details  
2003 Core 
interviews 
Klepp and 
Time 
10 interviews in each 
municipality. The persons 
having the same position in 
both Klepp and Time.  
Additional 
telephone 
interviews  
Klepp and 
Time 
 
10 fulltime kindergartens and 
8 primary schools to find out 
extent of MRA. 1 teacher in 
both Klepp and Time to learn 
how they work with safety 
procedures.  
Inspection 
meeting  
Klepp 
 
To learn more about 
inspections. 
 
Internal 
meeting 
SA 
 
To have observation and learn 
more about reflections about 
supervision. 
Documents Klepp and 
Time 
Municipal plans, annual 
reports, area planning 
documents, emergency 
reports, inspection reports, 
material about risk and 
emergency management, 
crises plans. Information 
about exercises at SA. Traffic 
safety plans, political 
decisions concerning safety, 
injury statistics, health 
emergency plans, RAVs, 
MRA examples, safety 
procedures in schools and 
kindergartens. Examples from 
engineering department of 
safety and various papers 
about safety in the 
municipalities.   
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Year  Activity  Organisation Details  
2004 Interviews  Klepp and 
Time  
To have follow-up questions 
with the emergency leaders in 
each of the municipalities 
about SA exercises.  
Interviews  SA Two interviews to learn more 
about exercises and the 
supervision policy at SA. 
Interview  Klepp An interview with the council 
physician to see how injury 
prevention and SC was 
interlinked with MRA 
practice. 
Documents DCPEP Reports about municipal risk 
management and annual 
reports.  
SA Material about exercises. 
2005 Common 
interview 
Klepp Project leader and the council 
physician about SC and how 
this is linked to MRA. 
Documents Klepp Statistics about injury 
registration.  
 
2006 Information 
check 
DCPEP Facts about DCPEP, Klepp 
and Time 
 
Table 4 Overview of data gathering 
This table gives an overview of the data gathered. It holds a variety of 
methods; observations, different types of interviews and collection of 
documents. Since the experience in use of MRA (and partly RAV) was 
limited, a wide variety of information sources was needed to reveal the 
practice. In addition, telephone interviews were taken successively to 
ask questions of the organisations involved. These are not registered in 
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the table. Information from homepages and other varied sources have 
also been used. 
 
3.4.1. Pre-study 
When starting the PhD project there was a fixed research question 
about how municipalities implement BiS
3
. A pre-study was conducted 
in 2001 and 2002, through interviews, meeting, seminar and reading 
documents. The information gathered showed a lack of understanding 
of the concept BiS, it was vague and at the time there was little practice 
of BiS in the municipalities. At the local supervisory authority (SA) the 
same findings were stated through interviews and documents. Joining a 
national course about municipal emergency management (2002) 
confirmed that BiS was still too vague to be used.  
 
Key personnel in organisations or in the sites were of great importance 
in getting an overview of the research field. Therefore the pre-study 
gave valuable indications of which question(s) could be of relevance.  
At the SA I got information about a newly developed risk tool, MRA. 
As a result of the pre-study, the field of interest became the 
implementation and use of different risk tools in municipal risk 
management.  
 
An alternative research choice could be a one-sided documentary 
analysis with a rhetorical focus on the BiS concept. The overall 
consideration was, however, that the limited experience on the subject 
could lead to a lack of sufficient material for a doctoral study, so there 
was a need to change the original research question as a result of the 
pre-study. The revision was thematically from BiS to risk management 
where the use of different risk tools was prevalent. The focus was still 
on implementation and safety planning. 
 
3.4.2. Core study 
In the core study (in 2003), 10 people in each of the municipalities of 
Klepp and Time were interviewed using an open-ended semi-structured 
                                                 
3
 The initial title of the PhD project was: Process design and the effect of 
implementation - The planning process importance for prioritising BiS in societal 
planning. “Beredskap i Samfunns – planlegging ” (BiS concerns emergency and risk 
matters in societal planning. There is no equivalent concept in English.) 
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interview guide. The interview guide is in the appendixes. These were 
the positions in each municipality: One average politician, the chief 
administrative officer, chief executives of the health, education and 
planning/engineering departments, the emergency manager, and at the 
street level a community nurse, one school headmaster, one 
kindergarten manager and an employee in the planning/engineering 
department. They represent different political and administrative 
positions, ranging from top level management to people working as 
street level bureaucrats in the departments for health, education and 
engineering/planning. The main aim was to map their practical work 
with safety, knowledge and differences between the top and the bottom 
of the organisation. Interviews from these different levels could also 
show if the implementation had been done thoroughly in the 
municipality or only at the top level. It also revealed a need for further 
information. The aim was to see whether the street level had been 
introduced to risk tools or not. The interviews were recorded to be able 
to give exact quotations when needed. In addition, information was 
collected through available documents, observations in meetings and 
follow-up interviews. 
 
The interview guide had to take different municipal levels into 
consideration. The top and partly middle levels in the municipalities 
were familiar with the concepts or used the DCPEP or MRA 
guidelines; the street levels were not so familiar with the RAV and 
MRA concepts. Alternative safety concepts were used in their working 
situation. An important concern has been to observe how strategies 
from top management are implemented in the organisation. A case log 
from both Klepp and Time was written to have an overview of the 
interviews and to write down the experiences from the interview 
situations. 
  
3.4.3. Follow-up interviews 
The follow-up questions (after 2003) were developed on the basis of 
the core interviews. A need for more in-depth information and a more 
focused research on emerging themes were revealed in the analysis 
process. The follow-up questions were focused according to the 
different themes in the articles. To find out about the extent of MRA in 
Klepp, I interviewed, by telephone, the managers in all of the fulltime 
kindergartens and the headmasters of all of the primary schools, and the 
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leader of the health and engineering department. This was needed since 
the core interviews were limited. The supervision subject revealed a 
need for follow-up interviews with emergency managers in the 
municipalities and representatives from the SA. Since the last article 
focuses on MRA only, more follow-up interviews with the project 
leader and the council physician in Klepp were conducted to cover the 
theme about Safe Community. 
  
3.4.4. Document analysis  
The RAV guidelines were analysed using the rational planning 
perspective. There was accordance with rational planning ideals 
(Banfield, 1959) and RAV, as described in the theory chapter. The 
rational planning perspective is used as an explanatory framework for 
RAV in order to explain the hallmarks of the risk tool. Analysing RAV 
using the communicative planning perspective showed little accordance 
and thus that this perspective was not suitable as an explanation 
framework for this tool. A top-down strategy was revealed in the 
guidelines using management theory in the analysis (Mintzberg and 
Quinn, 1996).  
 
The MRA guidelines were analysed using the communicative planning 
perspective (a further description is given in the theory chapter). There 
was accordance in the procedural focus, the collaboration process and 
the seeking of consensus. Although some elements in the analysis have 
accordance with some hallmarks from rational planning theory, the 
total consideration of the MRA guideline showed a lack of coherence. 
Therefore the rational planning perspective was not considered 
sufficient as a theoretical explanation framework for MRA. MRA 
document analysis showed a bottom-up strategy way of thinking. 
 
3.4.5. General documents 
Documents were gathered from a wide range of sources ranging from 
governmental guidelines to safety plans in kindergartens. According to 
the different article themes, some quotations from documents have 
been used. This was done in addition to quotations from the interviews 
to be able to fill in supplementary and more detailed written 
information. The document gathering was also done to gain an 
understanding of the risk management field as a foundation for making 
relevant questions. 
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3.5. Considerations of this case study  
Now that both general methodology and concrete methods have been 
presented, it is possible to assess this study. The considerations in this 
chapter will focus on reliability, validity, generalisation and general 
methodical challenges during the research.  
 
The initial PhD project was changed because of little knowledge of 
BiS. This was due to the findings in the pre-study, which showed a lack 
of external validity. It was not relevant to do research on a subject that 
was more or less unknown in the municipalities and which had little or 
no experience at all. The BiS concept was unfamiliar, had little internal 
validity and was therefore difficult to research.  
 
One of the main challenges in this work has been studying the 
phenomenon MRA use that had limited experience when the core 
interviews were done in 2003. However, seen in relation to BiS, it was 
possible to do research on MRA because it was developed and had 
started trialling. Although MRA had been used in some areas before it 
was introduced in Klepp municipality as a totality, there were few 
examples of regular use. This has lessened the experience of an 
ongoing activity in this research, but has made it possible to follow the 
emerging use of MRA. This also gave insight into how a new tool is 
introduced into a municipality. It is the research question that makes 
implications for how research can be conducted. Since the subject of 
concern in this study was in its infancy, there was a need to explore 
what this limited experience was. This is a procedural way of research 
using a case study design in order to explore an emerging process of 
implementation and use of a new risk tool. RAV showed an uptake of 
68% in 2004, in all municipalities in the country. What was of concern 
in this study was to see how and to what degree the risk tool was 
implemented and used in the total municipal organisation. RAV is also 
used to in order to explain MRA in a comparative way.  
 
In all research it is important to know how the data was gathered in 
order to assess reliability. Social science research does not give 
replication logic as in most natural science research and experiments. 
As time passes, differences in experiences, new tasks and public 
opinion can influence the informant and the same questions that were 
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asked can be outdated or not give the exact same answers (Bryman, 
2004). In this study the data gathering is described in Table 3. 
Interviews were conducted over a long time, as there was gradually 
more learning and a need for further refinement of the data. The core 
interviews in 2003 gave an information base which was used to sort out 
what was of further interest to the study. Other information sources like 
document gathering and participating in meetings was done in order to 
have more sources that could secure reliability of the findings; in other 
words to see if the different data sources confirmed each other or if 
there were any discrepancies. Using documents was also a way of 
securing historical data and testing the memory of the informants. 
 
3.5.1. Interviews  
In what way is validity secured in the core interviews? Do, for instance, 
concepts used in the interview guide cover the experiences in municipal 
risk management and have those concepts relevance in other settings 
too? I wanted to see if the concept I asked about in the interview guide 
was credible for an external municipality. The questions to be asked in 
the interview guide were tested in advance. In the autumn of 2002 a 
chief administrative officer in a neighbouring municipality had a test 
interview and gave comments afterwards. This led to an additional 
question. 
 
Making an interview guide for the core interviews did represent some 
challenges according to internal validity. There were different levels in 
the municipalities to interview. The top level and usually the middle 
level were familiar with the risk concepts that were referred to in the 
interview guide. However, the street level needed to relate the concepts 
to their context. My experience from earlier work in a school 
department was valuable in order to ask similar questions in both 
kindergartens and schools. Similar concepts were found in community 
nursing and the planning/engineering department, related to the street 
level workers‟ own work experience. Neither of the informants in 
community nursing used the concepts RAV or MRA. For instance 
„assessment visit‟ was a concept used in both municipalities in 
community nursing, which has some similar elements to both RAV and 
MRA. Both overview of risk and considerations of proactive risk 
assessments were prevalent. The challenge of interviewing in the 
municipal organisation was that there was a wide range of different 
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services with different skills and professions and it was not a single 
purposed organisation with one common aim. Only interviewing the 
top level may have increased the internal validity, the consistency of 
concept understandings, but an aim was also to see if the lower levels 
in the organisation had implemented the risk tools RAV and MRA. Our 
assumption was that even if the street level bureaucrats did not use the 
exact same concept, there were similarities in practice. This was tested 
in article II. 
 
The main aim of the interview guide for the core interviews was to 
cover questions thematically, not to follow it slavishly. It was a semi-
structured interview guide. A description of the interview guide‟s 
intentions is presented in the appendixes. This is done to give the reader 
insight into the themes that are covered and the reflections about how 
to question the different municipal levels. The specific interview 
questions are also included in the appendixes. Making the interview 
guide available will give the reader insight into the considerations to 
make the guide as internally valid as possible to the different municipal 
levels. The core interviews are formulated widely because the aim was 
to learn more about an unknown field. Looking at this guide will show 
that the questions asked are a starting point. The follow-up questions 
are more specifically related to the different themes in the articles.  
 
The interviews were taped to be able to give exact quotations, when 
illustrations of different themes were appropriate. The interviews had 
mostly one to one and a half hours duration. This was in order to meet a 
criterion of saturation and give time for the informants to fill in other 
relevant information. The interviews were transcribed and used as an 
extended memory to ensure reliability of the findings. 
 
There was a parallelism in conducting the interviews. This was due to a 
comparative purpose. In both municipalities the same 10 positions were 
asked about their experience with the risk tools. This gave some insight 
in two matters: 
1. How the risk tool was implemented from the top to the bottom 
in each of the municipalities. The extensiveness of the risk 
tool in the organisation was then covered briefly and could be 
a basis for further data gathering.  
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2. If there were any similarities in use of the different risk tools 
across the different municipalities. Therefore the same 
positions in each municipality were chosen to have a 
consistent comparison foundation and to increase reliability. 
 
The reason for using a semi-structured interview guide was to be able 
to understand the respondents understanding of the themes raised. 
There were common themes that were asked in each interview, in order 
to gain an understanding of the different respondent interpretations. 
The semi-structured interview also laid the foundations for the 
respondent‟s own understandings and reflections that they raised. As 
more learning was gained, follow-up questions were asked in order to 
gather more data on the research questions raised in the articles.  
 
The questions in the core interviews were widely formulated and 
related to learning theory. Afterwards I could see that some of my 
presumptions about facilitating for learning and implementation in the 
municipalities were not so valid and there was a need for further 
revised theory. There was also need for follow-up interviews that were 
more focussed according to the emergent research questions that were 
raised in each of the articles. Those research questions were developed 
as a result of intermediation between data and theory. There was a 
change in some of the theoretical prerequisites because the data did not 
fit with the theory properly. New theory gave a better explanation 
framework, which increased the external validity (generalisation). 
 
3.5.2. Limited generalisation 
According to generalisation the theoretical explanation frameworks can 
extend use of theory or adjust theory.  The use of the concepts bottom-
up and top-down strategies has been theoretical lenses to describe the 
implementation of tools. The dimensions rational and communicative 
perspectives have also been used as theoretical frameworks. The field 
of risk management is an interdisciplinary field and combining 
different theories can broaden the understanding of the field. Theories 
of bureaucracy, institutionalism, risk management, learning, planning, 
safety and organisation have been combined in this research to 
contribute to a framework of understanding. The different articles focus 
on different aspects with the help of different theories. The theoretical 
lenses used in the study may introduce new ways of combining theory 
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and data. When starting the pre-study the focus was on learning theory, 
but as the research process continued I found that learning theory had 
only a limited explanation according to the data. Including different 
sources of theory seemed to give a better fit with the data and was a 
way to increase internal validity. A wide variety of theoretical glasses 
can contribute to different explanations of data. The theory helps shape 
the findings. Other perspectives may have been found in this material 
using other theoretical lenses, for instance a cultural perspective or a 
behaviouristic perspective.  
 
This case study can be seen as mostly limited generalisation. According 
to the limited generalisation argument case studies can be related to 
other comparable cases on the basis of the findings and what is known 
about similar contexts.  Here, the explanation and the implementation 
of different risk tools in municipalities is one subject of concern. The 
theoretical explanatory framework of different ways of handling risk 
management may contribute to new insight and to a reflection of own 
practice. This explanatory framework can have relevance for other 
municipalities, SA and DCPEP concerning learning about different risk 
tools and their implications. A more general topic of interest can be 
implementing new tools in municipalities. What hampers or encourages 
the implementation can be findings of more general interest. A further 
treatment of generalisation is given in the discussion chapter.     
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4. Findings  
The theme in this thesis is risk management in municipalities and 
implications of the use of different risk tools. Each of the articles 
focuses on the research questions that were raised at the end of the 
theory chapter. The co-writer of the three first articles is my supervisor 
Odd Einar Olsen. An overall assessment of the relationship between the 
articles will be given, followed by an overview of the main findings.  
 
Article I 
Universal and contextual tools as a double strategy in emergency 
planning. 
Aud Solveig Nilsen and Odd Einar Olsen  
 
How can universal and contextual tools be a double strategy in 
emergency planning?  MRA and RAV are compared and combinations 
of the tools are examined.  
 
Article II 
Different strategies – Equal practice? Risk assessment and 
management in municipalities.  
Aud Solveig Nilsen and Odd Einar Olsen 
 
How can practices be so similar, when strategies are so different?  
RAV is used in a top-down strategy, whereas MRA is used in a bottom-
up strategy. Despite the different strategies there were many similarities 
in practice.  
 
Article III  
Resistance or acceptance? Mitigation strategies in risk 
management. 
Aud Solveig Nilsen and Odd Einar Olsen 
 
How does resistance to pre-designed national risk management 
standards influence learning between the regulator and the regulated?  
Because of resistance to readymade solutions, the SA has gained 
knowledge about MRA as a new way of handling risks. 
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Article IV 
Mini risk analysis – tools for empowerment in local risk 
management. 
Aud Solveig Nilsen 
 
How can MRA strengthen an empowerment strategy in local risk 
management?  
How MRA can be an empowerment tool to be used in injury prevention 
work and local risk management.  
  
4.1. The relationship between the articles 
The research problem in this thesis is: How does the use of different 
risk tools influence risk management in municipalities? The four 
articles cover different aspects of risk management in municipalities. 
These aspects are briefly:  
 
I. The differences and complementarities of RAV and MRA. 
II. The similarities in use, despite different strategies. 
III. The SA‟s supervision strategies, the relationship with the 
municipalities and resistance to readymade templates. 
IV. MRA as a practical empowerment tool.  
 
The findings in each article will now be described in more depth.  
 
MRA is a new risk tool and the implications of its use have not been 
analysed before. The rational and communicative frameworks have 
been used to explain the implications of both RAV and MRA. MRA is 
an alternative contribution to risk management, where the local level is 
in focus. RAV focuses on the top level in risk management and not the 
executive level. When comparing and analysing these different tools, 
the differences in implications are explained. Without a reflection on 
the use of different risk tools, the traditional RAV would not have been 
challenged. MRA can give valuable contributions of awareness and 
systematic risk handling at the street level and in people‟s daily work 
operations where risks can occur.  
 
In articles I and II, the main purpose has been to describe and explain 
MRA and RAV. Both risk tools have, in general terms, the same aim, 
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to map risks, prevent accidents and to reduce the severity if an accident 
should occur.  
 
In this study the use of RAV concentrated on severe risks, whereas 
MRA focussed on everyday risks. The tools have been used with 
different risk focuses which are relevant in different contexts. RAV has 
been used to obtain an overview of risks in a long-term planning 
context whereas MRA has been used with daily risk assessment in an 
operational context. 
 
The articles describe strengths and weaknesses of the different tools. 
The strength of RAV is that it gives a „total‟ overview of the risks in 
the municipality. This makes it easy to prioritise the most urgent issues. 
MRA has increased the systematisation of safety work in daily work 
operations. RAV is found mostly at the top level in the organisation and 
is not used at street level. MRA is lacking the perspective of long term 
planning.  MRA and RAV were found to have different implications. 
The tools are complementary rather than competing and use of both 
tools can strengthen mitigation and risk management.  
 
RAV is in this research used in a top-down strategy and MRA is used 
in a bottom–up strategy. The foundations for these strategies were 
found by analysing the RAV and MRA guidelines and also in how the 
different tools were used in practice. Although the different tools are 
used in different strategies, the findings show similarities in practice (A 
II). This was found to be due to professional norms and institutional 
structures. With some exceptions, where MRA is used regularly the 
users find that their work with safety has been more conscious and 
systematised (A II). RAV and MRA have differences in 
implementation in the organisation. RAV in Time is used at the top and 
sparsely at the middle level. At the street level, RAV is not used at all 
(2003). The intention was that RAV should be made in each of the 
departments and then further used in local services. This did not happen 
due to a major reorganising and lack of prioritising (A II). In Klepp, 
MRA was made to have a risk tool more fitting for a municipal context, 
in daily risk assessments. MRA is used thoroughly in the organisation, 
but in community nursing there was a lack of knowledge about MRA. 
In schools, MRA is used sparsely. Kindergartens and the 
planning/engineering department used MRA regularly (A II). 
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In article III, we have taken a step upwards and included the 
Supervisory Authority (SA). The SA‟s tasks are to guide and inspect 
municipalities in risk and emergency subjects. They are the local 
representatives for governmental institutions. A resistance to 
readymade governmental templates has been prevalent in Klepp. This 
was due to unsatisfying experiences with RAV and a belief in own 
solutions. Due to this background, Klepp has made its own tool, MRA. 
Klepp and Time have different roles in their relationship to the SA. 
Despite resisting inspections for several years, Klepp has contributed a 
new risk tool. Klepp has challenged the traditional solutions, resulting 
in a more procedural tool. Time has had an adaptive role following the 
template recommended by DCPEP. Rational and communicative 
supervision strategies are prevalent in the relationship between the SA 
and the municipalities. Klepp has been a contributor of solutions and 
the SA has taken this into consideration. Here we find elements of 
communicative rationality. In Time, which has had a more adaptive 
role, there is some familiarity with the rational supervision strategy. 
Where the municipality has a role of contributor, a more 
communicative dialog is prevalent.  
 
Articles I to III have focussed on the differences between MRA and 
RAV. The last article focuses on MRA only. This is to strengthen the 
explanation of MRA and I relate this tool to empowerment theory, 
safety theory and Safe Community experiences. MRA is a tool for 
involving people in local risk management. MRA has a unique focus on 
process and involving users in their own risk assessments. The MRA 
working process has hallmarks from empowerment and can be seen as 
a practical empowerment tool that can contribute to lay the foundation 
for the involvement of people, especially at the street level.  
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4.2. Summing up the findings 
 
Ministry of Justice and the Police 
The Directorate for Civil Protection 
and Emergency Planning (DCPEP) 
Supervisory Authority  
Municipal risk management 
strategies  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rational perspective Communicative perspective 
RAV MRA 
 Top level focus 
 Long term planning 
 External experts  
 Overview of major risks 
 Readymade universal 
template 
 Street level focus 
 Short term focus 
 Involve street level 
 Daily risk assessments 
 Contextual knowledge 
 
Main findings Main findings 
 Learning as a box 
ticking approach of 
known risks 
 Lack of involvement 
 Risks seen in relation 
to each other 
 Similarities in practice 
despite different 
strategies 
 Learning as increased 
awareness of ongoing 
risk 
 Empowerment  
 Too limited contextual 
knowledge of risks 
 Similarities in practice 
despite different 
strategies 
 
Figure 1. Main findings 
Top-down 
Bottom-up 
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Using the rational planning perspective has been fruitful for explaining 
the hallmarks of RAV. The RAV guideline and the rational perspective 
have many similar elements. On the other hand, MRA can be seen as a 
tool with elements from communicative planning. Examining these 
tools in the light of the different planning perspectives has revealed 
differences in implications.  
 
The different tools are suitable in different situations. RAV is 
conducted at the top level in the municipal organisation and used in 
long term planning purposes. The focus is on major accidents that can 
occur in the municipality. RAV gives an overview of risks, which 
makes it possible to prioritise the most severe risks to handle. External 
experts are often used in order to make an RAV. The readymade RAV 
is implemented in the municipality with use of a top-down strategy. 
The RAV is supposed to be used by all the levels in the municipality, 
but in this study this was not found. The pitfall of this rational planning 
procedure is that learning can be reduced to a box ticking approach. 
Instead of proactive risk awareness, there is a reactive handling of 
known risks. RAV is suitable for major risks, but lacks focus on daily 
risks at work. From 1994, RAV has been the governmental risk tool 
recommended by DCPEP for use in municipalities. The implications of 
RAV show limitations that can be challenged by the alternative tool 
MRA.  
 
MRA has a street level focus, where involving employees in daily risk 
handling in work operations is central. Findings show that experience 
with MRA has increased awareness about risks. The disadvantage with 
MRA is that it lacks a long term planning dimension. It has a more 
procedural planning focus. MRA is suitable for risk assessments with a 
short term focus, but is unsuitable when an overall assessment of major 
risks is needed. MRA has a contextual focus and is limited to daily 
risks in own work. MRA and RAV are suitable in different situations 
and can therefore complement each other.  
 
MRA can be a contribution to development in local risk management, 
introducing other perspectives than in the rational RAV. Analysing 
MRA showed similarities with empowerment theory. This could 
illuminate other sides of conducting risk management. Focussing on 
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involving, stimulating belief in own skills, risk assessments as an 
ongoing procedural activity and a focus on risks in daily work 
operations. Including these factors in risk management gives a broader 
view on how to manage risks. MRA can be seen as a practical 
empowerment tool to be used in municipal risk management. The MRA 
method has a communicative focus, where peers are supposed to 
collaborate in order to reveal and handle risks. Everyone‟s opinion 
should be present and afterwards a conclusion based on a discussion 
should be reached. The new elements in risk management here are a 
focus on the street level bureaucrats as important contributors to the 
municipal risk management system. A procedural planning focus, 
preventing and handling daily risks, is a supplement to a static long 
term planning method focussing on already known risks.  
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5. Discussion and contribution  
The aim of part 1 of this thesis is to examine common findings and 
main patterns. Part 1 gives a comprehensive presentation of 
methodology, something that there is often limited space for in articles. 
In part 2 the more detailed findings and discussion are presented in the 
articles. The overall intention of this research is to contribute 
knowledge for improving the quality of municipal risk management. 
The research problem is: How does the use of different risk tools 
influence risk management in municipalities? This thesis has examined 
two risk tools, RAV and MRA. These tools have different hallmarks. 
RAV has a long term planning perspective, focuses on large accidents 
and concentrates on a top level municipal analysis. The findings show 
that RAV is made primarily by the top and to some extent the middle 
level in Time municipality. MRA has a short term planning 
perspective, concentrates on daily risk assessment amongst employees 
(mostly street level bureaucrats) but is also a tool for the middle and top 
levels (A II). Rational and communicative perspectives were used to 
describe the main patterns of RAV and MRA. The frameworks have 
made it easier to see the strengths and weaknesses of the risk tools in 
different settings. In the rational planning perspective, the prerequisites 
of an ideal planning situation were used to analyse the RAV guideline, 
revealing many similarities due to an overview of risks and 
consequences and a hierarchical way of working (A I). Using the 
communicative planning perspective to analyse the MRA method 
showed similarities in that everyone in the work situation is involved in 
the risk assessment process, everyone‟s opinion should be heard and 
consensus is the aim for the end of the discussion process (A IV). The 
findings show different implications in use.  
 
There is a dilemma when making governmental guidelines for risk 
management for all of the municipalities in Norway. The guidelines 
need to be general, but general guidelines do not cover contextual 
factors in each and every municipality. The challenge for DCPEP and 
SA is to be able to cover both general and contextual risk management 
in order to give the municipalities different tools to cover both stances. 
The RAV guideline has its strength in making a grand overview of 
severe accidents; MRA has its advantage in making preventive efforts 
and risk assessment a daily work item. Where RAV has a long term 
planning focus, MRA has an ongoing planning focus. There are 
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different phases in accident development; measures for reducing risks, 
emergency, crisis and recovery are prevalent. These phases have 
different planning needs. The dilemmas to be found here are, for 
instance, making preventive risk efforts, but not being able to foresee 
every single risk that can occur. Another is making probability analyses 
based on known risks, but then new risks occur. There is a dilemma of 
predictability that is not often found in crises. Other strategies therefore 
need to be developed in order to be proactive and to handle unknown 
risks. RAV can contribute with an overview, whereas MRA can help in 
preventing and handling risks in everyday life. When focussing on day-
to-day low-level risks, the overview of severe risks is lacking. On the 
other hand, focussing on a long-term perspective and the use of 
statistics can lead to the daily risks being overseen. RAV and MRA 
therefore complement each other; it is not a question of either or, but 
that both tools are needed in order to consider all elements in municipal 
risk management. RAV has its strengths where MRA has its 
weaknesses and vice versa. 
 
Some of the foundation for the development of RAV is based in the 
Norwegian oil industry. Probability analyses are used in order to reach 
high reliability in high hazard organisations. This experience cannot be 
transferred automatically to other contexts without an adjustment. RAV 
is systematised in a chart according to probability (DCDEP, 1994). 
Reflecting on the RAV guidelines reveals some pitfalls about its 
transferability and suitability to cover the complexity of municipal risk 
management. The RAV guideline is general, but contextual factors are 
also needed in risk assessments. Language from experiences in 
technological organisations cannot be automatically used in a 
municipal context. Although DCPEP have adjusted RAV to a certain 
extent, the rational planning perspective is very prevalent. The 
municipalities are not rational bureaucracies, due to lack of resources, 
time demands and ambiguous ends. This study revealed criticisms of 
RAV because of lack of suitability for the municipal organisation 
(AIII). This was due to not taking into account the complex municipal 
organisation that does not act as an ideal bureaucracy and lack of an 
ongoing procedural awareness about risks in daily work.  A similar 
experience is found in health research where a petroleum-based 
reporting system was transferred to a health institution. The 
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terminology was unfamiliar and not properly adjusted to a health 
context (Høyland and Aase, 2006).   
 
To lay the foundation for risk assessment and handling in everyday 
work, the employees on site have to be included. They have contextual 
knowledge and experience in safety considerations due to 
professionalism and governmental guidelines (A II). In order to have 
both an overview and a procedural focus on risk, the top level in the 
municipality has to facilitate tools which make this combination 
possible. Implementing MRA has shown that this tool can be seen as an 
empowerment tool to be used in local risk management. It enforces a 
belief in own skills and ability in local solutions, due to the MRA 
method of working (A IV). 
 
The reorganisation of DCDEP to DCPEP in 2003 transferred some of 
the tasks to other institutions. MRA was moved to the Directorate for 
Health and Social affairs and their Internet site. The reason was that 
this directorate worked with Safe Communities and MRA was linked to 
this specific task. This is a traditional way of thinking, putting 
prevention in the tradition of health promotion work. To see prevention 
and risk management as two sides of the same coin could have 
strengthened a systemic way of preventing risks. To be able to handle 
daily risks may also increase the ability to handle more severe risks (A 
I). However, it was hard to find somebody in the Directorate for Health 
and Social affairs who had detailed knowledge of MRA
1
. They lacked 
ownership of MRA due to not being involved in the development 
process. DCDEP had given financial support to Klepp in order to 
develop the tool and was engaged in the process.  
 
Regardless of whether RAV and MRA are used in the municipalities, 
other methods of risk assessment are also prevalent. One of the main 
findings showed a pattern of similarities in practice despite the use of 
different tools and strategies (A II). Professionalism, similarities in 
work tasks and other governmental safety and health regulations that 
apply to all municipalities, were factors that could explain these 
similarities. To investigate safety work at the street level was a way to 
                                                 
1
 The Internet site of the Directorate for Health and Social affairs was under revision 
for more than six months. MRA was not available in this period. Several telephone 
calls also showed a lack of knowledge about this tool in the administration (2004).  
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challenge an assumption about differences in practice due to the 
different RAV and MRA methods. The challenge here was due to 
limited experience in use of MRA as an ongoing practice, since the tool 
was newly developed. On the other hand there is also limited insight 
into how RAV is conducted in municipalities, but there are surveys of 
extent. Revealing safety in working practices independent of the use of 
RAV or MRA, did show accordance with these methods. There was, 
however, an increased awareness and systematic thinking about safety 
where MRA was used regularly.  
 
There is a growing debate about risk and a need for communicative 
rationality (Webler, 1999, Jaeger et al., 2001, Renn, 2005). In a rational 
actor paradigm, societal context factors have been lacking (Jaeger et al., 
2001).  In the area of planning tradition there are many empirical 
examples of participative planning situations that have taken on 
problematic and complex issues (Forester, 2000, Healy, 1997, Reuter, 
2000, Innes and Booher, 2004). These experiences can also be of 
relevance in risk and participative discourses. Including societal 
contexts in risk management and a categorisation of risk-related 
knowledge is included in a new concept of risk governance. „Risk 
governance comprises a broad picture of risk: not only does it include 
what has been termed „risk management‟ or „risk analysis‟, it also looks 
at how risk related decision making unfolds when a range of actors are 
involved, requiring co-ordination and possibly reconciliation between a 
profusion of roles, perspectives, goals and activities (Renn, 2005:363). 
This research can contribute to the debate on governance due to the use 
of rational and communicative perspectives.  
 
5.1. Research contributions  
The implications of using the different risk tools MRA and RAV have 
been studied. The contribution is to improve the knowledge about 
different risk tools and their advantages and disadvantages in the 
municipal context. The use of MRA has not been studied (by an 
external part) before. There are implications from the use of this risk 
tool that can strengthen the assessment of risks in daily work operations 
at a lower level in an organisation. The MRA method encourages street 
level workers to assess and handle risks at their own level. It is a tool 
for strengthening the ability and self-belief and empowering workers to 
take care of risks in daily operations. MRA is procedural, enforcing the 
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ability of risk awareness as an ongoing activity. The experience in use 
of MRA is that it raises consciousness about risks and helps individuals 
to be more systematic in preventing and handling these. MRA can help 
organisations to lay the foundations for risk assessment and analysis in 
daily work operations, where the main focus is on the employees at the 
middle and street level (or laypeople). MRA is complementary to RAV. 
 
The implications of the use of RAV have not been contrasted with 
MRA in other research. This contrasting can contribute to an increased 
consciousness about the different implications of the tools. This study 
shows advantages and disadvantages with the different kinds of tools. 
MRA is a tool which has filled a gap that has been lacking when only 
using RAV. 
 
Since 2002, the Supervisory Authorities (SAs) have had a new risk tool 
MRA, to consider when giving supervision. Before 2002, only the 
RAV template was available. An alternative tool can be more 
convenient in some of the municipal services. This research can give 
insights to the SAs and DCPEP about the differences in use of RAV, 
MRA, or a combination of both. The use of MRA is fairly new and the 
implications of use can, through this research, give increased 
knowledge about MRA. This PhD research can give input to SAs on 
introducing MRA in their guidance of the municipalities. 
  
5.2. Practical implications for risk management  
 
5.2.1. Municipalities  
Research on High Reliability Organisations (HROs) shows patterns of 
how safety work performances can be reached. This HRO research is 
from high hazard organisations and contains elements from organising 
and cognitive sets of thinking, which can have relevance for other kinds 
of organisations. According to Weick, Sutcliff and Obstfeld there is a 
pattern of collective mindfulness that is found in HROs that can be of 
relevance for others (Weick et al., 1999). Some of these hallmarks are 
awareness and an ongoing focus on safety in working operations. This 
is a procedural way of working, focusing on safety assessments in 
working operations in here and now situations. In municipalities there 
are a wide variety of tasks and the organisations are not unified in their 
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ends and production as in HROs. However the collective mindset can 
be a way to reach safety in ongoing situations. MRA has some elements 
similar to the collective mindfulness: concentrating on the local level‟s 
ability to do their own risk assessments and handle risks on a local 
level. Using Weik et al‟s theory can be a way of explaining MRA and 
using it as an empirical example of how elements of collective 
mindfulness can be transformed into municipal risk management in 
order to reach an ongoing awareness about risks. The MRA way of 
working is also to empower people to believe in own skills.  
 
To build on already existing safety practices makes it easier to adopt 
tools. Examining routines and procedures can give an insight into 
potential for further knowledge development. Adjusting the risk tools 
to already familiar practice, can be a way of incrementally increasing 
systematisation and further strengthening the abilities in risk 
assessments.  
 
This thesis has shown different implications of the risk tools RAV and 
MRA. This insight can be a contribution to other municipalities in new 
ways of conducting their risk management. When the differences of the 
tools are made clear it is easier to choose the most suitable tool for a 
given situation. When planning and overview is needed RAV is most 
suitable; in daily risk assessments of work operations MRA is more 
suitable. Combining both risk tools gives a wider variety of risk 
assessments. 
 
5.2.2. Supervisory Authorities 
The different supervision strategies used by the SA are analysed in this 
research according to the rational and communicative planning 
perspectives. This difference in supervision strategies implies different 
roles. The municipality can be seen as an executive body or an own 
political body. The role of the SA can be as an inspector or as a 
collaborative partner. The analysis can give SA insight into its own 
role. There can be a dilemma between having the role of inspector or 
partner. The SA has the overall responsibility for guidance of the 
municipalities; this gives insight into how many of these conduct their 
risk management. This insight can be a way to benchmark quality in 
risk management where the different municipalities are seen in relation 
to each other. This insight gives an indication of best practice in 
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municipal risk management. An inspector role can be needed when 
assessing the overall quality of risk management in municipalities. A 
role of collaborative partner can be more suitable in learning situations 
and development of new knowledge. Dilemmas need to be considered 
in the light of the relevant supervision situation, there are no readymade 
solutions. However, insight into the different implications can make it 
easier to choose a solution. But it is also important for the SA to go 
beyond formal regulations and exploit existing routines, to be able to 
lay the foundation for further supervision.  
 
5.2.3. The national risk and emergency management system 
In order to reach a high quality of risk management, the municipalities 
need to be incorporated in an overall management system. In this way 
the different municipalities get the same tools and guidance in order to 
learn to perform better. This research has shown that both RAV and 
MRA are tools needed in municipal risk management. Including MRA 
in governmental priorities can be a way to enhance the capacity of 
ongoing risk assessments in municipalities. 
 
5.3. Themes for further research 
 
The intention in the RAV guideline from 1994 was, first and foremost, 
to strengthen the municipalities‟ ability in crisis management. As time 
passed there was also another expectation from DCPEP; to use RAV as 
a foundation in municipal planning and services (DCDEP, 2001). There 
are surveys on the extent of RAVs but insights are lacking on how they 
are used in the municipalities. It is not enough to make an RAV, the 
intention is that it shall also be possible to find this in planning 
documents and services. There is no statutory provision requiring use 
of RAV in municipalities in Norway. This has been an ongoing debate 
lately, but the use of RAV is still voluntary. For municipalities, 
displaying an RAV does not mean it is used in planning activities on an 
ongoing basis. DCPEP reports in 2006 that 64% of the municipalities 
do not use RAV in area planning
2
 and sees a need for improvement. 
There is a need to investigate how municipalities have included RAV in 
their planning processes or why they do not use RAV in planning.  
                                                 
2
 2006 Internet site about RAV www.dsb.no. 
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The use of MRA was in its infancy in 2003. It had been introduced to 
other municipalities but was barely used. This meant that there was 
little experience in the use of MRA. There is still a lack of experience 
about the use of MRA as a regular activity. The factors that encourage 
or hamper this way of working can be of interest. There is a need for 
further research on the use and implications of MRA from other 
settings.  
 
There is a need for research on optimising the combination of RAV and 
MRA. Using both tools covers more elements than using only one. 
Laying the foundation for the use of both tools in risk assessments can 
increase the quality of risk management. There is also a need to link the 
tools to existing knowledge and routines for informal risk assessments 
to build upon already existing knowledge and experience. There is a 
need for research on how to combine these different risk tools in order 
to incorporate the dilemmas found in risk management.  
 
In the Safe Community (SC) movement there are experiences with 
local injury prevention (Backe, 2003). These experiences are often 
presented in SC research as statistics showing figures explaining 
decreases, similarities or increases in injuries. There is a lack of 
explanation of the local working processes and what encourages or 
hampers such local involvement
3
. An empowerment perspective can be 
useful in this respect. MRA has in this research been characterised as 
an empowerment tool in local risk management where peers collaborate 
and are involved in the risk assessment process. Per Nilsen writes that 
further research is needed on why and how community-based 
intervention works. This should include social science in addition to 
natural science (Nilsen, 2006:15). There is a need to know how to 
supply and enable people on a local level to be involved with, and have 
an ongoing focus on, injury prevention.  
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 A Safe Community Conference was held in Karlstad Sweden in November 2005, 
where the theme was Empowerment. The author held a presentation about Safe 
Community and empowerment. It was the first time empowerment had been a main 
theme of a Safe Community Conference.  
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6. Conclusion  
The conclusion in this thesis is that a combination of RAV and MRA, 
rather than exclusive use of one of the tools, can increase the quality of 
municipal risk management. RAV has the pitfalls of not covering 
ongoing risk awareness and a lack of implementation at the lower level 
in the municipal organisation. MRA lacks a long term planning 
perspective and also a total overview of municipal risks. The different 
tools seem to complement each other. Where weaknesses have been 
found in the use of RAV, MRA could strengthen these and vice versa. 
RAV has its strength in a long term planning perspective and where 
risks are seemingly easy to detect. The tool is founded in a rational 
planning perspective, where ends and means are clear and where the 
best solution is chosen from all possible alternatives. RAV has been the 
tool officially recommended by DCPEP up to 2002.  
 
MRA is an alternative tool providing a procedural way of detecting 
risks, which enforces an ongoing focus on risk awareness. Enabling 
peers to analyse and handle risks themselves is a type of empowerment. 
Analysis of MRA has shown similarities with empowerment theory. A 
belief in one‟s own skills is central. MRA can be seen as an 
empowerment tool in local risk management since the peers collaborate 
and find local solutions. 
 
To have tools that lay the foundations for local involvement is 
important, because this is where the daily risks occur. In order to 
handle emerging risks that are uncertain, there is a need to build up 
resilience in the municipal organisation. Experiences and knowledge 
from research of High Reliability Organisations show that a cognitive 
attitude of collective mindfulness can be transferred and used in other 
organisations outside high hazard technologies. Some of these elements 
are found in MRA‟s focus on procedural risk preparedness, detection 
and handling.  
 
There is a dilemma in using general guidelines for specific contexts. 
Readymade templates may not have the ability to catch emerging 
signals of risks. A procedural focus and a more context-based tool may 
enhance the handling of locally emerging risks. Instead of “either-or” 
the effort is to find a suitable balance between general and contextual 
guidelines in risk management. Different situations require different 
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solutions. This research has found that MRA is complementary to RAV 
and include sides in risk management guidelines that not have been 
considered before. Without MRA, the traditional method of using RAV 
would not be challenged. Including both tools can increase the quality 
of risk management since more risk situations are considered.   
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concept of mini-risk analysis (MRA) as an additional strategy to cope with 
accidents and disasters in the local community. MRAs focus on daily risks 
and small incidents.  
The MRA argument claims that if the employees are accustomed to 
cope with daily incidents, this competence will enhance their capacity to 
mitigate disasters. Findings from two small Norwegian municipalities 
indicate that the MRA strategy is a complementary tool in emergency 
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1 Introduction  
Emergency planning normally focuses on the big unexpected events. According to the 
Norwegian Directorate for Civil Defence and Emergency Planning (DCDEP), a 
typical tool used by larger organisations to prepare for emergency situations is the risk 
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and vulnerability analysis (RAV) [1]. The basic planning concept in RAVs is most 
often a top-down rational planning process where potential threats are defined and 
optimal solutions to meet the threats are identified. The rational planning approach 
may, however, have some shortcomings in emergency planning [2–3].  
In this paper, we discuss the concept of mini-risk analysis (MRA) as an additional 
strategy to cope with accidents and disasters in the local community [4]. MRAs focus 
is on daily risks and small incidents. It is a bottom-up strategy where all employees in 
the organisation use the simplified MRAs in their daily work. A bottom-up strategy in 
safety work has been used in Safe Communities [5–6]. According to Weick et al. [7], 
efficient safety work relies on the concerns about safety issues among all 
organisational members. The problem discussed in this paper is to see how a strategy 
for coping with daily small risk issues is a way to enhance the capacity to mitigate 
disasters.  
2 The context  
In 1994, the Directorate for Civil Defence and Emergency Planning (DCDEP) in 
Norway distributed guidelines that local governments were supposed to follow in 
their mitigation and emergency planning. The guidelines for RAV analysis should 
equip local governments with the tools necessary to produce emergency plans and lay 
the foundation for resilient ways of organising the municipality. The guidelines rely 
on standardised planning tools and are attached to rational planning procedures. It 
represents a top-down approach focusing on more and less possible disasters. Up to 
2002, about nine of ten municipalities had produced an emergency preparedness plan 
[8].  
The municipality Klepp has about 14,000 inhabitants. The municipality is 
responsible for schools, technical infrastructure, healthcare etc. within its 
geographical area. The landscape is flat and there is no risk of flooding, avalanches or 
snow slides. In spite of this, the municipality has chosen to work with subjects related 
to safety. The concept of MRA has been developed in the Norwegian municipality 
Klepp. The municipality has recently been a member of the „Safe Communities‟. The 
MRA strategy is part of this Safe Community engagement and Klepp has received 
additional economic resources to develop and maintain this work. Klepp has received 
„The Emergency Prize‟ from DCDEP in Norway partly because of the development 
and use of the MRAs.  
Time, the neighbouring municipality to Klepp, has 13,500 inhabitants and has 
similar industrial structure, nature and risk scenarios as Klepp. Time has applied the 
traditional RAV as a part of the risk management and emergency planning. Apart 
from Klepp, Time has no additional resources available for emergency planning.  
3 Method  
In this study, ten persons in each of the municipalities of Klepp and Time have been 
interviewed using an open-ended semi-structured interview guide. They represent 
different political and administrative positions, ranging from the top-level 
management to people working as street level bureaucrats in the departments for 
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health, education and engineering/planning. The main issue was to map the 
employees‟ attitudes and practical work with safety. The interview-period was from 
January to April in 2003. In addition, information has been collected through 
available documents, observations in meetings and telephone calls. An important 
concern has been to observe how strategies from the top management are 
implemented in the organisation. The approach applied in this study, differs from 
former (Norwegian) studies where the focus have been limited to the top level in the 
organisations [9,8].  
4 Theory  
Emergency situations and planning needs  
Efficient emergency planning needs to cover mitigation, preparedness, response and 
recovery [10] In the pre-crisis stage (mitigation, preparedness), it is essential that the 
crisis management can have some scenarios about future crisis [11]. The scenarios 
can then guide the planned design of the crisis organisation, the allocation of 
resources for mitigation and resources to meet a crisis, planned communication 
channels, training of personnel, the drilling for roles, responsibilities and cooperative 
channels.  
Emergency planning in the pre-crisis stages often have some common features. 
First, it is normally very difficult to get political and administrative leaders interested 
in emergency planning before the crisis appears [10]. As a consequence, emergency 
planning receives low attention, resources and support. A next question is the 
inclination to focus on legal and technical aspects. This narrow focus tends to block 
for social and psychological aspects that are important to take into account in 
emergency planning [12–14,7] Turner puts the focus on the process leading to the 
accident [15–16]. According to Turner, accidents develop over time through a long 
chain of events, and should be viewed as the outcome of interactions between the 
human and the socio-technical system. Turner refers to the period where chains of 
discrepancies develop and accumulate unnoticed as the „incubation period‟ leading up 
to the accidents. One reason why such dangerous discrepancies can pass unnoticed is 
that the flow and interpretation of information about hazards are hampered by poor 
communication, ambiguous messages and cultural differences. Another reason may 
be that beliefs and norms among actors do not comply with the existing regulations. 
Reason explains organisational accidents as the combination of latent conditions for 
accidents, work place factors triggering failures, and active failures done by people at 
the wrong time [17–18,12]. Latent conditions in the organisation could be poor 
planning, inconsistent procedures, unclear responsibilities, and unfortunate workplace 
factors etc. All these aspects direct attention towards organisational and psychological 
factors as core variables in emergency planning  
During a crisis period, crisis decision-making tends to be increasingly centralised, 
give way to informal processes and improvisation, and technical and political experts 
may advance into decisional positions [19]. The volume and speed of the information 
flow increases, it becomes very difficult to control the information flow, and decision 
makers tend to pay more attention to the information source than the information 
provided. It may be very difficult for the decisions makers to redefine the situation 
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and they can easily get victims of groupthink [10]. To reduce uncertainty, they may 
supplement sparse and confusing information with analogous data and other 
experiences. All these processes are basically organisational and psychological 
processes generated in a situation of extreme collective stress [20].  
 
The crisis aftermath also contain some specific features making it difficult to go 
through a process of organisational learning and evaluation. People may want to hide 
their own failures, conflicts of power may arise etc. [21–22]. Ideally, emergency 
planning should take all these factors into account. In practice, this is very difficult. 
Not only because of the complexity and uncertainty facing all emergency planning 
[3], but also because the crisis management fails to design a planning process able to 
improve preventive measures, preparedness, efficient response and recovery. The 
impacts of a plan will often depend more upon the planning process and the actors 
involved in the planning process, than the written document itself [23].Taking into 
consideration all the well-known characteristics of a crisis, it is relevant to ask 
whether a comprehensive and standardised planning procedure is able to catch all 
these elements.  
5 The limits of rational planning in emergencies  
The DCDEP guidelines for RAV are based on a variant of the rational approach to 
planning [24]. One basic assumption in this theory is that the world is predictable. 
Another one is that it is possible to identify and agree upon clear and predictable 
means and ends, and that it is possible to get an overview over all alternatives and 
consequences of decisions. Hence, it is possible to choose the best solution to all 
problems based on total information and universal decision criteria. The instrumental 
planning ideal may work in a stable and predictable environment, facing simple and 
clear-cut problems. The pre-conditions for such planning are difficult to grasp when 
dealing with extreme uncertainty as faced in emergency planning [2].  
The Rational planning ideal applied in emergency preparedness is only possible to 
some extent [2]. A rational planning process may contribute to draw a map of the 
crisis management organisation, the acquisition of physical resources, a plan for 
communication and information, and some training of staff. The rational plan may 
point to the responsible actors, and give some guidelines for action in case of 
emergency. Clarke however, found that some emergency plans were pure fantasy 
documents with poor linkages to a real emergency situation [2]. The plans were 
rhetorical documents only useful to convince decision makers and the public that 
everything was under control. They suffered from weaknesses such as widespread use 
of analogous data and irrelevant experiences to describe a potential crisis, the misuse 
of calculations, focus on irrelevant but controllable factors as conditions for the 
planning, and doubtful assumptions about the functionality of a complex crisis 
organisation [2].  
It should be obvious that a rational approach to emergency planning as described 
by Banfield or even an approach taken the bounded rationality of decision-makers 
into account [25], will have some important shortcomings in the case of a real crisis. 
From an organisational learning perspective, Gherardi and Nicolini found that 
different communities of practice in the same organisation make their own 
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interpretation of safety matters [13]. They found that the „technical route to safety‟ 
containing rules and regulations, formal risk analysis, cost and benefit analyses etc, 
did not include social factors contributing to the understanding of safety matters. Thus 
emergency planning seemingly require some alternative planning strategies to 
increase the preparedness, and to mobilise people working in the organisation to take 
responsibility for safety issues.  
6 Some aspects of safety and learning in organisations  
High level managers, who often are the people responsible for the rational emergency 
planning, may be more prone to take risks than operators on the ground for two 
reason [26]. Due to their professional background (very often business administration) 
and their distance to daily operations, they may not fully comprehend the risks they 
are taking. The different levels of authority that are involved (or responsible for) 
safety issues, will often interpret safety issues in accordance to their own position, 
responsibility and knowledge. Thus, the information about hazards that are the basic 
input information in the rational planning process may be twisted and turned on its 
way through the bureaucracy. In worst case, the plan could as Clarke noticed, rely on 
wrong conditions. In addition, the incentive systems both in public and private 
organisations normally direct management attention towards efficiency and economic 
profit at the expense of safety issues [27–28]. If safety issues are not focused in daily 
operations, workers may take short cuts to overcome a hard work pressure, or make 
individual decisions without knowing fully the consequences for the safety situation 
in the organisation. Gradually, the organisation could move beyond a boundary of 
safe state of affairs [27].  
Some organisations are known for their ability to avoid serious accidents, and 
effectively contain consequences of a dangerous situation. Such high reliability 
organisations (HROs) have usually been studied within the nuclear industry, armed 
forces (aircraft carriers) and other high hazard industries [29–30,19]. Weick et. al. has 
tried to adjust the theory of HROs to other organisations with a „normal‟ exposure to 
hazards and risks [7]. The concept of „collective mindfulness‟ is used as the key to 
describe processes and characteristics possible to transfer from HROs to „normal‟ 
organisations [7].  
Within a concept of mindfulness, members of the organisations are constantly 
worried about failures, not about their successes. Therefore they encourage the 
reporting of failures and near misses as well as a collective analysis of the incidents in 
order to learn from them. This perspective is familiar to the „iceberg theory‟ 
developed by Heinrich in 1931, postulating a more and less fixed ratio between near 
misses, small accidents and big disasters [31]. According to this logic, it should be 
possible to reduce the number of big accidents if it is possible to reduce near misses 
and the number of small incidents [12]. These principles are still active in the Safe 
Communities movement [32–34].  
Furthermore, the concept of mindfulness emphasises the avoidance of 
simplifications in incident analysis because such shortcuts may reduce the 
understanding of accident processes. Multi-skilled teams look upon complex 
problems together to get a broader view on possible solutions. People talk together to 
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get different interpretations and to avoid automatic action. This learning process may 
enhance the capacity to have sensitivity to operations.  
The HROs also have a strong commitment towards resilience. The best-qualified 
employees should handle a crisis if it occurs, whatever formal position they may have 
[19]. It is important to respond adequately and not to follow procedures in a mindless 
way. Westrum have used the phrase „license to think‟ to illustrate this point [35]. The 
workers are empowered to contribute to practical solutions if a crisis occurs.  
7 The MRA approach: small steps towards great changes?  
The MRA approach relies on ideas close to „mindfulness‟ and organisational learning. 
The collective learning processes presuppose that people can contribute with different 
perspectives to get a broader view of problems, and learn about relevant solutions 
through direct or indirect experience transfer [36]. If a culture of mindfulness should 
flourish, it is important to establish systems of reporting, analysis and discussion of 
incidents, and to make all employees responsible for safety aspects in the 
organisation. Collective learning processes are normally presented in stepwise 
„learning cycles‟ inspired by the logic derived from the „Deming circle‟. Deming, as 
the father of the „total quality‟ movement, focused on the basic elements planning, 
doing, checking and acting as an ongoing process in any organisation aiming to 
improve quality [37–38]. Since the mid 1970s the quality movement and OHS 
(Occupational Health and Safety) management has gradually been merged [39]. In 
that respect, the MRA approach could be regarded as a continuation of a long 
development path within quality and safety management.  
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8 Comparing RAV and MRA analysis  
There are some main features characterising the two planning approaches when used 
in practice. Some themes are listed in Table 1 below.  
Table 1 The RAV and MRA compared  
 
Risk and Vulnerability Analyses 
(RAV) 
Mini Risk analyses (MRA)  
Level  Strategic  Operational  
Perspective  Catastrophes  Small events,  
Daily incidents  
Focus  Superior  
Universal  
Detailed  
Contextual  
Planning  Linear, plan  
Mapping  
Circular, process, catch signals  
Timeframe  Long term,  
There and then  
Short term,  
Here and now  
Management  Top-down  Self sustained  
Participation  Experts  Users  
Preparedness  Calculations as a decision tool for 
prioritising risks  
The precarious principle in all 
working processes, 
mindfulness  
Learning  Exercises, textbooks and rules of 
behaviour  
Practice in daily work  
Learning-by-doing  
The Risk and Vulnerability analysis guidelines [1] suggest that the planning process 
should be organised by the top management. Participants should be decision makers 
and experts to ensure ownership to the plan in the top management. The guidelines 
advise local governments to make an overview over all possible risks within their 
areas. The risk and vulnerability analyses should describe causes, probabilities and 
consequences. These factors should be systematised and proposals for the best 
countermeasures should be decided. The assumption is that all factors can be 
considered and described in a precise and objective way, and thereby provide a 
complete overview over threats, preventive measures and actions to be taken in all 
situations. The examples of crises used as illustrations in the RAV-guidelines include:  
 • floods  
 • avalanches  
 • hurricanes  
 • pollution of the drinking water  
 • explosions  
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 • breakdown in electricity supplies.  
They are all big accidents, supposed to be handled in a rational way based on a 
rational plan. This could be a doubtful assumption, due to the unpredictable character 
of risks and crisis.  
The Mini-Risk Analyses [4] is a simple mapping of everyday risks and 
vulnerability situations. Based on simple categories, both potential risks and 
preventive measures are identified. The use of MRAs is closely linked to the daily 
work or leisure activities. The planning process is adjusted to the local context and 
daily operations. The main participants are the users and the operators close to the 
potential hazard. Safety should be considered in all operations by using the MRA. The 
aim is that users and operators should improve the organisational awareness, follow 
the precautionary principle and implement preventive measures as an integrated part 
of their daily work. The MRA is partly a guideline for analysis, partly a tool capable 
to structure reporting and prioritise actions. It is an attempt to combine activities 
aiming to increase awareness and to contain everyday risk sources. The intention is 
also that the MRA should equip operators to conduct the simple analysis with a 
systematic approach to emergency planning. The differences in participation between 
the RAV and MRA approaches reflect the old discussion about participation in 
planning and risk management [40].  
9 The RAV in practice  
The emergency plan in Time is comprehensive, containing everything from 
responsibilities to warning chains and economic responsibilities. It is following the 
main principals for a crisis organisation recommended from the DCDEP. The 
municipality has made an overview of all anticipated risk factors. In the plan, several 
scenarios are developed and weighted in accordance to degree of seriousness. The 
most severe risks for human accidents they found were:  
 • traffic accidents  
 • lapse of electricity  
 • fire in buildings  
 • failure in the drain system  
 • industrial accidents.  
An example of the use of RAV is showed below and is about traffic accidents.  
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Table 2 RAV example of traffic accident  
 Humans Environment  Economic values  
Unimportant     
Limited   X   
Serious    X 
Very serious  X   
Catastrophic     
Note: The frequency of risks of traffic accidents is estimated to be more than one 
accident every year  
In 2002, the politicians decided to use RAV as a basic planning tool in all 
departments. The engineering and planning department also tried to include the RAV 
in the comprehensive municipality planning process. During the information-
gathering period (January to April) the other departments did not succeed in 
producing any RAVs. This was partly due to an ongoing reorganisation process 
causing new personnel in key management positions. It was only the emergency 
manager, the municipal doctor and the municipal legal practitioner that really worked 
with the RAV before the reorganisation started. They had external guidance from The 
Directorate for Civil Defence and Emergency Management. So the planning process 
became very vulnerable to organisational changes. Most important was the 
replacement of the person responsible for the emergency planning process. As a 
consequence, emergency planning got a low priority and some of the „organisational 
memory‟ got lost. The findings from Time show that the planners had „followed the 
book‟ during the emergency planning process. But after the final presentation of the 
plan, it was filed and forgotten. Since the new leaders also lacked experience, 
attempts to revitalise emergency planning became fragmentary and poorly connected 
to former efforts. The RAV activities in Time are anchored at the strategic level, and 
very little has been implemented in the departments on a lower level. The scenarios 
presented in the RAV were of a catastrophic and abstract nature that has been very 
difficult to adjust to an operational level. Even though the top management in the 
municipality is included in the work with RAV through the regular management 
meetings, only a few of them have training in risk and safety issues. The middle level 
management in the organisation is not familiar with the concept of RAV.  
Klepp has a long tradition in working with the RAV concept. A risk and 
vulnerability analysis based in a rational top-down approach was used in the 
department of education between 1992–1995. Accident scenarios where identified 
and the scenarios where weighted in accordance to degree of seriousness. This 
exercise made the department of education aware of potential risks within the sector 
and revealed the need for improvements. This experience was transferred to the health 
department when working out a preventive health work-emergency plan in 1998 [41]. 
The health department in Klepp used the RAV-guidelines from DCDEP, but adjusted 
them in accordance to former experience from the department of education. The RAV 
was made simple and user-friendly, but still the concept and approach remained the 
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same. Between 1999 until 2003 Klepp received external financing in order to develop 
the RAV. These efforts resulted in the concept of Mini-Risk Analysis.  
Klepp has made an overall and simplified crisis plan. It‟s main content is a 
planned crisis management organisation where different positions have been assigned 
to special responsibilities. The warning and mobilisation plan is converted into a 
mini-bank format card where the entire mobile numbers to the crises team and 
important emergency contacts are printed. This card has been distributed to the 
middle management level in the bureaucracy and is expected to increase the 
efficiency to handle a crisis should it occur.  
10 Some experiences with the RAV  
10.1 Time  
“We as politicians have just little knowledge about RAV.” (A Politician in the 
technical board). The different check-offs and considerations made in the RAV 
turned out to be almost impossible to understand for laymen and politicians. In that 
situation, it was hard to mobilise interest or enthusiasm about emergency planning.  
The transportation of dangerous goods was one of the scenarios that Time found 
to be relevant in connection with the work on a comprehensive RAV. The former 
emergency manager had been in contact with The Norwegian Pollution Control 
Authority to get information about transportation of dangerous goods, and he was 
deeply disappointed because they did not have a decent overview. “It is impossible to 
find out what dangerous goods are transported.” (Former emergency manager).  
One of the questions asked was how useful RAV is for Time municipality.  
“I think RAV is useful for us, but there is much that is not relevant. It is 
sometimes like filling in a betting slip. And it is distant from what we are 
doing in daily work. The most important is that we have started a process 
with to identify risks, and we have to think about the critical questions on 
the way.” (City manager).  
The Time administration see failures and challenges in their work with the RAV and 
are open about it. “We have made our first generation of the RAV, but it needs further 
adjustments and improvement”, (Former emergency manager). One main reason for 
the shortcomings is the theoretical approach to potential hazards and preparedness 
measures hardly tested in practice.  
10.2 Klepp  
“If we are listing up ten accidents that can happen, then it is the 11th that will come 
up.” (The former emergency manager). This expresses frustrations about using energy 
on plans that they find uninteresting and a waste of time. Instead of having plans that 
are useless because nobody knows them, Klepp try to integrate safety thinking in the 
daily work, which can make them prepared for unexpected events.  
The manager in a kindergarten in Klepp has earlier worked with the ordinary Risk 
and Vulnerability analysis. “I found it so distant, it was far away from my daily work. 
…RAV was of a catastrophic distinctive character. If we are used to safety thinking 
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through MRA in the daily life, we are better prepared to handle crises too.” (Manager 
in kindergarten).  
10.3 The MRA in practice  
The municipality of Klepp has a stable administrative top-management. The leaders 
in the department of health, education and engineering/planning have worked in the 
municipality for four to 14 years. Even though Klepp have had a reorganisation going 
on since 2002, the „organisational memory‟ did not get lost due to their experience 
and knowledge about the organisation. The long experience in using RAV and stable 
personnel are some resources that Time lack in their organisation.  
The local administration in Klepp realised after eight years of experience with the 
RAV that the DCDEP guidelines were too cumbersome, and based on planning 
procedures poorly adjusted to the daily routines in a complex and multi-purpose 
organisation. As a consequence, the local government started to develop the concept 
of MRA as a simplified alternative to the RAV analysis. One objective was to cope 
with daily incidents and bring the planning process closer to the operators in the 
„street level bureaucracy‟ [42]. The project of developing MRA aimed to introduce 
risk handling as a continuous way of thinking in daily operations and services. Some 
parts of the organisation use MRA as an ordinary planning tool, but the work with the 
MRA is not implemented in all parts of the organisation. Some of the street level 
bureaucrats had not heard about the concept, and Klepp has still a way to go 
implementing the planning tool in the whole organisation.  
The focus in the MRA is on a detailed and contextual level. The idea is that the 
workers should be trained in using MRA through daily operations. The strategy from 
the top management team is that people in the organisation dealing with the 
operational problems are best suited to mitigate and work with daily safety issues. 
The MRA is a continuous process and the Klepp administration finds it suitable in 
their organisation. This means that the top management may not have all the 
information about all thinkable risk factors in the organisation, but they have given 
the organisation a tool to use in mitigation and containment of potential crisis. But the 
MRA, as a common language in the organisation, is also used to report about safety 
problems and give managers an opportunity to catch updated information about risk 
factors.  
One example is the health department using the MRA analysis to document a need 
for increased staffing in order to prevent violence from patients. The situation was so 
threatening that some health workers where afraid of going to work. The simplicity in 
the MRA logic made it easier to communicate the problem to higher levels in the 
organisation and to the politicians. Used in this way, the MRA supported decision- 
making among politicians and made it easier to prioritise actions. The health 
department received additional resources in order to increase the staff.  
Another example of MRAs in use is when the kindergarten is going on a trip. The 
employees in the kindergarten have to analyse potential risks and prioritise actions in 
advance. Using the MRA as a guideline, they have to ask themselves what they can 
do to reduce risks and hazards, and also how they can reduce the consequences if an 
incident occurs. The employees are forced into thinking and planning in advance. If 
possible, they have to implement preventive measures. If not possible, the operators 
have to report the problem back to their superiors. They also have to clarify 
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responsibilities. Who is going to bring the first aid kit, take responsibility for 
transportation and bring mobile numbers to medical treatment and parents.  
One important goal by using MRA, is to include the precarious principles in all 
working processes. It is a way of learning by doing. In the kindergarten the manager 
finds it challenging to use temporary, unskilled, and young people. “Some of us have 
worked here several years and got the safety thinking in our backbone.” (Manager in 
kindergarten). Inexperienced stand-ins are only allowed to have a limited 
responsibility before they get proper training. In that process, the use of MRA 
contributes to improve the training given to new employees.  
MRA is found both on an operational and strategic level. The engineering and 
planning department has for instance used the MRA when rebuilding a creamery. The 
risk factors identified were linked to increased traffic, and preventive implemented 
measures were based on the MRA. The Mini-Risk Analysis is also used as a 
simplified tool in cross-sector planning sessions in the municipality. The departments 
of education, health and engineering/planning use MRA on a regular basis to develop 
different views on area planning and other cross sector problems.  
11 Some experiences with the MRA  
11.1 Klepp  
“We are more interested in involving the whole organisation, something is 
coming to happen but we don‟t know what or where. I am interested in 
having a mental preparedness in a way” (City manager). “We have applied 
a way of thinking where we do not want to focus on big accidents, but 
rather look upon the small crises that often occur” (Former emergency 
manager).  
As the project leader for MRA told in a newspaper: “We want to have more grazes, 
but fewer serious accidents”.  
The intention behind the Mini-Risk Analysis is to mobilise people to participate in 
different activities, increase awareness among all employees, and encourage 
employees to take more responsibility for safety issues.  
11.2 Time  
But why does Time not choose to work with MRAs? There were some different 
explanations. “We have a quality system that has similarities with the MRA, and 
therefore we have not considered using this kind of tool” (The planning department 
manager). He was working with a total quality system, and meant that this system had 
great similarities with the MRA.  
There was another meaning expressed: “We are not mature [enough] for using the 
MRA yet” (Former emergency manager). The emergency leader had the opinion that 
the risk consciousness should be more widespread in the organisation before the 
MRA approach could be introduced. He was supported by the city manager: “We 
have not worked as systematically as Klepp have done with these matters, and 
therefore we have not considered using MRA” (City manager). This is the quite 
opposite approach compared to Klepp, where the introduction of MRAs is expected to 
increase awareness and consciousness.  
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12 Strengths and weaknesses in the use of RAV and MRA  
The RAVs and MRAs approaches have similarities. Both approaches go through 
similar phases. Their main focus is on identifying risks and vulnerabilities, and to 
implement preventive measures. It is also emphasised that the analysis process should 
be a collaborative effort.  
The RAV reveals some risks and make it easier to prioritise the most urgent issues 
to handle. It is a tool that the top management can use to prepare long-term 
emergency plans for the municipal. The advantage of having the RAV at a strategic 
level is that the management in the organisation could be informed about risks, and be 
entrusted with the arguments necessary to allocate resources to improved 
preparedness.  
The scenarios in the RAV give ideas about recourses and personnel needed in a 
crises organisation. The emergency plan has a description of a centralised crisis 
management, standardised procedures to be followed and the distribution of tasks and 
duties in case of a disaster. It also contains a plan for warning, mobilisation of team 
members and information.  
The problem with the RAVs is that the emergency plan is mainly theory and 
hardly tested in practice. The planned crisis management members are too busy with 
their daily work and therefore rarely involved in crisis management. Some of the big 
accident scenarios identified in the RAV, also seem to be distant from ordinary work 
and therefore difficult to take seriously.  
The RAV is usually connected to at a strategic planning level. This means that the 
rest of the organisation is not included in the work with risks. The collaboration is 
limited to those at the top management level and experts. The RAV misses the 
process of how risks should be handled at the street level.  
In Klepp an internal evaluation indicates that the MRA practice [43] has 
contributed to systemise the safety work where it is used, and has increased the 
consciousness about safety issues among operators and users of different facilities. In 
addition, the use of MRAs make employees feeling more secure in the performance of 
daily work tasks and decisions related to safety problems at work [43].  
After a crisis, evaluations should be conducted in order to improve the 
organisational learning effects. Within the MRA approach, this is a continuous and 
ongoing process. The lessons learnt should be brought back to the organisational level 
with the hands-on experience, because the people responsible for daily operations 
should have the best opportunities to solve new problems. The strength is also that the 
MRAs represent a common language making it easier to communicate across sectors 
and professional boundaries. Through cross-sector collaboration it is possible to 
ensure that different views can be present and taken into consideration. The analysing 
process, however, presupposes a broad participation if the planning and analysis 
based on the MRA should be successful.  
When used by employees dealing with potential risks, and also used at a sector or 
even a cross sector level, the MRAs appear as bits-and-pieces risk and vulnerability 
analysis. A weakness is that MRAs only can be a partial foundation for an emergency 
plan in the organisation. In comparison with the ordinary RAV, the MRAs seem to be 
narrow-minded with a limited focus. It contributes to maintaining different views on 
risks and hazards in different communities of practice. The major pitfall is that MRAs 
may loose the comprehensive perspective necessary in a crisis situation, and also to 
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build a common understanding about identified risks and hazards throughout the 
whole organisation. Here the ordinary RAV has got its strength because the crises 
organisation is settled and the responsibility for operations and the overview of 
recourses have been prepared in advance.  
The development of the MRA has claimed a lot of time and recourses. If it were 
not for the external financing, the tool would not have been developed or used. “It is 
not a part of the ordinary work in the municipality. The mini-risk analysis is 
something that they (the local administration) have brought into the acquisition of 
resources as participant of the Safe community movement” (A politician).  
Klepp did not want to produce a comprehensive plan analysing all kind of 
scenarios as recommended in the ordinary RAV analysis. A major pitfall is that the 
MRA approach may be applied as an alternative to RAVs in situations were the two 
approaches are incompatible.  
The traditional RAV analysis seemingly has its strengths where the MRAs have 
their weaknesses and vice versa. The MRA perspective does not focus on the top-
level organisation and the preparation of a crisis management team. Street level 
bureaucrats in Klepp who are familiar with the MRA, had a limited knowledge about 
crisis management and resource mobilisation in case of a real disaster.  
On the contrary, the MRA approach has got the precarious principle as the main 
guideline in all daily work operation. The prevention of accidents is a continuous 
process. The MRA approach requires that persons responsible for daily operations 
have to think through potential risks and make a plan for how to handle it – before it 
occurs.  
The MRA approach is context specific and oriented towards practical solutions to 
operational problems, whereas the RAVs have a universal focus based on scientific 
analysis and calculations. The weakness in MRA is that it does not handle the long 
time perspective; it is more focused on „here and now‟. Klepp have tried to use the 
MRA in the planning activities and found it a bit difficult because of the short time 
perspective. The strong focus on simplicity and short-term solutions may lead to a 
neglect of comprehensive plans, standardised procedures, and a top management 
responsibility in case of emergencies. The combination of two different planning 
approaches and tools, do seemingly lead to a better integration of safety thinking in 
the municipality.  
13 Reflections  
It is a great challenge to make guidelines for RAV analysis that are relevant for 
different organisations. Such guidelines need to be general and universal, and one has 
to try to establish a similar practice in different organisations. The guidelines are 
given without taking into consideration local and geographical differences. Such 
guidelines are also unaware of the local efforts going on to cope with risks and safety 
issues. The RAVs set an ideal standard for implementation. This normally claims an 
instrumental way of thinking and the municipals become tools for implementing 
national standards poorly adjusted to the local context. They also claim an equal 
practice in every municipality, which can contribute to a more efficient emergency 
planning. Similar standards on local and national administrative levels can make the 
emergency planning more predictable and give clear frames of responsibility.  
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A procedural way of thinking takes the context into consideration. Instead of 
thinking of something fixed and ready, a contextual learning process concerning risks 
and hazards never finishes. This perspective is more connected to the Mini-Risk 
Analysis. Employees with „hands on‟ experience need to collaborate to develop a 
decent MRA. Instead of getting fixed directions, the aim is to get the precarious 
thought into „peoples head‟ in such a way that they use it in everyday working 
operations. The ideal is that people have got enough time to reach consensus after 
defining and analysing the problems [44]. Enough time, power (and resources), is 
always a constraint in almost all organisations [45]. Collaboration forums where 
representatives from different departments and levels in the organisation can meet and 
discuss risk scenarios from both a RAV and a MRA perspective may contribute to 
bridge the gap between the two planning worlds.  
14 Bridging the tools? Towards a double strategy in emergency planning  
A systematic bridging of the two planning tools has not been tested out. Still, several 
options for combining them exist. Data registered and analysed through the MRAs 
may be used as an input to a comprehensive RAV, covering all sectors and 
organisational levels in the municipality. This may enhance and improve the 
information flow from the bottom to the top-level in the organisation and contribute to 
the identification of specified risks. When using RAV and MRAs simultaneously, it is 
easier to harmonise the information and communicate it to all potential stakeholders, 
and not only to the experts. Data (risk identifications and measures taken) 
accumulated through all MRAs within a specific field, may constitute a unique and 
highly relevant database for strategic plans.  
The MRA already serves as a tool for increased awareness and understanding of 
risk issues among the street level bureaucrats. Consequently, the MRA is a good 
starting point to improve the understanding of the role and content of a RAV. This 
may enhance the legitimacy of emergency planning in the community and improve 
opportunities for presenting risk issues to the right organisational level and initiate 
participative RAV planning processes. 
The RAV plan, often describing the centralised crisis organisation and emergency 
resources on standby, has to be introduced to all organisational levels. Then the MRA 
users will know more about potential assistance in case of emergency, which in turn 
may improve their confidence in the top management capacity to handle crises. It is 
essential that the street level bureaucrats collaborate, because it is in these working 
conditions that most risks are developing.  
15 Conclusion  
The RAV and MRA approaches provide different contributions to emergency 
planning and safety. The traditional RAV analysis seemingly has its strengths where 
the MRAs have their weaknesses – and vice versa. If only one perspective is applied, 
important factors contributing to the reduction of risks and the containment of hazards 
may get lost.  
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The concept of „collective mindfulness‟ seems to be familiar with some of the 
basic ideas behind the MRAs. It is process oriented, focused on context specific 
analysis as well as participation from the employees with hands-on experience. 
Furthermore, it relies on collaboration within a framework of respect for different 
specialities and perspectives. MRAs contribute to mitigation, the increase of 
awareness and motivation among employees. The MRA concept, however, misses the 
overview and the centralised planning of crisis management much needed to prepare 
for disasters.  
On the contrary, the traditional RAV applies a top-down approach under 
estimating the importance of contextual knowledge, participation and personal 
experience in crisis situations. In a RAV approach, experts and technicians are 
supposed to solve the problems. The RAV approach does, however, not give much 
room for interpretation of local contexts.  
The main challenge is to combine the two approaches and methods. The problems 
faced are among other things to maintain the interest and engagement for safety work 
and resource allocations to conduct MRA and RAV analysis as parallel exercises. 
Furthermore, it is important to develop better strategies for mutual exploitation of the 
benefits from the engagement, awareness and participation mobilised through the 
MRAs, with the strengths of comprehensive strategies produced in RAVs. Instead of 
using time on „fantasy documents‟, the combination of RAV and MRA give an 
opportunity to utilise the resources already present in the organisation.  
Internet addresses  
The Internet address to DCDEP is www.dsb.no and it is possible to get an English 
version of MRA and RAV under the icon publications.  
www.safecommunity.net is about Safe Communities work.  
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Municipalities 
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1 
 
A study of two municipalities shows that totally different organisational 
strategies in risk assessment and management lead to very similar practices 
at the operational level. Klepp municipality is a member of ‘Safe 
Communities’ and works with a bottom-up strategy using ‘mini risk 
analysis’ (MRA). Time municipality has a top-down strategy based on a 
rational planning approach and uses ‘risk and vulnerability analysis’ 
(RAV). The implementation of MRA in Klepp started in 2000 and 
experience is growing. Some sectors adopt the tool more readily than 
others. Despite very different strategies both mitigation and preparedness 
practices and measures at the operational level are very similar in both 
municipalities. Similar rules and regulations from government shape a 
strict framework for safety management. Furthermore, professionalism 
among street-level bureaucrats is seemingly a more important guideline 
than organisational strategies in risk assessment and management 
. 
Key Words: Safety strategy; risk assessment; risk management; 
municipality; institution 
 
 
Introduction 
„A strategy is the pattern or plan that integrates an organisation‟s major goals, 
policies, and action sequences into a cohesive whole.‟ (Mintzberg and Quinn, 
1996:3). Municipalities have multiple sets of goals and policies to execute, and a clear 
strategy may help to identify priorities in the constant flow of information and 
demands. This also applies to the assessment and management of risk. Aven and 
Kristensen (2004) discuss how different perspectives on risk may lead to different 
mitigation and response strategies. The traditional „command and control‟ paradigm 
of strategies to mitigate and respond to accidents and disasters has been contested 
from different angles. Dynes (1993) argues that the most important input to such 
strategies should come from local communities, where people know the risks and 
potential hazards better than distant planners without local knowledge. Some authors 
argue that local self-organisation appears to be an efficient and rational response to 
crisis, and that people usually act in rational ways during times of crisis. Comfort 
(1990), Quarantelli (1998), Helsloot and Ruitenberg (2004) and Comfort et al (in 
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progress) support this view, and emphasise an important implication: that authorities 
should develop tools to improve citizens‟ response to risks and disasters. One way to 
strengthen the local capacity to assess risks and respond to unwanted incidents is to 
introduce concepts of risk assessment and management that build on the knowledge 
and experience possessed by street-level bureaucrats. 
Reports on emergency management in municipalities from the Directorate of Civil 
Defence and Emergency Planning (DCDEP) in Norway focus on the top 
administrative level (Directorate of Civil Defence and Emergency Planning, 2001; 
2002; 2003). These reports lack information about how safety strategies are 
implemented at the operational level. This study is about how the operational levels 
do (or do not) implement safety strategies based on different concepts of risk 
assessment and management. The „risk and vulnerability analysis‟ (RAV) model 
recommended by DCDEP relies on ideas from the rational planning ideal found in 
Banfield.s theory, where a top-down perspective is prevalent (Banfield, 1959). RAV 
is used to systematise the grand overview of risk factors in the municipality, and to 
prioritise preparedness measures based on calculations about probabilities and 
consequences. Experts are supposed to work out plans and top management is 
responsible for implementation. In this approach, organisations are seen as simple 
instruments for executing strategies formulated at the top level of the organisation. 
„Mini risk analysis‟ (MRA) is part of a bottom-up strategy in which the purpose is to 
reveal risks and implement appropriate measures at an early stage. This concept was 
developed as a response to shortcomings in the rational RAV concept. MRA is 
supposed to be executed in an ongoing process of preventing and handling risks „here 
and now‟, at the lowest possible level, and to be used at all levels in the organisation, 
the aim being to ensure that all employees use it in their daily work. MRA is supposed 
to be the core tool in mitigation, but also prepares employees at all levels in the 
organisation to respond in relevant ways if a crisis occurs. A further comparison of 
the RAV and MRA strategies is to be found in Nilsen and Olsen (2004).  
In our case study we examine Time and Klepp, two neighbouring municipalities of 
about 14,000 inhabitants each, located on the west coast of Norway. The landscape is 
flat and there is no risk of flooding or avalanches. The two municipalities have very 
similar industrial structures, transport systems and organisational arrangements, and 
are seemingly exposed to a very similar risk scenario. Time uses RAV and Klepp 
MRA strategies. Klepp became a member of „Safe Communities‟ in 2002, and in the 
same year received the „Emergency Prize‟ from DCDEP, partly due to its 
development of MRA.  
Given the two municipalities‟ reliance on totally different strategies for risk 
assessment and management, one would expect to find different practices. On the 
contrary, we found that the practical handling of risks and hazards in the towns is very 
similar. The question arises as to how practices could be so similar, when strategies 
are so different. In attempting to answer this question, we shall first look at theoretical 
explanations. 
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Theoretical framework 
Institutionalism 
Bureaucracy theories explain organisations as rational systems with hierarchical 
structures, defined divisions in labour and authority, and defined procedures for the 
execution of work tasks (Weber, 1982). Strategies decided at the top level are 
supposed to be executed in the rest of the organisation without hesitation. A basic 
assumption in the RAV strategy is that organisations function as the perfect 
bureaucracy.  
Lipsky gives a more descriptive and contextual picture: the street-level bureaucrats 
are for instance teachers and social workers, employees who „.. interact directly with 
citizens in the course of their jobs‟ (Lipsky, 1980:3). Lipsky‟s focus is on how street-
level employees work in practice and why there are so many discrepancies with 
expressed policies. Explanations may be that goals are often idealised, ambiguous, 
multiple and diffuse. The output could be difficult to measure in terms of goals, or 
because clients would have different needs. An insatiable need for more service 
provision combined with scarce resources is a dilemma that employees have to handle 
in their daily work. The street-level bureaucracies „may be asked to “trim the fat”, but 
never to reduce the quality of services or affect “vital programs” and “necessary” 
services‟ (Lipsky, 1980:39). Another characteristic is that talk and action are not 
connected: strategies produced at the top level, for instance, do not necessarily 
influence practice in the organisation (Brunsson, 1989; Røvik, 1998). Consequently, 
street-level bureaucrats need to take shortcuts to be able to manage their work tasks. 
Time pressure may also affect safety work (Lawson, 2001). These shortcuts could be 
institutionalised over time as part of daily practice, and transformed into more and 
less tacit knowledge (Brown and Duguid, 1991; Reason, 1997; Turner and Pidgeon, 
1997). Managerial decision makers will often have a limited understanding of risk 
issues, due to an administrative background (Rosness et al, 2002). They will often 
tend to pay attention to those processes and events that are easy to measure, and to 
take less account of intangible issues like successful safety work; this could be 
regarded as a dynamic process of non-events (Weick, 1990).  
By using Perrow‟s (1999) terminology as a metaphor, municipalities may be seen as 
loosely coupled and complex systems. They are responsible for the delivery of a wide 
range of services (health, education, transport, infrastructure, etc), and the complexity 
of their work tasks is combined with a widespread interpretative flexibility in the 
performance of those tasks. As in most service delivery, the coupling between 
different delivery sequences is very loose. All these factors contribute to a situation 
where it is difficult to discover or judge the consequences of deviations between 
strategy and practice. When organisations have similar structures and practices, 
DiMaggio and Powell (1991) argue that there will be a process of defining „decent‟ 
practices among institutions, and that this is connected to values and attitudes also 
present in similar organisations.  
The term institution refers to regulatory structures, governmental agencies, laws, 
courts, professions, interest groups and public opinion (Oliver 1991) that are able 
to exert pressure on organizations and their members. (Wicks, 2001:663)  
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According to Scott (2001) there are three pillars that can constitute institutions: the 
regulative, the normative and the cognitive pillar. The regulative pillar presents a 
rational actor model of behaviour, based on conformity and sanctions (Wicks, 
2001:664); this is an instrumental way of looking at institutions. The normative pillar 
concerns values, norms and role expectations among members in the organisation. 
The cognitive pillar is about self-constructed rules, meanings and identity. These 
pillars have usually been examined separately. Using the three perspectives 
simultaneously when analysing behaviour in an organisation Wicks found that this 
could broaden our understanding of the processes constituting institutions. As an 
alternative strategy to the „command and control‟ paradigm, Dynes (1993) discusses 
the importance of the community and street level in risk assessment and management, 
arguing that the local population and street-level bureaucrats often have an 
undervalued knowledge of mitigation, relevant responses to crises and recovering 
strategies. He can be interpreted as emphasising the importance of the normative and 
cognitive pillars in institutions:  
Rather than forcing people to fit some artificial plan, it is always more effective to 
use, as the planning base, the patterns of existing behaviour, which then can be 
adapted to the „new‟ situation. (1993:181)  
All these factors may explain why there will be deviation and inertia between top-
level strategies and practice „on the floor‟. But it cannot explain why the practice 
should appear similar when the strategies are totally different. 
Laws, regulations and professionalism 
The municipalities have obligations to both a central and a regional government 
concerning safety issues. Government rules and regulations are supposed to be 
implemented at the municipal level. Rasmussen and Svedung have developed a socio-
technical model that illustrates the complexity in risk management (Rasmussen, 1997; 
Rasmussen and Svedung, 2000). Figure 1 illustrates different levels included in risk 
assessment and management. The authors are critical of a traditional top-down 
management approach and of relying on a one-sided belief in what Scott labels the 
„regulative pillar‟. Rasmussen discusses the problem of interpreting laws and 
externally imposed regulations: „In consequence, rules, laws and instructions 
practically speaking are never followed to the letter’ (1997:187). Although laws and 
regulations may be difficult to implement in exactly the same way in all organisations 
and at all levels, they still play an important role in structuring work tasks and 
priorities.  
A description of the professional organisation can also explain why bureaucracies 
may react similarly to the same type of problems. According to Mintzberg, 
organisations can be bureaucracies without being centralised (Mintzberg and Quinn, 
1996). This happens when work tasks are complex and a great many decisions have to 
be taken in a short time. In many situations, a municipality may act as a professional 
bureaucracy: similarities in performance are connected to the competence that the 
professional employees possess:  
Many of the standards of the professional bureaucracy originate outside its own 
structure, in the self-governing associations its professionals belong to with their 
colleagues from other institutions. These associations set universal standards, 
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which they ensure are taught by the universities and are used by all the 
organizations practicing the profession. (Mintzberg and Quinn, 1996:659)  
When performing work tasks that are difficult to describe in detail, and when the ties 
to the profession are stronger than to the organisation, the professional employee may 
pay more attention to the professional norms than to a specific strategy implemented 
in the workplace (Malin, 2000). Professionalism based on knowledge, rules of thumb, 
values and role expectations seems to be closely connected to the normative pillar in 
institutions. 
 
Method 
It is a challenge to illustrate similarities in practice. If we look at written papers and 
material from both municipalities, it is easy to find that they have different strategies. 
It is more difficult to document similar practice, because most of it is not written 
down or easily available.  
Ten core interviews were conducted in each municipality, during spring 2003. The 
informants were picked at three organisational levels: 
 the strategic level: one politician, one chief administrative officer; 
 the tactical level: chief executives of the health, school and 
planning/engineering departments, and the tactical emergency manager; and 
 the operational level: one community nurse, one school headmaster, 
managers in kindergartens, and one employee in the planning/engineering 
department. 
Additional interviews were conducted with teachers, assistants in kindergartens, a 
municipal doctor and the project leader of MRA. In addition to the in-depth 
interviews with some of the operational managers, the rest of the headmasters and 
managers of kindergartens in Klepp were interviewed about the use of MRA. 
Supplementary information sources used were documents about RAV and MRA, 
municipal plans, annual economic reports, safety, quality and health, safety and the 
environment (HSE) manuals, and written materials on risk and safety regulations. We 
also observed discussions at political and supervision meetings concerning risk and 
vulnerability analysis.  
We have chosen to concentrate on community nursing, primary schools and 
kindergartens in both municipalities, although we also use some examples from the 
planning/engineering department. We do not focus on individuals, but on their roles 
present in the organisation. In that the study is a comparative one, some information 
at the micro level is lost, but there are better opportunities to compare different 
departments at an organisational level. 
 
Results 
A simplified version of Rasmussen.s vertical model has been used to illustrate our 
findings (Figure 1). The Ministry of Justice and DCDEP form a common framework 
to which all municipalities have to relate; the county governor supervises the 
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municipalities. emergency work. Klepp and Time are then treated individually to 
show their different strategies. The bottom-up strategy is partly implemented at the 
operational level in Klepp. At the operational level in Time, RAV is hardly used.  
 
Figure 1. Current emergency strategies and vertical management in the 
two municipalities 
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Municipalities are responsible for emergency planning and preparedness 
In 1993, a Norwegian Parliament white paper stated the need for new tools to build 
societal resilience and improve safety and preparedness:  
Risk and vulnerability analysis could be a sufficient tool to give a more systematic 
examination of situations that can occur, to improve preparedness in society and 
our ability to handle unexpected events. (Norwegian Parliament, 1993:33, 
translated)  
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In 1994 the DCDEP issued guidelines for RAV analyses in municipalities. There was 
a discussion as to whether RAV and emergency planning should be a statutory 
provision, but it was linked to a regulation on internal control introduced in 1992. 
Hence, risk assessments and management became the municipalities‟ own 
responsibility.  
In 1998 the responsibility for supervising municipalities in their emergency planning 
and mitigation work was assigned to county governors‟ emergency staff. As part of 
this supervisory role, the county governor is also responsible for training and 
guidance. In the period 1999.2003, 75 per cent of municipalities in Norway carried 
out an RAV analysis (Directorate of Civil Defence and Emergency Planning, 2003), 
and Time has followed this practice.  
Klepp started to develop MRA in 2000, after a period of mixed experience with RAV. 
They saw a need for a more contextual approach and to link risk assessments to daily 
mitigation work in the municipality. A project group, including street-level workers 
from all departments, developed the MRA together, the project manager taking the 
approach of „being a missionary rather than a dictator‟ (chief administrative officer). 
When they presented MRA to the different departments, the project group had already 
tested it in practice and had relevant examples to show to different stakeholders in the 
organisation. 
 
MRA in the Klepp municipality 
Since Klepp became a member of Safe Communities in 2002, the municipality has 
worked with safety and health issues in an extensive way. The bottom-up strategy 
assumes that workers at the operational level identify and manage their own risks: 
„The MRA is a simple and useful tool and it feels sensible to work with it‟ (chief 
administrative officer). The politicians intend to implement MRA practice in each 
core activity in the municipality. The municipal plan‟s slogan is „active and safe‟, and 
safety thinking is supposed to be implemented both in planning and in practice.  
Klepp has a stable staff of officers at the tactical administrative level. The department 
managers have been employed in Klepp for between four and 12 years, and when the 
municipality was reorganised, in September 2002, they became important carriers of 
the organisational memory about ongoing emergency management. Personnel at the 
tactical level know and work with MRA. They use it in planning activities, and the 
department managers in planning/engineering, school and health sometimes use MRA 
to develop different perspectives on the same topic. For instance, MRA is used when 
the technical board is planning a road in a populated area or when preparing other 
municipal plans. At the community nursing tactical level, MRA is used for instance 
when analysing what to do when patients are violent or how to reduce risks and 
prevent accidents among employees and patients.  
The main findings at the operational level are from community nursing, schools and 
kindergartens. According to the charge nurse, MRA is not a concept that is used at the 
operational level, even though some are familiar with the tool. Instead they use 
similar risk assessments focusing on the security of personnel and on the quality of 
service. Thinking on safety is similar to MRA, but the nurses do not use the concept 
as such. Shortcomings in the use of MRA are due to too little experience with it and 
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to a lack of education among community nurses. The (eight) primary schools use 
MRA arbitrarily. All the headmasters, but not all the teachers, know about it. Some 
schools use MRA, but the prevailing opinion is that this is a new tool whose 
implementation takes time. In Klepp, seven out of ten full-time kindergartens use 
MRA on a regular basis, two plan to use it in the future, and one has no plans. MRA 
is often used when going on trips. Earlier experience with the use of RAV is 
expressed like this: „I found it so distant. It was far away from my daily work‟ 
(kindergarten manager). Kindergartens‟ experience with MRA is that the tool has 
contributed to more systematic planning and an increased consciousness of risk 
factors. They consider MRA a useful tool in safety planning.  
The planning/engineering department uses MRA frequently when making plans that 
include safety considerations - for instance, constructing roads, building a new school 
or considering bicycle trails. The chief executive of the planning/engineering 
department states that they sometimes put the MRA in writing and sometimes just 
discuss it on the spot.  
 
RAV in the Time municipality  
Politicians in Time decided to implement RAV in 2002. An RAV was carried out at 
the strategic level, and contained an overview of potential risks in the municipality. 
The plan was that each department should carry out their own RAV in 2003, but this 
has not been done due to a reorganisation and to lack of prioritising. Consequently, it 
has not been possible to introduce RAV at the operational level as this is supposed to 
be a top-down implementation strategy. The municipal mayor is well informed about 
RAV, but the other politicians have varying degrees of knowledge.  
Time municipality introduced a new organisational set-up in January 2003. The chief 
executives of the health, education and planning/engineering departments have been 
employed in Time between one and 12 years. After the reorganisation, the department 
managers‟ posts were redefined. They had not produced departmental RAVs by the 
time they were interviewed, although they all knew about the emergency strategy and 
the RAV concept. Time has not run internal courses in RAV analysis, but political 
and administrative leaders have participated in external courses. The reorganisation 
affected safety management, and caused delays.  
Time has not considered using MRA, because of differing opinions. The emergency 
manager and chief administrative officer do not consider the municipality as mature 
enough for it; the chief executive of planning/engineering, on the other hand, 
considers the existing quality system as satisfactory, and therefore regards the use of 
MRA as unnecessary:  
The county governors emergency staff regarded our quality system as about the 
same as MRA, which contains the same safety systems as we have in our 
activities.  
The chief executive of the health department states that the RAV concept is not in 
use. In spite of this, she feels the department has reliable safety systems:  
I think we (as nurses) are fairly good in thinking about preparedness. It is in our 
profession. We have the education to do it.  
Different strategies equal practice? 
  113 
However, she notes problems related to the conflict between a heavy workload and 
safety management, a theme that arises every day in nursing: „This is because we 
have more needs than it is possible to meet‟ (chief executive of health department). 
 
Examples of similar practice in Klepp and Time 
Existing emergency planning and safety systems in Klepp and Time are quite similar. 
In both organisations, staff have to adapt to government rules and regulations, both 
have HSE and quality systems built on the same logic and to the same guidelines, and 
both have a system of internal control built in compliance with the same government 
regulation. In addition, both municipalities have procedures for nursing based on 
current the professional knowledge and ethics within nursing.  
The assessment visit is an activity which illustrates the points above, and has some 
parallels with a risk analysis. Before new patients enter community nursing, a nurse 
and ergonomic personnel visit their homes. The patient‟s security is considered: if 
there is, for instance, a slippery floor, the nurse requisitions anti-slip mats to put under 
rugs, and there is consideration of whether there is enough light and whether technical 
remedies are required for the patient‟s health. In addition, health personnel also 
consider their own working environment: if patients are heavy, for instance, a bed lift 
could be installed or a hospital bed requisitioned. The nurses did not use safety 
concepts like RAV, consequence assessments or MRA, but recognised that the 
analyses they carried out during their assessment visits were similar in nature.  
At the operational level in primary schools  
Klepp has a written MRA that the teachers are supposed to use, but the strategy is 
sparsely implemented in schools. One headmaster, who had earlier participated in the 
MRA project group, trained his staff in MRA, and this school actually uses MRA as a 
tool in its planning activities. The headmaster at another primary school revealed 
another, more common practice: he had told the teachers about MRA, but it was not 
implemented in the school. A teacher at the same school knew about MRA from the 
newspaper; he was not aware of MRA practice, but followed the established safety 
rules and procedures at his school, for instance when taking pupils on trips, etc. All 
headmasters of the primary schools in Klepp had heard about MRA; they define it as 
partly implemented, and still regard it as a tool for special occasions. When 
performing routine day-to-day activities, some schools use MRA and others do not. It 
is thought of as an additional tool for identifying risks and deciding safety measures.  
Teachers in Time are not supposed to use RAV at the operational level. Instead, 
teachers in primary schools use established guidelines for HSE resulting from 
governmental safety regulations. Primary schools in Time apply very specific and 
carefully reasoned safety rules. Both when assessing risks and responding to hazards, 
teachers in the two municipalities act in very similar ways.  
Although the kindergartens in Time do not use MRA, they have very specific safety 
rules to follow. There has been one fatal accident and some serious incidents during 
recent years, which may explain the focus on safety in kindergartens generally. 
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Discussion 
RAV and MRA strategies are in use at the strategic and tactical levels. In Time, the 
RAV strategy is not in use at the operational level. In Klepp, the MRA strategy is not 
in use at the operational level in community nursing, and to some extent in the 
education department‟s schools. In kindergartens, MRA is used on a regular basis. 
Different strategies 
MRA is based on a bottom-up strategy, following Dynes‟s (1993) arguments about 
exploiting local knowledge in risk assessment and planning. Instead of having fixed 
plans for all possible incidents (Clarke, 1999) and a top-down organisation to respond 
to them, the MRA strategy aims to empower the people already at the site and to 
strengthen their existing capacity to prevent and respond to occurring events. When 
MRA is used both at the top and the bottom of the organisation, it may improve 
communication between the levels. Some of the experience with MRA is that it is 
simple and clear. The MRA project leader reports that it contributes to a more 
systematic approach to risk and raises consciousness of risk factors and safety 
measures (Aanestad, 2001). Employees are recommended to carry out this analysis 
together to get a broader view and reach a common understanding of risk factors. 
MRA is a tool for assessing risks in activities taking contextual „here-and-now‟ 
questions into consideration. MRA can be seen as „common sense put into a system‟ 
(chief administrative officer, Klepp).  
In Time RAV is used at the strategic and partly at the tactical level in the 
organisation. It was supposed to be fully implemented at the tactical level, but this has 
not happened, partly due to reorganisation and thereby to a relocation of responsibility 
for emergency planning. RAV gives a universal overview over risk factors, and 
simplifies decisions about mitigation and preparedness instruments. It is based on a 
rational planning paradigm, focusing on expert-based anticipations about risks and 
hazards.  
Similar practice 
It seems as though the institutional risk assessment and management systems 
established through government regulations, internal control systems and professional 
knowledge guide safety considerations in everyday work situations. Despite different 
strategies, safety practice in schools and procedures in health departments may 
contain so many similarities that employees in the sectors see no need for another 
concept or further safety procedures.  
Although teachers, kindergarten managers and community nurses work in different 
municipalities, many challenges are the same because of similar structures and work 
tasks. They also undergo profession-related safety training that may overrule detailed 
administrative procedures and organisational strategies. In sum, laws and regulations, 
existing safety procedures in the organisations and professionalism seem to explain 
why practice is so similar, even when the risk assessment and management strategies 
are very different.  
There is one exception to this pattern of close similarities. Seven of the ten full-time 
kindergartens in Klepp use MRA on a regular basis and their experience is that it 
makes employees more conscious of risk matters. MRA enforces systematic thinking 
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that makes it easier to handle risks. The employees in the kindergartens consider 
MRA a useful tool for avoiding hazards and preparing for unwanted incidents. A 
principal reason is that the existing contextual practices for safety work in Klepp 
kindergartens and the MRA strategy have similarities, and therefore the latter is easy 
to implement - it is an improvement on existing practice, but feels familiar to the 
employees.  
Municipalities are multi-purpose organisations, and may be seen as loosely coupled 
and complex systems. Performance is often difficult to measure in exact terms. 
Employees often belong to strong professions (teachers, health personnel, engineers, 
etc) with inherent professional standards and ethical rules. Hence, institutional 
processes often have more influence on organisational behaviour than do formal 
strategies and plans. Risk assessment and management are also carefully regulated 
through government laws and formal procedures, reducing the number of alternative 
implementation strategies. In this case, the regulative and the normative pillars seem 
to institutionalise behaviour to the extent that similar practice occurs. 
 
Conclusions 
The characteristics of the municipal bureaucracy, lack of management attention and 
institutionalised modes of task performance seem to explain the fact that overall 
organisational strategies are more and less ignored at the operational level, being 
replaced with similar practices in different municipalities. Furthermore, the regulatory 
framework and systems for internal control leave street-level bureaucrats with little 
freedom in their daily work performance.  
The top-down RAV strategy based on the rational planning paradigm does not 
influence practice at the operational level at all. The expert-driven approach is very 
difficult to implement in a multi-purpose organisation with strong institutional 
characteristics. The bottom-up MRA strategy, however, contributes to improved 
performance and consciousness of risks and hazards if it is introduced in operational 
areas where existing practice is comparable to MRA practice. In addition, introducing 
the MRA strategy has to be accompanied by a determined effort to train street-level 
workers; if not, practice will remain unchanged.  
A bottom-up strategy combined with the use of MRA may be a contribution to more 
systematic and collaborative risk management, and also increase the awareness of 
risks among all employees. It should not represent a totally new way of working, but 
be designed as an extension to already existing practice; it appears that this will make 
it easier to implement in a complex organisation.  
A paradox remains: without strong support from management levels, a bottom-up 
strategy is very difficult to implement in organisations with vague goals and strong 
professions. The main challenge is how management can support the lowest 
appropriate level of employees, and empower them to assess risks in systematic ways 
and to respond adequately to unwanted incidents. 
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Abstract  
The tasks of a supervisory authority (SA) are to guide and inspect municipalities in 
mitigation, and risk and emergency management. Two municipalities, which have 
showed different responses to the work of SA, are compared. Klepp has resisted 
inspections by SA and created their own solutions to risk management. The other 
municipality, Time, has seen governmental guidelines as a facilitator to their work 
and accepted inspections.  
 
Despite their negative attitude towards SA, Klepp has contributed to a mutual learning 
process between the municipality and the SA by introducing a new strategy and tool 
(mini risk analysis, MRA) in risk management. MRA is a tool, which may lay the 
foundations for empowerment and involvement in local risk management. It is 
especially designed for municipal contexts, focussing on daily risks in working 
processes. Time, on the other hand, has passively adapted SA inspections and not 
contributed in the learning process.  
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Introduction 
To cope with emerging and new risks, regulations have to be applied locally, 
nationally and internationally. The „.. modern industrial society is highly 
differentiated, and legislators must enact laws designed to coordinate this diversity 
and to define and protect public interests- as a society, technology and the economy 
evolve‟ (Kirwan et al., 2002:2). Regulations can be placed on a scale, from strictly 
prescriptive to self-regulative.  
Regulations can have some inbuilt dilemmas. A highly regulated area may limit 
individual‟s initiative to perform his or her work tasks. Another pitfall with 
prescriptive regulations is that they hardly consider change. Research also shows that 
safety regulations,‟ practically speaking, are not followed to the letter‟ (Rasmussen, 
1997:187).  On the other hand, a self-regulation strategy may not supply workers with 
the necessary competence to perform best practice, because the practice may be too 
contextually bounded. „Ironically, then, many small businesses prefer prescriptive 
regulations‟ (Kirwan et al., 2002:261). Small companies may have fewer resources to 
be able to interpret a wide regulatory framework.  
Still, a „responsive regulation‟ can be flexible enough to include prescriptive, self -
regulation and mixed methods, as different circumstances need different actions 
(Hutter, 2001:313). This takes into consideration that a wide range of different 
methods can be used. Acceptable risks are related to changes in „technology, 
scientific knowledge, public opinion, local circumstances, and so on‟ (Hutter, 
2001:314). Regulatory authorities may have the role of being both a controller and a 
coach, where the laws regulate what is legal or not. 
Supervisory authorities (SAs) are a part of a regulatory regime. The focus in this 
article is on public risk management and the relationship between the regulator and 
the regulated. Risk management is defined as „a range of related activities for coping 
with risk, including how risks are identified and assessed and how social interventions 
to deal with risk are monitored and evaluated‟ (Hood and Jones, 1996:7). The SAs 
task is to supervise and inspect the municipalites skills in risk management. It is 
emphasised in a Norwegian Royal proposition that the SAs shall have both a 
controlling and a guiding role (Royal-Proposition, 2005). The guidance can take 
several forms, for example informing municipalities about new regulations and ways 
of handling risks, network meetings and exercises and inspections to improve risk 
management.  
Hood uses the terms Sprat (social pre-committed to rational acceptability thresholds) 
and Shark (selective handicapping of adversarial rationality and knowledge) (Hood 
and Jones, 1996). Sprat is a conventional, bureaucratic and rational approach which 
metaphorically speaking is seen as a thermostat. Shark is focused more on conflicting 
values, which are public debated. Shark promotes confrontation between risk creators 
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and risk receivers in a procedural debate (Shrader-Frechette, 1991). In real life there is 
often a mix between these basic styles (Hood and Jones, 1996). 
 Relations between the regulator and the regulated may vary from cooperation to 
competition or active resistance. In this article we discuss how different relations 
between SA and two municipalities influence the output from regulation. Resistance 
is central in one municipality and a passive adoption to SA is central in the other. We 
will consider a rational and a communicative perspective in our analysis. The question 
we will consider is: How does resistance against pre-designed national risk 
management standards influence on learning between the regulator and the regulated?  
 
The context 
The two municipalities in our study, Klepp and Time, have about 14 000 inhabitants 
and are neighbouring municipalities located on the Western coast of Norway. The 
landscape is flat and with no specific concerns about natural disasters. The risk 
scenarios are to a large extent similar, focused on infrastructure and technological 
awareness, breakdowns in vital service provisions and individual accidents. Klepp 
became a member of Safe Communities
1
 in 2002. They received an “emergency 
prize” from the Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning 
(DCDEP) due to the development of a risk tool called mini risk analysis (MRA) in 
2003. Both municipalities have participated in exercises organised by the SA in their 
county since 1997. The Directorate for Civil Defence and Emergency Planning 
(DCDEP) is the regional SAs‟ superior.  
SAs have a responsibility to guide and inspect plans, mitigation and risk management, 
but SA has no statutory provision concerning municipalities using RAV and lacks the 
power to put force behind their demands for an proactive risk management. Plans can 
although be dismissed by SA if safety matters are not properly incorporated in 
municipal plans. In 1994 the DCDEP issued guidelines to all municipalities in 
Norway concerning the mapping of risks, called risk and vulnerability analysis 
(RAV).  
Since 1998 the SA‟s in Norway have had responsibility for:  
 Inspections  
 Coordinating the emergency work in the county2 
 Motivating the municipalities to use risk analysis tools 
 Informing and supervising the municipalities on how to integrate risk and 
safety issues in comprehensive planning.  
                                                 
1
 The Safe Community movement started in Sweden 1989 on behalf of WHO and the 
Ottawa charter. The main aim is to conduct local injury prevention in communities. 
www.safecommunity.net 
2
 The three later tasks are from a directive (year 2000) from DCDEP to be executed 
by SA. 
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The SA has an emergency staff taking care of guidance and inspection of the 
municipalities in the region. Every other year exercises are held which all 
municipalities are supposed to join. Municipalities are inspected every fourth year. 
These regular activities may shape arenas for dialog or instruction. The aim is to 
increase knowledge about risk management and that learning shall lead to changed 
behaviour. This aim is ideal, motivational factors and self- efficacy (a belief in own 
skills), is also central in learning situations (Bandura, 1986). 
Time and Klepp are compared. They have different strategies in risk management. 
Time has a top-down strategy engaging top management and experts in scenario 
building, risk assessments and planning. Time uses a traditional risk and vulnerability 
analysis (RAV) designed by the Directorate for Civil Defence and Emergency 
Planning (DCDEP). RAV focuses on the strategic level. Klepp has developed a 
bottom-up strategy which supposes that street level workers are best suited to take 
care of everyday risks at the operational level (Nilsen and Olsen, 2004). Klepp 
developed an alternative approach to the traditional RAV, mini risk analysis (MRA) 
that focuses on daily risks and small incidents. MRA stimulates collaboration, 
creativity, awareness of risks and ways to handle them. Empowerment to the street 
level bureaucrats is one of the ideas behind the concept (Nilsen, 2006a). However, 
closer analysis of how the strategies are performed in practice reveals similar 
outcomes (Nilsen and Olsen, 2005). Due to professional norms and institutional safety 
directives the two municipalities show a surprisingly similar performance. Klepp has 
resisted inspections by the SA and believe in their own capability in risk management.  
 
Theory 
 
Rational and communicative planning 
The foundation of a rational planning paradigm can be found in theories about 
bureaucracy and rational planning. In a bureaucracy there is a hierarchal organisation 
where the executing level is supposed to fulfil tasks originating from the top level in a 
rational perspective. A machine is used as an analogue of a well functioning 
bureaucracy: „A machine is certainly precise; it is also reliable and easy to control; 
and it is efficient- at least when restricted to the job it has been designed to do‟ 
(Mintzberg and Quinn, 1996:640). The „ideal bureaucratic‟ institution has hallmarks 
of: 
 Legal authority,  
 Accuracy, rapidity, clarity,  
 Hierarchy  (Weber, 1982). 
In critical bureaucracy theory, those ideal standards of a bureaucracy are scrutinized. 
Lack of resources, time constraints and many ambiguous ends and means in 
bureaucratic organisations makes it impossible to fulfil the tasks laid on the street 
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level bureaucrats
3
 (Lipsky, 1980:3). Another element is that what is „said‟ by the top-
level in a bureaucratic institution is not necessarily what is „done‟ (Brunsson, 1989). 
Banfield developed a theory of rational planning (Banfield, 1959) closely linked to 
the principles of a bureaucracy. Clear ends and means are prerequisites for an 
efficient planning process. Every condition that‟s relevant for a choice and its 
consequences is clear and known. The world is predictable and it is possible to decide 
on clear goals. It is possible to identify and evaluate all alternative options based on 
scientific methods. It is also possible to have an overview of all alternative courses of 
action. The best alternative will be chosen at the end. Banfield has developed an ideal 
theory, but ideal standards are difficult to find in practice. The rational planning 
perspective can also be found in more moderate theories, like Herbert Simon‟s 
restricted rationality (Simon, 1977), and Lindbloms „muddling through‟ (Lindblom, 
1959).  
Habermas has developed a theory of communicative action (Habermas, 1995, 
Habermas, 2004). This theory is concerned with forums of dialogue. Human 
communication is a medium that functions as a coordination of actions (Austin, 1962, 
Eriksen and Weigård, 2003). It is said: „…that speech often is action. Conversation is 
a basic element of human interaction and that social interactions are shaped and 
reshaped through speech‟, Austin in (Eriksen and Weigård, 1999:58 Own translation).  
In an „ideal speech situation‟ all the different interests must be represented. 
Everybody has a right to present his or her view. The power of the argument is the 
most important force in the discussion. The aim is to reach an understanding between 
the participants. „In communicative action participants are not primarily oriented to 
their own individual successes; they pursue their individual goals under the conditions 
that they can harmonize their plans of action on the basis of common situation 
definitions‟ (Habermas, 2004:286). The aim of the discussion is to seek consensus.  
These criteria in Habermas „ideal speech situation‟ are rather abstract, but could be 
used as a guideline to prepare for collaborative agendas as they are recommended in 
planning theory (Innes, 1998). Excerpts from Habermas communicative speech ideals 
are used as ideals of dialogue situations. In a dialogue there is a right to state one‟s 
own viewpoints and a mutual respect for the other participant‟s interests and 
meanings. In a real dialogue there is reflection, clarification and mutual learning 
between the participants (Hanssen et al., 2004).  
Habermas ideal standards have received massive critique. Much of this critique 
concerns the absence of power in Habermas‟ theory (Flyvjerg and Richardson, 2002). 
The theory is also seen as impractical, because of the ideal of consensus. Reuter 
discusses the complementary of power and discourse (Reuter, 2000) acknowledging 
the combination of both as a way of using power more discursively. Despite much 
critique, the theory has contributed in a wide variety of areas; for instance as an 
inspiration for resolution boards, management ideals and in collaborative planning 
(Healy, 1997).   
                                                 
3
 Street level workers are employees who; interact directly with citizens in the course 
of their jobs‟. LIPSKY, M. (1980) Street-level bureaucracy, New York, Russell Sage 
Foundation. For instance teachers, social workers and community nurses. 
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The SA can have different roles in relation to municipalities. They could be traced 
back to principles embedded in the theories of rational and communicative planning 
as shown in the table.  
 
The SA role in 
relation to the 
municipalities 
Rational planning 
perspective 
Communicative 
planning perspective 
Ways of interaction One way information 
-Little contact and interaction  
Mutual interaction 
Management values Effectiveness Dialogue, mutual trust, 
mobilisation, equality and 
partnership  
Decision making  Instruction/command 
(monologue) 
Dialogue/mutual 
understanding 
Municipal role in 
public system 
Body of execution Political body, with own 
strategies and goals 
Table 1.  Inspired by (Jenssen and Kleivan, 1999). 
 
Supervision 
The principles of rational and communicative planning perspectives will now be 
related to supervision between SA and municipalities (Jenssen and Kleivan, 1999).  
Supervision is usually conducted on the basis of legal authority (Weber, 1982) and the 
main aim is to see if there are deviations from laws and bylaws. When there are no 
statutory provisions, other strategies requiring collaboration may be relevant (Jenssen 
and Kleivan, 1999). Both the SA and the municipalities need to find solutions on the 
basis of a common challenge because there are no laws backing the inspection. The 
SA`s role in relation to municipalities and the SA`s use of different strategies will be 
examined in the different frames of reference. The SA can be seen as either having 
the role of an inspector or a collaborating partner. In Bekkers and Homburgs 
description, there is a demarcation between the role of cop and coach (Bekkers and 
Homburg, 2002).  The municipalities can be seen as executors of laws and directives 
or as individual political bodies. The choice of a rational or communicative 
supervision perspective affects the SA‟s relation to the municipalities. A rational 
perspective characterises the SA as an expert, as the body taking care of laws and 
bylaws. On the other hand, a communicative perspective implies a belief in the 
municipalities‟ knowledge of their own context and that they can be collaboration 
partners in finding common solutions. The learning agendas are either stable or 
changing. A dynamic way of learning is needed when changing conditions are under 
consideration (Rasmussen and Svedung, 2000).  
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Supervision  Rational planning 
perspective 
Communicative planning 
perspective 
Supervision/inspection SA has the right 
solutions and points out 
deviations in the 
municipalities. 
Inspector 
SA contributes with knowledge 
to different solutions, and the 
municipalities contribute with 
contextual knowledge. Partner 
of discussion 
Participation  Expert role Laypeople, politicians etc are 
included in the decision 
process; experts take their 
views and criticisms into 
consideration. 
Learning  Fixed solutions 
Stability, prediction. 
Overview over all 
relevant factors. 
The communication as a 
mutual process  
Dynamic learning  
Documentation  Formal reports, 
statistics, scientific 
knowledge, cost benefit 
analysis.  
 
Many sources of information 
Contextual factors, 
understanding of scientific 
knowledge as not value free. 
Taking different views into 
consideration.  
Table 2.  The model is inspired by (Jenssen and Kleivan, 1999) 
We often find a mix of both perspectives in supervision and inspection. Classical 
bureaucracies are rarely found, but elements from this organisational form are living 
in almost all modern organisations today depending on the context and the situation. 
The command and control model does often survive as an ongoing habit in 
organisations (Argyris, 1998) even though a communicative perspective could be 
more suitable.  
 
Method 
The comparative case study focuses on use of different risk tools and strategies. 
Those differences also have influences on the relation to the supervisory authorities. 
This study contains ten core interviews with parallel positions in each municipality, 
carried out in 2003. Interviews have been conducted at top, middle and street levels in 
each municipality. Interviews at the SA, and supplementary interviews with the 
emergency leaders in each municipality were conducted in 2004/2005.  
Additional information encompasses interviews with key personnel at the SA, diverse 
supplementary interviews in the municipalities and observation in meetings. Joining 
an inspection meeting between the SA and Klepp gave insight in how inspections 
were conducted. An inspection meeting with Time was not held in the research 
period. Other information sources used were documents from inspections and 
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exercises, evaluation reports from exercises, municipal plans, risk analysis and 
contingency plans etc.  
Combining both interviews and written material is done to increase the reliability of 
the findings. Using documents can help to provide details reported close to the event 
and can increase the accuracy of incidents happened. Different information sources 
can either confirm or disconfirm findings. The written material was a way to secure 
historical data. When using interviews there was an ongoing opportunity to test 
assumptions and ask whether they are correct or not, this can enhance validity. Asking 
the respondents about their use and understanding of different safety concepts, gave 
an overview of the concept prevalent in their working situation. Using the core 
interviews as a basis for more specific interviews was an advantage because it made it 
possible to have an overview of many risk management subjects. The more focused 
interviews have been conducted to get more detailed information to be able to answer 
the research question in this article. Whereas the interviews of the emergency leaders, 
the interviews of representatives of SA, joining inspection meeting and extensiveness 
of documents have been of special importance.  
 
Results 
We will use SA‟s focus on exercises as a way of guidance in risk management and 
how inspections are conducted. In this case the actual SA has the responsibility for 27 
municipalities in its county. Exercises are a regular activity every second year with 
different subjects in focus, where half the municipalities are main players and the 
other half fellow players. In this way, SA guide and train the municipalities in risk 
and emergency subjects. The municipal inspections are conducted every fourth year. 
This is illustrated below, where one municipality is used as example 
.  
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
Exercise as 
main player  
Inspection from 
SA 
Exercise as 
fellow player 
 As in year 1 
Table 3 
 
Exercises as supervision 
In 1994, the Directorate for Civil Defence and Emergency Planning (DCDEP) 
introduced RAV guidelines. Municipalities showed a lack of interest in learning about 
RAV. Therefore SA asked municipalities in the county to choose among different 
guidance strategies in order to mobilise municipalities to engage in safety issues and 
contingency planning. Most of them decided that exercises would be an interesting 
way of working with emergency and risk management. In 1997 the first exercises 
were conducted. They focused on how to establish a crisis plan and how to make a 
RAV. Although a few municipalities did not participate in the first exercise, all of 
them have participated in the following exercises. In addition to the SAs 
requirements, the exercises also allow municipalities to test each other, giving an 
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element of friendly competition. The exercises can be seen as the main way of 
guiding the municipalities in emergency and risk management. 
 
Exercises 1997-2005 
The SA organises exercises for the municipalities every second year. These exercises 
have fictive scenarios. Tora 1(1997) and Tora 2 (1999) was the name of fictive 
hurricanes. The main player municipality had to solve emergency tasks in the wake of 
the scenario. The fellow players (usually one of the neighbouring municipalities) 
introduce tasks that have to be solved in addition to the tasks from the SA. This puts a 
lot of pressure on the municipality on scene and makes the exercises more realistic 
when letting a lot of uncoordinated incidents happen at the same time. The focus in 
the early years was mostly on major disasters. In 2001 the training was focused on a 
smaller event, where municipalities had to take care of patients from the central 
hospital due to a fictive fire. This challenged coordination activities and made the 
municipalities aware of the resources needed in such situations.  
In 2003 there was a tabletop exercise concerning water pollution and health problems. 
In 2005 there was a tabletop bird flu exercise.  
Regarding the exercises as a whole, there has been an improvement in the municipal 
ability to handle crises (SA report 2003). Points of improvements from the 
municipalities have been taken into consideration by the SA and have been used in 
the development of the exercises. A quotation from a SA officer seems to sum up this 
experience: 
        „ I think that the dialogue approach is very valuable. We do not have a statutory 
provision. It is better to convince, to show good examples and talk together. Then 
there is a common understanding and easier execution of the tasks‟ (officer 1 at SA, 
2004). 
 
Exercises in the case municipalities 
In 1999, Klepp was main player. The aim was to train the emergency management 
and to improve their capacities in crisis management. From the evaluation report it 
was stated that: „The exercise gave much more learning value than just 
speeches/courses‟ (Fellow evaluation report 1999:4).   
Time was main player in 2001. Klepp municipality was their fellow player. Time 
wanted to test their new contingency plan, and the evaluation showed a good 
knowledge of the different roles in the emergency management staff. The task in this 
exercise was to transfer patients from a central hospital to home municipalities 
(because of a fictive fire). Points of improvements were further improvements with 
information channels and an alternative room for crisis management with more 
telephones. The evaluation of the exercise concept was positive because it was a 
„realistic‟ exercise (Klepp‟s evaluation report 2001:4).  
In 2003 Klepp was main player again. The subject was water pollution/health 
problems and information handling. The evaluation from the fellow player on both 
role clarification and information handling was positive. The evaluation of the SA‟s 
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exercise program was mainly positive. The most positive remark was that in the 
middle of the exercise there was a timeout, where main player, fellow player and the 
leaders of the exercise had an evaluation, which gave valuable suggestions for further 
playing.  
Time was main player in 2005, where the theme was bird flu. The fellow player 
considered their play as satisfying. „The exercise was realistic and the participants 
showed good spirit and involvement‟ (Fellow player report 2005). Especially the use 
of data and digital maps was considered advantageous.  
 
Inspections –passive acceptance 
The SA visits the main playing municipality to analyse performance and conduct 
supervision and inspection. They examine written material like overall municipality 
plans, contingency plans, RAV, and crisis management organisation to get a broad 
view of the state of art in the municipality. SA also has meetings with key 
management personnel in the municipality.  
Time received inspections from the SA in 1998 and 2002. The main impression in 
1998 was that the municipality did not have any systematic approach to risk and 
crises management, and that preparedness measures were incomplete or lacking. „The 
municipality expressed a lack of motivation for working with emergencies because 
efforts was not based in their own wishes or needs, but in governmental expectations 
and pressures‟ (Page 1 in inspection report 1998 from SA).  
In 2002 the SA was more satisfied with the improvements that Time had done since 
the previous inspection, but anyhow there were critical comments from the SA: 
„The SA is less pleased with how the municipality has worked with incorporating 
preparedness on the agenda‟ and „SA look forward to how the result from RAV is 
going to be incorporated and used in municipal planning and municipal service‟ 
(Inspection report 2002 page 3 and 4).  
Findings from 2003 show, that RAV was not followed up in the municipal service 
(Nilsen and Olsen, 2004).  This was due to a major reorganising and a lack of 
prioritising. The RAV was also considered as „a distant tool, a bit apart of what we 
are doing in our daily work tasks‟ (Chief administrative officer). They saw the RAV 
as a first-generation work that needed to be developed further. Contingency planning 
and preparedness was not properly rooted in the top-management or in the rest of the 
municipal bureaucracy.  
 
Inspections –resistance 
Klepp refused to receive inspections. The chief administrative officer had a former 
career in SA (in 1992/1993). His attitude was that the SA contribution in risk 
management was of little value. „We [Klepp] have our own decentralised emergency 
model. We have a high focus on accident prevention. We have a strong prioritising 
and do not want to spend more time on emergencies than we already do in our own 
project‟ (Letter from Klepp 2000). Since there is no statutory provision, there were no 
ways of making inspections obligatory and Klepp refused to have one.  
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In 2003 the SA wanted to assess Klepp municipality in order to award a prize for 
good emergency work, but this was difficult since the municipality refused to receive 
inspections. Klepp had allowed discussions with the SA, but not inspections. Klepp 
were told that they would get the prize if they allowed the inspection. Since the SA 
seemed to value their work with MRA, the municipality was convinced that 
inspections could take place. They had their first inspection in 2003. The inspection 
did not follow the ordinary pattern with single interviews. In cooperation with Klepp, 
the interviews were conducted as group interviews. This was because Klepp insisted 
on contingency planning, mitigation and preparedness as teamwork and not a singular 
top management responsibility. The emergency leader claimed that he had a relaxed 
attitude towards the inspection. The work with contingencies and risk management 
had been incorporated as a part of daily work and therefore they have no facade to 
keep.  
The inspection report from the SA says that:‟ Safety is thoroughly incorporated in 
planning documents and is a very clear element in overall planning and in ongoing 
service and municipal activities „ (Page 2 in inspection report). The name of the 
municipal plan 2002-2013 is called: „Active and safe‟. SA also considered MRA to be 
well on the way of being integrated in Klepp. The SA recommended developing an 
information plan for crises and some minor technical and administrative 
improvements. 
The SA got a new experience in conduction group inspections, due to Klepps 
suggestion and got insight in how safety can be clear and systematic prevalent in 
municipal plans.  
The SA can be both a controller and a coach according to the circumstances 
considered. Where Time has acted as an executive body, a controller role has been 
prevalent in the inspections. When Klepp has acted as an own political body, the 
coach role has been more present. Presenting data from 1997-1995 gives an overview 
of the learning process. What we see is that there has been gradually more learning 
gained trough exercises. Both Klepp and Time got more skills in risk management, 
although Klepp has a more overall perspective in risk management than Time. 
 
Discussion 
What we see is an opposite pattern of behaviour. Klepp has contributed with an 
alternative risk analysis (MRA) and Time has used the recommended one (RAV). 
Klepp has refused inspections for many years (the only municipality to do so) and 
Time has allowed all inspections. Since Time has accepted the SA‟s 
recommendations, there has been no contribution to the field of risk management. The 
passive acceptance has not resulted in learning input for the SA. The SA has a „black 
sheep‟ in its group, which does not want to follow their „order‟. How can resistance 
against SA‟s working methods contribute to increased consciousness about different 
ways of handling mitigation and emergency/risk management? Klepp has developed 
MRA founded in a bottom-up strategy and finds that this tool is more suitable in a 
municipal context than the RAV. They believe in their own abilities in risk 
management (Nilsen, 2006a). The resistance is founded in a consciousness about 
alternative ways of risk management. This resistance has given input to the SA, which 
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has broadened its competence in different kinds of risk analysis. The SA has 
presented Klepp‟s MRA to the other municipalities. The SA sees it as a valuable 
contribution in the handling of daily risks.  
Klepp has acted as a political body, not an executive institution. Despite their 
resistance to inspections, they have contributed with different perspectives to the SA. 
Klepp developed MRA because they found it more suitable than the top-down and 
expert oriented RAV (Nilsen and Olsen, 2004). General guidelines in risk 
management may be challenged because they do not always fit with the local context. 
MRA focuses on collaborative processes in local risk management. This was a 
divergence in thinking between Klepp (using MRA) and the SA (recommending 
RAV). In communicative planning it is found that: „unless the scientific information 
was related to practical action or to the context and particular situation facing policy 
makers and managers, participants rejected it‟ (Innes, 1998:58). Klepp has made 
MRA to fit with their context. The SA has as the learning process emerged, received 
valuable insight into how MRA can be more suitable in municipal contexts.  
The resistance against inspections and ready-made templates from the SA has resulted 
in openness for dialogue. The resistance was founded in a consciousness about 
alternative ways of conducting risk management. Klepp is a Safe Community where 
MRA is part of a totality in preparedness and safety management. The MRA process 
has many hallmarks of empowerment and elements from the communicative 
perspective. This results in people‟s belief in their own skills. The MRA enforces 
collaboration and often results in involvement in risk handling at the local level. The 
top-level in the municipality trusts that the lower level handles their own risks. 
Enabling the lower level to take care of risks and unwanted hazards is part of a 
bottom-up mitigation strategy. Laypeople are in the focus, not external risk experts or 
the top-level management as in the traditional RAV.  
Time accepted inspections and executed assigned tasks from the SA without 
hesitation. They have acted as an executive body. This may be the easiest way to 
handle demands from the supervisory authorities. But single tasks not seen in a 
broader context may not contribute to good mitigation and risk management. „A 
prescriptive standard would have lead to a box-ticking approach‟ (Crawford and 
Stein, 2004:500). This may be relevant in some technical procedures, but 
considerations about changes in public risk management are often prevalent. The 
result in Time is passive learning. Time seems to lack an on-going contingency 
planning and risk management as an integrated part of the total municipality planning 
and administration system.  
Time has expressed that a rational planning approach has been prevalent in the 
inspections. They saw the inspectors as cops, metaphorically speaking. The classical 
inspection approach is to use a template and identify deviations. The overall 
perspective and knowledge at the SA gives the official understanding of good 
standards. They can also use other municipalities as reference points. The classic 
inspection role has similarities to the rational planning perspective, where it is 
possible to measure deviances from ideal means. When Time has acted as an 
executive body, they have put themselves in a position „to follow orders‟. 
Municipalities have to execute a lot of compulsory tasks imposed by governmental 
agencies and are used to follow orders (Andersen et al., 2002). When Klepp has seen 
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risk management as part of its Safe Community work, it seems as Time has just seen 
risk management as another obligation that has to be „ticked off‟.  
 
Conclusion 
The findings from Klepp show a deviant response to inspections and an alternative 
way to perform risk management in municipalities. The SA found the alternative risk 
model (MRA) valuable. The SA has learned about the tool and presented it to the 
other municipalities. Klepp has been an innovative contributor to contingency 
planning and risk management and has contributed to learning in both the SA and 
other municipalities in the county.  
A course with no deviations from the SA‟s recommendations, may have contributed 
to a more passive learning agenda. Fulfilling the tasks (here passively using RAV and 
joining inspections) did not contribute to a higher reflection about risk management. 
A box-ticking approach may contribute to an artificial feeling of safe operations in 
mitigation and risk management. Diversity in thoughts has in this case resulted in 
different solutions and a higher level of reflection. The MRA contributes with a 
working method, which requires local involvement and mobilisation of employees. 
Laying the foundation for involvement in local risk management is more efficient 
than having readymade templates and guidelines. No perfect tool would help if there 
were no involvement and reflection about it.  
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Abstract 
In local risk management the overall aim is to prevent, reduce and limit injuries and 
deaths. In Safe Communities (SC) there are many experiences about involvement in 
local injury prevention but most of the research about SC has appeared to be 
statistical treatment of injury registration. What is lacking in this research is how to 
supply street level workers with appropriate tools for participation and influence on 
decisions. Empowerment strategies can improve health and safety promotion in 
activities at all levels in communities. This implies capacity building, influence and 
power to the primary users. Mini risk analysis (MRA) has been developed as part of a 
proactive SC work. MRA is a simple, practical risk tool to be used in local activities. 
MRA stimulates collaboration, creativity in local solutions, awareness of risks and 
ways to handle incidents if they occur. MRA and experience from local SC work can 
contribute to increase involvement in local risk management through enhancing 
empowerment. The results show how MRA can be used as a practical empowerment 
tool.  
 
Keywords: Safe Community, empowerment, prevention, health promotion, risk 
management 
 
                                                 
1
 A former version of this paper was presented in a plenary session at The 6
th
 Nordic 
Safe Community Conference 9-11 November 2005, Karlstad 
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1. Introduction  
The Safe Community (SC) movement started in Sweden in 1989 on behalf of WHO 
and the declaration of health for all (based on the Ottawa charter). The Ottawa charter 
(1986) underlines the importance of health promotion and community encouragement 
in preventing injuries and to better people‟s health. The Safe Community movement 
has a worldwide network with 16 designated countries and 84 Safe Communities 
(autumn 2005). There are specific criteria to follow to be designated as a Safe 
Community (Rahim, 2005). The SC should have a cross sectional group where 
collaboration between different sectors can take place. There is a demand for long-
term engagement. Injuries should be registered. Frequencies and causes in the 
statistical material should be used for injury prevention measures. Continuous 
evaluation has to be done. Participation in conferences and SC networks is supposed 
to be an ongoing process to learn from others experience both nationally and 
internationally. Other demands also follow. The Karolinska Institute in Sweden 
facilitates the WHO Collaboration Centre and designates the SC. There are 
widespread studies of SC covering the documentation of injury reductions and 
different projects in injury prevention (Andersson and Menckel, 1995:168, Bjerre and 
Schelp, 2000, Haglund and Svanstrøm, 1999, Timpka and Lindquist, 2001, Ytterstad 
and Sogaard, 1995, Lund, 2004).  
Challenges and problems when implementing the concept of SC and safety 
management work have been studied from different perspectives. (Boyesen, 1995, 
Bjärås, 1992, Fosse, 2000, Mikkelsen, 1999, Mikkelsen, 2000). The aim of SC is to 
have a holistic approach to mitigation and preparedness, including different sectors 
and flexible ways of organising work tasks. The bureaucratic organisation can be a 
barrier to these ideals (Boyesen, 2000). The bureaucratic organisation is designed for 
standard work with separate budgets and working tasks (Weber, 1976, Weber, 1978). 
Bureaucracies are hierarchical organisations. „Bureaucracy tends to alienate staff 
members, and thereby reduce any personal responsibility‟(Boyesen, 2000). This 
structure may therefore suppress new initiatives, which are essential in the bottom-up 
way of working in SC. 
Some studies show that when project leaders quit, SC commitment decreases 
(Mikkelsen, 1999, Boyesen, 1995). The concluding remarks in Bjärås‟s Sollentuna 
study is that professionals have to support the street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 1980) 
to maintain the accident prevention programme (Bjärås, 1992). When including 
people at an early stage in SC it is more likely that they develop ownership to the SC 
themselves (Bjärås, 1992). Accident prevention experiences from municipal safety 
management conclude that some features have to be in place to make the prevention 
an ongoing process. Safety should be a responsibility for everybody in the 
municipality (street-level, middle and top level), safety has to be included in both 
municipal and departmental plans, financial support should be given and procedures 
for multi-disciplinary coordination should be in place (Boyesen, 1995;ASN 
translation). It is also essential that SC is grounded at the top level of the organisation 
in order to achieve support and an ongoing focus.  Experiences from SC can be used 
in local risk management.  
There are different strategies to be found in prevention work (Mikkelsen, 1999). The 
medical science and health planning approaches are top-down strategies where the 
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expert assigns tasks to their subordinates or co-players. There is a middle strategy 
where the middle level (professionals) in the municipality is mostly concerned with 
SC work and there is an empowerment strategy that is bottom-up. Forsberg and 
Starrins book compares the expert (top-down) and empowerment (bottom-up) models 
to show implications of the different strategies (Forsberg and Starrin, 1997). 
There is a poor theoretical description of empowerment processes in SC research, 
even though empowerment is an important issue in public health traditions (Forsberg 
and Starrin, 1997, Rifkin, 2003, Rissel, 1994, Wallerstein, 1993). The problem with 
SC research is that empowerment theory has not been used, although the implicit 
thoughts in the SC movement are about empowerment
2
. In SC the street level
3
 
(Lipsky, 1980) is supposed to be most important in injury prevention efforts 
(Mikkelsen, 1999), but SC research has focused on health experts and statistical 
treatment of injuries. There seems to be a need to develop an empowerment 
framework in SC to strengthen consciousness about the street-level and how they can 
be better supplied to effect injury prevention. Although the theoretical framework is 
lacking a lot of examples of local involvement are prevalent in SC practice. Those 
experiences can also have relevance for local risk management. Empowerment theory 
and MRA processes seem to be very interlinked. The aim of this article is to discuss: 
How can empowerment be related to risk management and how can MRA strengthen 
an empowerment strategy in local health promotion and risk management?  The 
purpose is to give an overview of empowerment in different areas and perspectives 
and relate those to risk management, which only sparely is covered in research before.  
 
2. Theories concerning empowerment 
This chapter is a review of a wide variety of experiences and theories about 
empowerment to give a contribution for reflections on how those insights may 
enhance a better ability for local risk management. Empowerment theories cover both 
general and specific levels of abstraction. To cover some general perspectives, 
descriptions of theoretical reflections about empowerment will be given. The focus is 
limited to organisations (communities) and empowerment. This is done to see if 
experiences with empowerment in these fields could contribute to insights about how 
empowerment can be linked to MRA, Safe Communities and local risk management. 
There is a wide variation in the use of the empowerment concept in the public health 
tradition (Rifkin, 2003). Some common characteristics are found despite different 
countries, people and cultures. Empowerment includes the following: ‟(i) it applies to 
the individual and to the collective/community; (ii) it addresses the issue of power and 
control over the resources and the direction of one‟s own life; (iii) it addresses issues 
                                                 
2
 In November 2005 there was a Nordic Safe Community Conference where the 
theme was „Community empowerment safety promotion and injury prevention‟. This 
is the first time empowerment has had a main focus in a SC conference. The 6
th
 
Nordic Safe Community Conference 9-11 November 2005, Karlstad. 
3
 Street level workers;  ‟interact directly with citizens in the course of their jobs‟ 
LIPSKY, M. (1980) Street-level bureaucracy, New York, Russell Sage Foundation. 
For instance teacher, social workers etc. 
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of capacity and confidence building of both individuals and communities; and (iv) it 
sees active participation as a necessary but not sufficient contribution‟ (Rifkin, 
2003:170). 
In South America, Paulo Freire developed a pedagogy of the oppressed (Freire, 1970). 
He was interested in the master/knave relationship and used thoughts from Hegel in 
the development of this pedagogy. To be able to be free from oppression, there was a 
need to reveal the world of the praxis that oppresses and also to reveal double ness in 
one‟s own conceptions to be able expel old myths (Morrow and Torres, 2002). 
Critical education was a way to contribute to the freedom process in South America. 
Political, economic and social structures have to be changed in order to be free from 
oppression. „Briefly, empowerment education involves people in group efforts to 
identify their own problems, critically to analyse the cultural and sosio-economic 
roots of the problems, and to develop strategies to effect positive changes in their 
lives and in their communities‟ (Wallerstein, 1993:221). Freire and his supporters 
trained people in critical thinking and were thus a supplier of social change.  
The basic characteristic of reality found in Freires thoughts is humanisation. People 
are social beings and can only fulfil themselves together with others.  It is a positive 
view of human life. The nature of praxis is seen as action-reflection. It concerns 
enabling people to believe in their own skills, a belief that things can change for the 
better through action. Freire and Habermas, have some similar thoughts that are 
relevant for empowerment. Whereas Freire is mostly concerned about practical 
matters and the process of enabling people to achieve critical thinking through 
education, Habermas contributes to the abstract framework underlying these matters. 
His books about communicative action (Habermas, 1995, Habermas, 2004) include 
„validity claims as the ontological foundation for a discourse theory.‟ (Morrow and 
Torres, 2002:41). These claims include; comprehensibility, truth, sincerity, rightness. 
In a dialogue it is the power of the best argument that contributes to consensus in an 
ideal speech situation.  
The communicative theory is also relevant for Freire because he stresses the 
importance of dialogue in knowledge theory as an epistemological stance. The 
epistemology is the study of the nature, origin and limits of human knowledge. This 
communicative rationality can be seen as a contradiction to banking education 
(mechanically accumulated knowledge) (Freire, 1970) where no dialogue is present. 
In Habermas‟ epistemology we find communicative rationality in contrast to strategic 
rationality. Strategic rationality has a subject/object relationship; communicative 
action has a subject/subject relation. The strategic rationality is often found in 
bureaucracies where assigned tasks have to be executed by the lower level that has 
limited influence in the decision making process. Where Habermas has his strength in 
the abstract framework, Freire contributes with contextual knowledge. In this way 
these perspectives can strengthen each other.  
Empowerment can be found in different areas, like public health tradition, 
management and risk management. 
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2.1 Public health and empowerment 
The concept of empowerment is central in public health theory and experiences from 
community participation in, for instance, health cities (Rifkin, 2003, Wallerstein, 
1993). The improvement of health does not only cover biomedical and technological 
advances. It is also linked to the social, political and economic environment. It was a 
historic shift when WHO extended its strategy for disease prevention to include a 
wider focus on health promotion in the Ottawa charter of 1986 (WHO, 1986). Taking 
this wide definition of health into consideration opened for several new ways of 
dealing with primary health care. „Data collected by WHO gave evidence that 
addressing the problems of those most in need and of involving intended health 
beneficiaries in decisions about how to solve these problems made a critical 
contribution to health improvements‟ (Rifkin, 2003:168). The health for all 
declaration from WHO in 1986 connected empowerment and health, like: „the process 
of enabling people to increase control over, and to improve their health‟. The focus is 
on enabling communities to take care of their own health issues. Some countries have 
since adopted the same perspective (NOU, 1998, SOU, 1997).  „Community 
empowerment becomes a social action process that promotes participation of people, 
who are in position of perceived and actual powerlessness, towards goals of increased 
individual and community decision making and control, equity of resources, and 
improved quality of life” (Wallerstein, 1993:219). Wallerstein is using Freire‟s 
thoughts about empowerment education in public health promotion.  
 
2.2 Management and empowerment 
Lee and Koh define empowerment as the „psychological state of a subordinate 
perceiving four dimensions of meaningfulness, competence, self determination and 
impact, which is affected by empowering behaviours of the supervisor‟ (Lee and Koh, 
2001:686). This is on an organisation/group level. We shall look at these dimensions 
more closely and relate them to work.  
 Meaningfulness. This is related to how the employees find the work relevant 
according to their own values and ideas. It is also about internal 
commitment.  
 Competence. The concept of self-efficacy from social learning theory 
(Bandura, 1977) is used to explain Lee and Koh`s meaning of competence. 
Knowledge is not enough.  The ability to believe in one‟s own resources is 
also necessary to be competent.  
 Self-determination. Is about autonomy in personal working tasks. It concerns 
having the ability and authority to try one‟s own solutions.  
 Impact. „Impact is the perception of the degree to which an individual can 
influence strategic, administrative or operating outcomes at work‟ (Ashforth, 
1989).  
These four dimensions apply to the relationship between a supervisor and her/his 
subordinates. This relationship has an imbalanced power structure. The concept of 
empowerment cannot be used between peers, because there is a prerequisite for a 
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superior/subordinate relationship. Empowerment in the work setting concerns the 
supervisor‟s involvement in empowering the subordinates. Each of the four 
dimensions above has to be nurtured to reach a high level of empowerment (Lee and 
Koh, 2001). 
 
2.3 Risk management and empowerment 
Beck uses the phrase „Richer is safer‟ to describe a world where many risks become 
more globalized, because the many polluting industries are placed in developing 
countries, where the dilemma is that it is better to have an unsafe workplace than no 
work at all (Beck, 1992). There are many dilemmas and challenges concerning risks. 
Beck sees a need for reflection, for ordinary people to engage in politics, for instance 
through social movements. Demonstrations are a way to influence the development of 
society and stimulate the prevention of hazards. Examples are fights against nuclear 
weapons, and aids and engagement in global environment movements.  
Globalisation of the economy, poverty, wars, civil violence, disasters- they all affect 
vulnerability at national, local and individual levels. There are supranational 
institutions, which are concerned about human security, like The Human Security 
Commission and the Human Security Unit subject to the United Nations Office for 
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). These organisations aim to be 
„shielding people from critical and pervasive threats and empowering them to take 
care of their own threats‟ (HumanSecurity-Commision, 2003). „Everybody‟s right to 
minimum living standards, protection from violence, ensuring basic education and 
health is included in the concept of human security‟ (Alkire, 2002). „Protection 
implies a top-down approach‟ with states having the primary responsibility‟. 
Empowerment implies a bottom-up approach and is about individuals and 
communities acting on their own behalf‟ (OCHA, 2005). This work with human 
security is an emerging field in both research and practices and may contribute to 
insights about long-term global empowerment.  
It is essential to include on site inhabitants when handling disasters and recovery 
(Comfort, 1990, Helsloot and Ruitenberg, 2004). The golden hour comes just after the 
disaster, and rescue in this hour may mean life or death for many people. The people 
onsite are often the best ones to handle the crises (ICRC, 2004). Emergency personnel 
often take a long time to reach the area. The self organisation of local populations is a 
resource to enable recovery after catastrophes, instead of relying only on external 
experts (Comfort et al., IIsis procject ongoing, Comfort, 1990) There has been an 
overwhelming belief that external experts should manage disasters. There is a need 
for a shift to see how local communities can be enabled to handle disasters. World 
Disaster Report focuses on community resilience, ‟local knowledge, skills, 
determination, livelihoods, cooperation, access to resources and representation are all 
vital factors enabling people to bounce back from disaster‟ (ICRC, 2004:9).  
Despite high hazards, some organisations reach a high level of reliability. High 
Reliability Organisations (HROs) work under difficult conditions where one error 
might escalate into a catastrophe. It is therefore essential to organise in a way that can 
prevent accidents. HRO studies have often focused on the nuclear industry, air traffic 
control or other high hazard organisations (LaPorte and Consolini, 1991, Roberts, 
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1993, Vaughan, 1996). Weick et al argues that other organisations can learn from 
HROs resilience (Weick et al., 1999). „Resilience is not only about bouncing back 
from errors, it is also about coping with surprises in the moment‟ (Weick et al., 
1999:100). Other organisations also live under pressures like time constraints, 
economical pressure and demands to be effective, and have prevalent safety issues. 
What Weick et al found was a pattern of stable cognitive processes (collective 
mindfulness), and variations in action patterns in efficient HROs. In a mindful 
infrastructure for High Reliability there are five elements. It is essential to be 
preoccupied with failures, to be sensitive to operations and to be committed to 
resilience.  It requires internal commitment of the people doing the work task and is a 
continuous learning situation. Another element is reluctance to simplify because they 
know that activities are tightly connected (Perrow, 1999) and deviant behaviour can 
effect other parts of the production process. The last element is the under-
specification of structures. This is essential, because it fosters the ability for flexible 
organisation. When disturbing signals are discovered it is the skilled workers on site 
who take action immediately, „it is a subtle loosening of hierarchy in favour of 
expertise‟ (Weick et al., 1999:103). There is a link between collective mindfulness 
and better safety performance in efficient HROs. The HRO culture of appreciating 
local workers‟ ability to solve their own challenges is a hallmark of empowerment.  
There is a distinction between reactive and pro-active perspectives in safety and 
accident prevention „Reacting to incidents and accidents once they‟ve happened is no 
longer enough‟ (Rosenberg, 2004). It is possible through leadership for safety 
prevention to work pro-actively. Through collective learning a focus on continuous 
improvement is possible (Kolb, 1984). Rosenberg has used Kolbs continuous 
improvement model in research on the Swedish Fire and Rescue Service in transition. 
There has been a change in attitudes when working pro-actively. Through dialogue 
with inhabitants in the municipality the rescue workers have gained a wider 
understanding of hazards, which can be in fire prevention. There is a shift from a 
supreme expert role to including laypersons knowledge. 
 
2.4 Critics 
There are critical remarks to the normative empowerment literature. Argyris discusses 
that empowerment may be full of inner contradictions. „Managers love empowerment 
in theory, but the command-and control model is what they trust and know best‟ 
(Argyris, 1998). Empowerment is often used rhetorically, like the „emperor‟s new 
clothes‟, but little is seen in practice. To be empowered, the subordinate has to be 
internally committed in the process, but as Agyris states he does not think that top-
level executives will permit total self-organisation in big organisations. It may be an 
illusion to believe that an entire organisation is able to reach empowerment, but parts 
of the organisations may be able to reach it. Empowerment can be seen as a leading 
star. 
The debate about the concept of empowerment reveals a great variety of explanations. 
„Despite this increased attention to empowerment, there is unfortunately great 
disparity in the prevailing definitions, and an equal lack of clarity on how to measure 
its impact on a population‟s health‟ (Wallerstein, 1993:218). „The lack of a clear 
theoretical underpinning, distortion of the concept by different users, measurement 
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ambiguities, and structural barriers make „empowerment‟ difficult to attain‟ (Rissel, 
1994:39). „Rappaport (1987) argued that empowerment could not be measured, but 
could only be considered case by case in its own unique context‟ (Rissel, 1994:40). 
Lee and Koh also underline that empowerment is not a dichotomous construct, 
„subordinates will be considered more or less empowered, rather than empowered or 
not empowered‟ (Lee and Koh, 2001:687). Rissel sees a need to distinguish 
psychological empowerment and community empowerment because they have 
different implications, „with regard to community empowerment, it seems possible 
that a group may be empowered on one issue, but not another. Therefore, the degree 
of empowerment may vary depending on the issue being considered‟ (Rissel, 
1994:44) 
I have presented a range of different perspectives. Some of these organisational 
perspectives are appropriate to highlight how empowerment can be achieved by using 
the risk tool MRA.  
An infrastructure for collective mindfulness strengthens the capability to discover and 
manage unexpected events (Weick et al., 1999:89). This cognitive infrastructure 
makes it possible to reach high levels of reliability. „It [mindfulness] is as much about 
what people do with what they notice as it is about the activity of noticing itself‟ 
(Weick et al., 1999:90). There are elements in collective mindfulness where 
empowerment seems to be prevalent. The superiors facilitate a climate of openness 
for failures. Weak signals about deviances have to be handled carefully and efficiently 
in order to not escalate into a catastrophe. Subordinates competence (Lee and Koh, 
2001) and ability to handle failures at a local level is highly valued. Self-organisation 
around deviances is possible. There is a built in flexibility in HROs where the 
ordinary hierarchical organisation is loosened up when deviances are noticed (LaPorte 
and Consolini, 1991). The most capable person, despite their place in the hierarchy, 
handles the deviance. 
There is a need for managers to know how to facilitate subordinates in empowerment 
processes. According to Lee and Hoh‟s definition of empowerment, four dimensions 
need to be present: Meaningfulness, competence, self-determination and impact (Lee 
and Koh, 2001). This means that superiors have to delegate some power over 
decisions. Flexibility in organising becomes possible. Agyris says it is easy to talk 
about empowerment, but more difficult to let it flourish in practice (Argyris, 1998). I 
will present some experiences and analyse MRA, to see how MRA can be an 
empowerment tool in practice. 
 
3. Context and method  
Klepp, the subject of this study, is a municipality in Norway with 14 000 inhabitants 
and became a SC member in 2002. As a part of the work with SC, Klepp developed a 
mini risk analysis (MRA) whose aim is to both prevent accidents and be prepared if 
they nevertheless occur (Nilsen and Olsen, 2004, Nilsen and Olsen, 2005). 
Participants from different departments developed the tool together and use it in their 
respective departments. Leisure organisations also use the tool. When using MRA 
people have to collaborate, to think through every possible risk and take decisions 
about what which ones they need to handle.  
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This paper is part of an explorative study and is based on interviews, observations, 
document studies and presentations. Core interviews were conducted in Klepp 
municipality in 2003
4
. Ten representatives from different political and administrative 
positions, ranging from the top-level to street level workers in the departments of 
health, education and engineering/planning. The interview guide was semi-structured, 
with fixed thematically issues. The flexibility was necessary to fit the context of the 
different positions in the municipality. Usually the top and partly the middle level 
managers were familiar with safety concepts used in the guide, but some of the street 
level bureaucrats needed to relate safety to own experiences. This weakened to some 
extent the reliability of the findings. Although the concept MRA was not used, 
familiar experiences were found (Nilsen and Olsen, 2005). The aim of these 
interviews was to map the people‟s work (or not) with MRA and how they managed 
to handle other safety issues in their daily work. Interviews were also carried out with 
all ten fulltime kindergartens in Klepp and the eight primary schools to map use of 
MRA. Additional telephone calls to the departments for health and 
engineering/planning were made about the widespread use of MRA. To strengthen 
reliability an interview with both the municipality‟s chief physician and the project 
manager working with Safe Community was conducted in 2005 to get an update 
status and to present findings and test out interpretations. To improve construct 
validity, which is a process for developing sounder interpretations of observations, 
other information sources and other activities took place in the period 2001-2005. 
General information was gathered through participation at a Public Health Conference 
held by Klepp when they were designated a SC in 2002. Observation was carried out 
at an inspection meeting held by Supervisory Authorities (SA) in 2003. Two 
representatives from the SA were interviewed in 2004. 
Documents concerning Safe Communities work, like the application for SC, the 
municipal plan, experiences concerning MRA as part of SC work, evaluation of MRA 
(Aanestad, 2001), statistical data concerning accidents, case documents about safety 
and prevention were also studied to strengthen the construct validity. The external 
validity has been tested towards theory and findings in other studies. 
 
4. Results  
The preparation work for SC in Klepp started in 1998 (unpublished work papers, 
Klepp municipality). There was a need to organise the SC work in the municipality to 
be able to fulfil the obligations to become a SC. In 1999 the local council decided that 
the chief administrative officer‟s management should be the steering committee for 
preventive work in the municipality. This was to secure a foundation at the top level 
and to take care of a multi administrative perspective where all the departments were 
included. The work with Safe Community was organised both as a retrospective way 
with the registration of accidents and a pro-active way of working through the 
                                                 
4
 The core interviews were done in 2003 and are ten interviews in each of the 
municipalities, Klepp and Time (Nilsen and Olsen 2004 and 2005, see in references). 
This was done as part of a comparative study. This article focuses on Klepp 
municipality only. 
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development of Mini Risk Analysis (MRA). The MRA is a locally developed tool for 
accident prevention and handling (Nilsen and Olsen, 2004). It is a simple tool for use 
in daily work operations and in leisure activities. The project group developing this 
tool had members from a wide range of departments. In addition, collaboration with 
external institutions like the emergency staff at the County Governor, the chief county 
medical officer and University of Stavanger was included.  The Health and Social 
ministry, the County municipality and the Directorate for Civil Protection and 
Emergency Planning has funded the SC work.  
The MRA was also made as a reaction against the traditional risk and vulnerability 
analysis (RAV) recommended by the Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency 
Planning, which was considered remote from daily work at the operational level 
(Nilsen and Olsen, 2004). „I found it so distant it was far away from my daily work. 
…RAV was of a catastrophic distinctive character. If we are used to thinking safety 
through MRA in daily life, we are better prepared to handle crises too‟ (Manager in 
kindergarten). The RAV concentrated more on catastrophes and long term planning 
with use of experts and a top-down strategy. A similar thought came from the middle 
level in engineering; „We don‟t want to have shelves filled with directives gathering 
dust‟ (Chief executive in planning and engineering department). MRA is a way of 
being concerned about preparedness in daily life.  
MRA is a proactive way of working. The participants use MRA to consider risks. On 
the basis of a common analysis they decide what needs to be done.  
The MRA method (Klepp-Municipality, 2002) 
1. Which activity/situation are we going to take into consideration? 
2. This is what we fear might happen. 
3. What must and should we do something about? 
4. What can we do to reduce the chances of these incidents occurring? 
5. What can we do to reduce the consequences if these incidents do occur? 
6. Evaluation. 
This method is a simple tool for mapping everyday risks, to prevent incidents or to 
handle incidents if they should occur. The thought behind the tool is that participants 
in the task/activity shall be enabled to take care of risks themselves. It is a decision 
about what is acceptable or not and a way to sort out what has to be handled. It is 
perceived as „common sense put in system‟ (Chief administrative officer).  
The steps in the method include both risk awareness and ways of handling them. The 
principles behind the MRA have similarities with the theory of collective 
mindfulness. The MRA method is supposed to be a common analysis developed and 
discussed by all participants. Step number two is brainstorming. Every risk that seems 
to be prevalent in the activity for the participants should be written down. In this step 
no criticism of the different suggestions is allowed, everybody should participate on 
an equal basis and there is room for creativity.  In step 3 there is a need for 
prioritising. Through discussion, the most dangerous and obvious risks are chosen. 
Since this discussion is contextual, the tasks participants may have considerations that 
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are not so prominent for external people. This process has some hallmarks with the 
thoughts about dialogue and ideal speech situation. The discussion is supposed to 
conclude with a common prioritising. Step number four is about proactivity and 
taking measures to prevent or reduce incidents. The people‟s skills and experiences 
are valuable factors in the problem-solution process. In step four the ability to handle 
consequences is enforced. People‟s self-determination concerns the ability to try one‟s 
own solutions and having the authority to do this. The final step is evaluation. 
Reflection on experiences can better safety considerations in forthcoming activities.  
 
4.1 Challenges  
It is the professionals that have been a driving force in SC, not the top level. The first 
phase in this work was that the middle management introduced MRA, later it was 
supposed that this should be an activity mostly done at the grassroots level like a 
bottom- up strategy. 
Educating the public was a challenge when introducing the SC work. European 
playground regulations were introduced at the same time and the public was sceptical 
about having an overprotective attitude to children‟s safety. According to the project 
leader they focussed more on activities and showed that MRA could be a way of 
making activities safer, not banning them. Klepp is against an overprotective attitude 
and believes that participants have the ability to assess risks themselves and the 
responsibility to handle them. 
MRA training has been delivered in different sectors according to interest although 
some sectors have not asked for it (Nilsen and Olsen, 2005). New personnel need to 
learn the tool, which can be seen as a safety challenge due to time constraints. 
 
4.2 Extensiveness of MRA 
The extensiveness of MRA has been examined mainly in the school department, 
health department and planning/engineering department in Klepp municipality. 
Representatives from each of the departments participated in the project group 
developing MRA. Results show that people joining the MRA project use the tool 
regularly in their work afterwards. The main findings in 2003 are that 7 of the 10-
fulltime kindergartens use MRA on a regular basis. The kindergarten manager from 
the MRA group has educated colleagues in the process. MRA use in the schools is 
sparser despite the headmasters having been educated in MRA. The one exception is 
the teacher from the MRA group, who later became a headmaster and has trained all 
of his teachers in MRA. This school uses it on a regular basis. In the health 
department some groups use MRA and others do not. At the middle level they have 
used it as a tool for handling violent patients and in other preventive activities. The 
community-nursing group that I interviewed did not know about MRA. It is the 
departments that prioritize how and who gets training in MRA and in the health 
department this was not done thoroughly. In the planning/engineering department 
they use MRA when they find it necessary, for instance when doing planning 
including safety considerations. The representative in the planning/engineering 
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department from the MRA group says that they sometimes use MRA without writing 
it down, because those involved know the tool well. 
„Joining the SC has lead to more multi disciplinary work. Before, the responsibility in 
each department was more separate and cases were more separate‟ (Chief executive in 
planning and engineering department). MRA is used when considering safety in 
municipal plans and other planning activities. Here different departments participate 
in making a common MRA with contributions from different perspectives.  
MRA is also used, for instance, before the youth club goes on a weekend trip, to equip 
a minibus with safety tools to prevent falls of the elderly, to be able to conduct safe 
activities in schools and kindergartens and in land use-planning considering safety 
(Nilsen and Olsen, 2004, Nilsen and Olsen, 2005).  
The work with MRA is also a product in demand from other municipalities, both local 
and regional. The Directorate of Health and Social Affairs also operate it. The project 
manager is active in teaching external municipalities and has a wide range of 
experiences to draw from Klepp and other municipalities.  
 
5. Discussion 
Weick et al suggest that organisations other than HROs can learn from the capacity to 
be resilient (Weick et al., 1999). When increasing the ability for awareness through 
collective mindfulness, the ability for both noticing and coping failures also arises. 
Through work with MRA, there is a process of thinking through activities in advance 
to see if there are safety challenges. They also think through the consequences of 
unwanted incidents happening and assign responsibility for different tasks if this 
should occur. There seem to be a link between collective mindfulness and processes 
in MRA work, which may contribute to mitigation and resilience.  These are factors 
that can lead to both risk and injury reduction that are central in SC work.  
How can a risk tool contribute to strengthen an empowerment strategy in local risk 
management? MRA is interlinked with empowerment. It is a simple, practical and 
non-bureaucratic tool. Participants become confident to take care of risks themselves. 
MRA is not time-consuming, and after experience people may use it by heart. It is 
useful in practice because it enforces systematic thinking through daily activities. 
MRA is considered useful and meaningful by the users (Nilsen and Olsen, 2004, 
Aanestad, 2001). The focus in MRA is on proactivity. Thinking through risks 
enhances the possibility to prevent unwanted incidents. When using MRA decisions 
are made by the street level workers, and not by risk analysis experts. In most cases 
there is no need for bureaucratic decisions. MRA is seen as a part of a bottom-up 
strategy (Nilsen and Olsen, 2005). MRA enforces the use of common sense by 
laymen. In the Ottawa Charter there is a link between empowerment and a positive 
effect on one‟s own health. Empowerment is the ability to have control over one‟s 
own life and to master situations.  The thought behind MRA is to give people the 
confidence to solve problems locally and not to come with finished solutions. 
Although MRA covers risk management, the working process is similar to 
empowerment work in the public health tradition. MRA may be seen as a practical 
tool to meet the need for making „community empowerment operational‟ (Laverack 
and Wallerstein, 2001). MRA can also be seen as a tool suitable for SC because of 
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enabling street-level workers in injury prevention. The criticism from Argyris 
underlines that empowerment is often talked about, but not done in practice. MRA 
may be seen as a practical empowerment tool. 
Resistance against RAV and the development of MRA was done to have a more 
meaningful way of working with contextual risks. This was a reaction against 
prescribed solutions made by experts. The general guideline of RAV was not 
considered as useful for the bottom-level in the organisation. Here we see a 
dichotomy between the experts contra the laymen (Forsberg and Starrin, 1997). 
Another contradiction is about reactivity and proactivity. The reactive tradition 
focuses on statistics of accidents and injuries that have already happened; the 
proactive way of working has more focus on prevention (Rosenberg, 2004). 
What is lacking in MRA is the macro perspective. Factors leading to risks in the 
surroundings may be overlooked because of a narrow focus (Nilsen and Olsen, 2004). 
Both SC and MRA seem to be interlinked with a harmony model (Boyesen, 2000, 
Nilsen and Olsen, 2004). If street level workers using MRA identify risks that cannot 
be solved at the local level, it is necessary to engage top-level management to acquire 
authority and resources to solve the problems. In times of lack of resources, time 
pressure and demands on efficiency it can be difficult. Thus the MRA is only an 
efficient empowerment tool as long as all stakeholders accept it, as a tool for 
mitigating and handling of risks and hazards. Another consideration is that MRA is 
not a unique tool as shown in the health department who already use similar tools and 
therefore have not adopted MRA (Nilsen and Olsen, 2005). The findings in this article 
shows that despite use of different risk tools, practice showed many similarities. This 
was found due to professional norms and institutional norms.  
 
6. Conclusion 
MRA can be connected to hallmarks in empowerment theory. The bottom-up strategy, 
the confidence of people finding their own solutions, the responsibility at the street-
level to identify and handle risks can be seen as practical empowerment. Not offering 
fixed solutions or instructing people to follow readymade directions is a way of 
enabling people to solve their own challenges. MRA is a reaction against RAV and 
prescribed solutions made by experts. It is self-efficacy to believe in one‟s own skills 
and solutions. Taking all these hallmarks into consideration, MRA can be seen as a 
practical tool to enable empowerment in SC and in local risk management.  
The question asked in this article is: How can MRA strengthen an empowerment 
strategy in local health promotion and risk management? The findings from Klepp 
municipality show that using MRA adds empowerment to the working process. This 
is through increased risk awareness, increased knowledge and action capabilities. 
Empowerment is often talked about; MRA is a practical tool used in activities. MRA 
seems to be especially suitable for street level workers. It is a combination of risk 
awareness and prevention where empowerment is a central way of working. The 
experience with MRA, empirical examples from SC and the presentation of a variety 
of empowerment theories may contribute to a better foundation of empowerment 
processes in local risk management.  
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Appendix  
This paper is based on a keynote speech about „Empowerment and Safe 
Communities‟ made by the author at the 6th Nordic Safe Community Conference, 
Karlstad Sweden, 9-11 November 2005.  
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Appendix I - The question guide 
 
The questions shall be formulated according to three different levels; top-level, 
middle-level and street-level bureaucrats in the municipalities Time and Klepp.  
 
1. Top-level. 
 
Questions to the chief administrative officer and the politician are to uncover 
why they choose to work with RAV/MRA or not. What is prioritised in the 
RAV/MRA work? Who has the ultimate responsibility and who has the 
administrative responsibility? At this top-level the intention is to get the 
main picture of the organisation, because I do not assume that this level is 
directly involved in daily work with RAV/MRA. 
2. Middle-level 
 
The emergency leader and the department leaders represent the middle level 
in the municipality. The focus will be on how learning and integration of the 
tools is arranged in the municipality. What are their interpretations of this 
work? What happens in the process from overall aims to interpretation in 
practice? 
3. Street-level 
 
Here a community nurse, a kindergarten manager, a headmaster and a 
worker in engineering/planning department are informants. The street-level 
bureaucrats need adjusted questions which relate the work with risk tools to 
their own experience. The reason for this adjustment is that I presume that 
knowledge of the different risk tools may be sparse. I want to know if RAV 
and MRA are used and implemented at the street-level. But rather than just 
stating whether they know the concepts of RAV/MRA, I want to ask if they 
have experienced similarities with the procedures. To uncover this I use 
examples to illustrate the concepts and to ask them if they use risk 
assessments in their work and if so, in what way.  
 
In the following questions, RAV was mainly used when interviewing in Time. Asking 
about MRA is to map why they did not choose to use it.  
 
When interviewing in Klepp, MRA was mainly used, but RAV was also included 
since they have previous experience with it. 
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Appendix II - Questions to the top-level in the 
municipality 
 
Begin with an introduction about my background (education and working practice) 
and a short description about the research project. Thereafter give an explanation of 
how the interview will be conducted (timeframe, tape recorder, confidentiality - use 
titles instead of names), ask for permission to use quotations. Give the mail address if 
they want to give extra information afterwards. 
 
1. Background  
Name: 
Education: 
Position: 
How long have you been employed in the municipality? 
General comments about earlier experience before you got his position: 
 
 2. Introductory questions 
1) I am interested to learn how the municipality works with safety
1
 and emergency 
matters, both accidents that occur rarely and daily risks which can happen in the 
departments. Can you give me a short description of how the municipality works 
with safety? 
A. At a general level? 
B. Specifically in the different departments 
2)  What would you say are the 3-4 most important general areas where the 
municipality works with safety? 
3)  In connection with the year 2000 problem, the municipality was instructed to 
elucidate unwanted incidents. What did the municipality do? Have you used these 
experiences in further work with safety?  
4)  How did the municipality solve problems during the power cut on 7
th
 June 2002?  
5)  Has the municipality been exposed to large scale accidents in the last 5 years? 
(for human beings, the environment or material values?) 
 
                                                 
1
 In Norwegian, the term „safety‟ includes both safety and security. 
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3. Planning tools for safety in municipalities.  
1)  When did you first hear about RAV?  
2)  RAV is not a statutory provision. In spite of this, have you chosen to use the tool?  
 If so, where? 
3)  Who has chosen to implement RAV/MRA? (Political or administrative 
resolution?) 
 Has RAV/MRA lead to changed safety practices after the tool was taken in 
use?  
 Is RAV/MRA suitable in your municipality? In what way?  
4)  If RAV/MRA is not used, is there any related activity? What is it?  
5)  Is there any other planning tool in use in safety work? (for instance: crises plans, 
emergency groups, HSE and internal control, BiS (safety incorporated in 
planning) quality management, consequence assessments or others? 
6)  How do you understand the concept BiS?  
7)  Has the municipality drawn up aims for its safety work? 
8) Who has made these?  
9) Has the political leadership (city manager, chief administrative officer, city 
council) been involved in work with safety? 
 If so, in what way?  
10)  Is safety work found in planning documents such as the economy plan or others?  
11)  How is safety and emergency work organised?  
 Are emergency groups established? 
 Are there other groups involved in this work?  
 Is there one employee with responsibility for emergency and safety work?  
12) Why did you choose to join Safe Community? 
 
4. The relationship to the Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency 
Planning (DCPEP), supervisory authorities and others   
1)  Has the municipality been in contact with DCPEP in the course of its safety 
work? 
 If so in what way? By mail, phone, participation on courses others?  
2)  Has DCPEP been of help in the municipality‟s safety work? 
 If yes, in what way? 
 If no, why not? 
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Have you been in contact with the Safe Community administration? 
 
The supervisory authority’s emergency2 exercises 
3)  Has the municipality joined the exercises in the following years?  
 1997  
 1999   
 2001  
4)  In what way were these exercises of benefit?  
5)  Has learning been achieved in the wake of the exercises? 
6)  How are the exercises evaluated afterwards?  
 
The supervisory authority’s inspections 
7)  What experiences has the municipality with inspections from the supervisory 
authority (SA)? 
 8)  Has the municipality received feedback that certain changes must be made?  
 How do you consider SA‟s role? 
9)  How have you responded to the SA‟s remarks?  
 
5. Political milieu and safety work   
1)  If we consider the political leadership, including city manager and town council, 
would you say that: 
 Safety is prioritized? How? 
 Safety work is more important now than before? 
2) Are there any parties which have a greater focus on safety work than others? In 
what way? 
3) Do some of the main committees focus on safety? Which ones? 
4) Has there been a need for extra financing for safety work? 
5) Have the politicians given extra grants for safety measures?  
6) Are there other relevant factors concerning political involvement/lack of 
involvement in safety work?  
7) How much understanding do the politicians have of RAV/MRA or other safety 
challenges in the municipality?  
                                                 
2
 The supervisory authority is the county governor‟s emergency staff in Rogaland 
County. 
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6.  Learning  
1)  How has the municipality gained knowledge of safety work? 
2)  Have courses been held? 
 For the political leadership?   
 For administrative management? 
 In the different departments  
 In the different units?  
3)  Did the courses have different content?  
 Was the information adjusted for the different levels?  
 Did the participants take part in group work?  
 Did they work with tasks themselves?  
4)  Can you see some challenges regarding involving all employees learning and 
conducting safety work? Which ones? 
5)  Has there been cooperation between departments concerning RAV/MRA or 
safety work generally?  
 Are there any other instances where safety problems are discussed? Which 
ones? 
 Do you know of any conflicts that have arisen in safety work?   
o Between departments? 
o Between other non-governmental organisations and the 
municipality?  
6)  Is safety an integrated part of the municipality‟s work? 
 In the municipal plan?  
o The text part? 
o The area part?    
o Exemplars? 
 In the economic plan?  
o How?  
o Exemplars? 
 In departmental plans? 
 In more detailed area plans? 
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7)  Do you know whether some departments work more with preparedness in safety 
work than others? Why? 
8)  Do more departments work with safety since the introduction of RAV/MRA?  
9)  Has the municipality experience with crises which have affected more than one 
department and where the emergency group has been included?  
 If you have experienced a crisis, is there something you can develop further 
in crisis handling? 
10)  Do you think that other municipalities‟ experiences (with RAV/safety work) have 
been relevant to your own municipality? Why? Which municipalities?  
11)  What safety challenges do you see ahead in safety work in your municipality?  
 
Specific questions about RAV: 
 
7. Risk and Vulnerability analysis 
1. When did the municipality start to use RAV? From where did you get 
information about RAV? Do you know the content in the RAV guideline and the 
guideline about Systematic societal safety and emergency in municipalities? Do 
you think these guidelines are adjusted to a municipal context? Is the RAV guide 
systematic? Is there room for local adjustments of RAV? Is RAV ambiguous? 
How have you ensured that RAV is used in a continuous (yearly) process, what 
system do you have? Has there been interdisciplinary collaboration when 
conducting RAV? Has RAV been a tool to prevent risks? Has other 
municipalities‟ work with RAV been useful for your own municipality? As 
experience has been gained with the use of RAV, do you have positive 
experiences with the tool? Which ones? Have you any reservations about the 
tool? Which ones?  
2. If the municipality has chosen not to work with RAV, how will you describe the 
safety work in the municipality? What is done to prevent accidents?  
 
We have now discussed safety work and use of risk tools in the municipality. Is there 
anything else that you think is relevant?  
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Appendix III - Questions to the middle-level in the 
municipality 
 
Begin with an introduction about my background (education and working practice) 
and a short description about the research project. Thereafter give an explanation of 
how the interview will be conducted (timeframe, tape recorder, confidentiality - use 
titles instead of names), ask for permission to use quotations. Give the mail address if 
they want to give extra information afterwards. 
 
1. Background  
Name: 
Education: 
Position: 
How long have you been employed in the municipality? 
General comments about earlier experience before you got his position: 
 
2. Introductory questions 
1) I am interested to learn how the municipality works with safety
1
 and emergency 
matters, both accidents that occur rarely and daily risks which can happen in the 
departments. Can you give me a short description of how the municipality works 
with safety? 
A. At a general level? 
B. Specifically in the different departments 
2)  What would you say are the 3-4 most important general areas where your 
department works with safety? 
3)  In connection with the year 2000 problem, the municipality was instructed to 
elucidate unwanted incidents. What did the municipality do? Have you used these 
experiences in further work with safety?  
4)  How did the municipality solve problems during the power cut on 7
th
 June 2002?  
5)  Has the municipality been exposed to large scale accidents in the last 5 years? 
(for human beings, the environment or material values?) 
6) Which concepts are most used in the safety work in your department? (For 
instance: crises plans, emergency groups, HSE and internal control, BiS (safety 
incorporated in planning) quality management, consequence assessments, safety 
deputy or others? 
                                                 
1
 In Norwegian, the term „safety‟ includes both safety and security. 
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3. The municipality’s general work with safety and emergency work.  
1)  What would you say are the 3-4 most important general fields in the 
municipality‟s work with safety?   
2)  Has the municipality drawn up aims for its safety work?  
 If yes, who participated in this work?  
3) Are there any written plans for safety work in the municipality?  
4)  In which way is HSE work a part of the overall safety work in the municipality?  
5)  Have you made an overview of accidents or crises that can occur in the 
municipality?  
 What does it look like? 
 Who participated in making it?  
6)  In your opinion what‟s the most important focus in safety work? 
 The rare accidents? 
 The daily accidents?  
 How are these balanced? 
Why did the municipality choose/not choose to work as a Safe Community?  
 
4. The relationship to the Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency 
Planning (DCPEP), supervisory authorities and others   
1)  Has the municipality been in contact with DCPEP in the course of its safety 
work? 
 If so in what way? By mail, phone, participation on courses others?  
2)  Has DCPEP been of help in the municipality‟s safety work? 
 If yes, in what way? 
 If no, why not? 
Have you been in contact with the Safe Community administration? 
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The supervisory authority’s emergency2 exercises 
3)  Has the municipality joined the exercises in the following years?  
 1997  
 1999   
 2001  
4)  In what way were these exercises of benefit?  
5)  Has learning been achieved in the wake of the exercises? 
6)  How are the exercises evaluated afterwards?  
 
The supervisory authority’s inspections 
7)  What experiences has the municipality with inspections from the supervisory 
authority (SA)? 
 8)  Has the municipality received feedback that certain changes must be made?  
 How do you consider SA‟s role? 
9)  How have you responded to the SA‟s remarks?  
 
5. Political leadership and prioritising  
1) Is the political leadership involved in the municipality‟s safety work?  
 City manager 
 Town council  
 Local council  
 Different parties?  Are some of them instigators in this work?  
2)  Have you, as a department leader, participated in emergency exercises together 
with the city manager?  
3)  To what extent do you think the city manager is informed about the safety work 
in the municipality?  
 Well informed - partly informed - slightly informed - not informed at all?  
4)  How do you perceive the political leadership‟s prioritisation of safety work in 
relation to other tasks?  
                                                 
2
 The supervisory authority is the county governor‟s emergency staff in Rogaland 
County. 
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5)  Have any resources been allocated in the economic or other plans for safety 
fields?  
 The municipal plan? 
 Area plans? 
 Crisis plans? 
6) Have you noticed a movement towards greater focus on safety work and 
emergencies in the different departments?  
 If so, do you know why?  
 
6. Employees in own department and own prioritising  
1)  Can you tell me about specific incidents concerning safety work in the 
department?  
2)  Has the introduction of RAV/MRA lead to new tasks in the department?  
 Which ones?  
 Who does these tasks?  
3)  Do you consider safety work highly prioritised in your department?  
 In relation to other tasks?  
 Statutory provision?  
4)  In which way is this reflected in the working tasks?  
 Is there sufficient time for the tasks?  
 Is there sufficient knowledge?  
 Are there opportunities for collaboration?  
 Is the work done systematically?  
 Is the work continuously updated?  
 How often is it updated?  
5)  Is safety work person dependent?  
 What system exists to take care of continuity if there is a change of 
personnel?  
6)  What future challenges do you see for safety work in your department?  
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In each of the departments, specific examples are used to discuss safety.  
 
7. Engineering/planning department.  
Can you tell me how the department works when using RAV/MRA or consequence 
assessments in work with traffic safety?  
 
8. School department.  
How do you use RAV/MRA when school classes are on trips? 
 
9. Health department.  
How has RAV/MRA been used to prevent falls amongst the elderly?  
 
10.  Learning  
1)  Can you describe how the municipality has laid the foundation for safety 
education? 
2)  Have courses been held? 
 For the political leadership?   
 For administrative management? 
 In the different departments? 
 In the different units?  
3)  Do you know if the courses have been adjusted for the different levels/instances 
in the municipality?  
 
Own department 
1)  Have the department‟s leaders received training?  
 Was group work a part of the training?  
2)  What have you, as department leader, done to train/exercise your employees in 
safety work?  
 At the division manager level?  
 In the street-level bureaucracy? 
3)  Have the employees had the opportunity to test the RAV/MRA method in order 
to gain familiarity with it? 
4)  Has there been cross-departmental work with RAV/safety work?  
 At what level where those meetings held? 
 What experiences are gained in such groups?  
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5)  Do you know whether conflicts have arisen concerning safety work?  
 Between the departments?  
 Other non-governmental organisations? 
6)  Are people other than the municipal employees included in work with safety? 
 For instance inhabitants affected by traffic?  
 Non-government organisations?  
7)  Have there been crises in the municipality where different departments had to 
collaborate to solve the problem?  
 Was the crisis/emergency group included in this work?  
 Have you gained useful experience in the aftermath?  
8)  Do you think other municipalities‟ experiences with RAV/MRA/safety work are 
useful in your own municipality? Why and how? 
 
Specific questions about RAV: 
 
7. Risk and Vulnerability analysis 
1. When did the municipality start to use RAV? From where did you get 
information about RAV? Do you know the content in the RAV guideline and the 
guideline about Systematic societal safety and emergency in municipalities? Do 
you think these guidelines are adjusted to a municipal context? Is the RAV guide 
systematic? Is there room for local adjustments of RAV? Is RAV ambiguous? 
How have you ensured that RAV is used in a continuous (yearly) process, what 
system do you have? Has there been interdisciplinary collaboration when 
conducting RAV? Has RAV been a tool to prevent risks? Has other 
municipalities‟ work with RAV been useful for your own municipality? As 
experience has been gained with the use of RAV, do you have positive 
experiences with the tool? Which ones? Have you any reservations about the 
tool? Which ones?  
2. If the municipality has chosen not to work with RAV, how will you describe the 
safety work in the municipality? What is done to prevent accidents?  
 
We have now discussed safety work and use of risk tools in the municipality. Is there 
anything else that you think is relevant?  
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Appendix IV - Questions to the street-level in the 
municipality 
 
Interviews were carried out with street-level bureaucrats in the school, 
kindergarten, community nursing and engineering/planning 
departments. 
 
Begin with an introduction about my background (education and working practice) 
and a short description about the research project. Thereafter give an explanation of 
how the interview will be conducted (timeframe, tape recorder, confidentiality - use 
titles instead of names), ask for permission to use quotations. Give the mail address if 
they want to give extra information afterwards. 
 
1. Background  
Name: 
Education: 
Position: 
How long have you been employed in the municipality? 
General comments about earlier experience before you got his position: 
 
Concepts used in safety work 
1) What concepts do you relate to safety work? Are these known concepts to you? 
RAV/MRA, crises plans, emergency groups, HSE and internal control, BiS 
(safety incorporated in planning) quality management, consequence assessments, 
safety deputy or others?  
Your opinion can learn me to understanding of the practical realities in work with 
RAV/MRA or safety work in general.  
2) Can you mention 4-5 safety challenges in your own work? 
3) I am interested in how you work with RAV/MRA or safety in general. Can you 
tell me how you take care of safety in your work? (This question is the most 
comprehensive and is filled with detailed information about the specific work the 
street-level bureaucrats are conducting). 
 
4)  Mapping of use of RAV/MRA 
 When did you first hear about RAV/MRA? Do you use it in your work? 
 Do you understand the way of thinking in RAV/MRA?   
 In what way did the municipality lay the foundation for education in 
RAV/MRA?  
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 Was this information easily understood?  
 Have you experimented or tried out different forms of RAV?  
 What are you satisfied with? 
 To implement RAV/MRA is an aim, what happens in practice?  
 Do you have any reservations about RAV? What are they?  
 Do you have evaluations of RAV use? 
 How many times a year do you use RAV/MRA?  
 
If RAV/MRA is an unknown concept, questions about familiar methods, other ways 
of working are asked. 
 
Learning  
1) Has there been sufficient time for education in how to conduct safety work?  
 Is the administration responsive to challenges in the implementation of 
RAV/MRA?  
 Is there a need for further education, exercises?  
 Has the administration asked you what you think is most important with 
RAV/MRA or safety work in general? 
 Do you join working groups conducting RAV/MRA? 
2) As experience with RAV/MRA has increased, have you gained some positive 
experience with the method? Which ones? 
3) Has the implementation of RAV/MRA lead to new working tasks? If so, which 
ones? 
4) Have RAV/MRA lead to new ways of conducting/assessing safety? Have they 
lead to changes at all?  
5) Could you consult someone about safety work? Who? 
 If not, who would you have preferred to ask?  
6) If there were problems with the implementation of RAV/MRA, what where these 
problems?  
7) Is there something you do now that you did not do earlier?  
 
The supervisory authorities (SA) and DCPEP  
1) Do you know about the exercises which the SA has every second year? 
2) Have you, in your work, received feedback from the SA‟s inspections? If so, 
which ones? 
3) Do you know about DCPEP‟s work with safety? If so, what? 
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Specific examples concerning safety work in each department.  
 
School / Kindergarten 
1) Can you tell me about how you use RAV or other safety assessments in 
school/kindergarten? In what way do you proceed? Use an example of a school 
class/or kindergarten when they are going on a trip.  
2) Are there any instructions in school/kindergarten about safety for children? 
3) Have the school/kindergarten guidelines for swimming, trips or other activities 
that can involve risks?  
4) Is there time and resources to work with RAV/MRA other safety assessments?  
5) Do you think that RAV/MRA is a good way of being precarious, to think trough 
what can go wrong in advance? 
6) If you had responsibility for safety education in your work, would you do 
something that is not taken care of?  
Is there anything else you would like to mention in this interview?  
 
Engineering / Planning 
1) Have you used RAV/MRA or other safety assessments in traffic safety cases in 
the engineering/planning department?  
2) Can you tell me how you do it?  
3) Are other departments included? Which ones? 
4)  If RAV has been used, has it had any effect on political decisions?  
5) Have you an impression that others beside your department understand how you 
work with RAV? For instance when using a risk matrix. 
6) Is there time and resources for work with RAV? 
7) Has an adjusted version of RAV been made to suit your daily work?  
8) Do you think RAV is a good way to work as a preparedness measure? 
 
Is there anything else you would like to mention in this interview?  
 
Community nursing.  
1) A fall amongst elderly is chosen as an example. What is done to prevent falls 
amongst elderly living at home?  
2) Is there any registration of falls in the municipality?  
3) Have you had collaboration with other departments? 
4) Who supports you with resources for preventive measure? 
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5) Are there enough resources to execute measures? 
6) Has an adjusted version of RAV been made to suit your daily work? 
7) Do you think RAV/MRA is a good way to work as a preparedness measure? 
 
Is there anything else you would like to mention in this interview?  
 
 
